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In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2009, academics and policymakers have
worked to empirically quantify macro-financial linkages. This dissertation contributes
to this debate by covering two broad themes. First, substantial changes in bank
regulation and supervision typically follow financial crises. Quantifying the impact
of these new policies is of paramount importance to academics and policymakers. To
this end, my research in this area sheds light on the ways in which changes in financial
stability policy ultimately affect the economy. Bank stress testing has become a major
tool of supervisory policy in the past decade. The first chapter, The Real Effects
of Stress Testing, uses the introduction of annual stress testing of large U.S. banks
in 2009 as a quasi-experiment to examine whether bank supervisory policies affect
real economic activity. While stress-tested banks reduced their risk exposure to large
corporate loans, foreign banks mostly offset this shock and enabled firms to continue
borrowing after the test. However, speculative grade firms that were highly exposed to
stress-tested banks borrowed on worse terms after the test, and subsequently reduced
fixed investment and employment. In contrast, highly exposed investment grade firms
received new loans and expanded intangible investment. This paper provides insights
into the effects of stress testing on the reallocation of risks in the financial system
and the consequences for real economic activity.
The structure of the U.S. mortgage market has experienced dramatic changes
in recent years, as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the major government-sponsored
enterprises or GSEs) faced substantial reforms to their business practices. An impor-
tant feature of regulatory reform included changing the pricing of loan guarantees on
mortgage-backed securities insured by the GSEs, in particular removing the subsidy
paid by small lenders to large lenders in 2012. The second chapter of this disser-
tation, Lender Cross-Subsidization and Credit Supply in the Fannie Mae
MBS Market (co-authored with Igor Karagodsky), shows that the removal of this
subsidy resulted in a relative increase in mortgage lending by small lenders. However,
states with relatively higher concentrations of large lenders experienced relative re-
ductions in credit following the removal of these subsidies. This research underscores
an important link between lender market power and credit supply.
Understanding the drivers of the fluctuations in bond returns is a central question
in finance. Theoretically, unexpected bond returns should reflect either changes in
expectations of future short-term rates or future compensation for risk. The third
chapter of this dissertation, Survey Forecasts and Bond Return Decomposi-
tions, revisits this question using survey forecasts of professional economists to
measure expectations of interest rates and returns, rather than with a statistical
model. Two main results emerged from this analysis: (1) News about future short-
term interest rates explains relatively more of the variation in unexpected excess
bond returns for short-maturity bonds relative to long-maturity bonds. (2) The share
of news explained by future short-term interest rates increases with horizon for all
maturities. This analysis contributes to the recent academic literature that highlights
the importance of subjective expectations in understanding asset-price movements.
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1 The Real Effects of Stress Testing
Abstract
I use the introduction of supervisory stress testing of large U.S. banks as a quasi-
experiment to examine the compositional effect of macroprudential policy on the
real economy. Following the 2009 round of U.S. bank stress tests (SCAP), tested
banks altered their lending behavior in the syndicated loan market at the extensive
margin. Firms that borrowed from tested banks in the syndicated loan market expe-
rienced larger reductions in tested bank shares in loan syndicates after the SCAP. On
the whole, non-tested financial institutions offset these reductions in risk, smoothing
shocks to firm borrowing and mitigating effects on firm real outcomes. Speculative
grade firms faced tighter credit conditions as a consequence of the SCAP. My results
imply that a 1 standard deviation increase in speculative grade firm exposure cor-
responded with an 8 pp lower probability of receiving a positive modification of an
existing loan, a 3 pp decrease in fixed investment, and a 7 pp decrease in employment
growth after the SCAP. In contrast, investment grade firms reliant on tested banks
fully substituted reductions in tested bank risk by borrowing from foreign banks and
subsequently expanded intangible investment. Firms accessing the syndicated loan
market for the first time and firms with short lending relationships faced steeper
reductions in borrowing and real outcomes.
I thank Fabio Schiantarelli for his advice and active support on this paper. I am also grateful
for advice and input from Pierluigi Balduzzi and Philip Strahan. This paper has benefftted tremen-
dously from formal discussions by Yuliya Demyanyk, Jose Fillat, Eric Fischer, Michal Kowalik, Robin
Lumsdaine, and Robert DeYoung. I also thank Susanto Basu, Allen Berger, Dominique Brabant,
Daniel Esposito, Igor Karagodsky, Dasol Kim, Sotirios Kokas, Jose Lopez, Dongho Song, Ethan
Struby, Francesca Toscano, Ayako Yasuda, and conference participants at the 2018 Office of Finan-
1
1.1 Introduction
Supervisory stress testing has emerged as the primary tool of macroprudential
policy in the United States tasked with preserving stability of the financial system.
While credited with restoring confidence in U.S. banks in the wake of the financial
crisis of 2007-2009 (Bernanke et al. (2013)), stress testing has come under criticism
from bankers for imposing additional capital requirements at the expense of credit
allocation.1 Recent studies have documented that banks reduced credit supply in
response to certain stress tests, particularly to risky borrowers. Thus, an impor-
tant question is whether firms are ultimately affected by their lenders being stress
tested. If firms reliant on borrowing from tested banks substituted this loss of credit
by obtaining funds from other lenders, then stress testing would not adversely firm
outcomes. In that case, risks would only be redistributed in the financial system.
Whether stress testing ultimately impacts firm borrowing and real economic activity
remains an unexplored question in the literature.
In this paper, I exploit the introduction of supervisory stress testing of large U.S.
banks as a quasi-experiment to identify the impact of macroprudential policy on the
economy. Importantly, I examine the role that bank- and firm-level frictions played
in the transmission of shocks from tested banks to firms. This paper first exam-
cial Research Ph.D. Symposium on Financial Stability, 2018 Northern Finance Association Ph.D.
Session (Charlevoix), the 2018 BC/BU Green Line Macro Meeting, the 2018 International Banking,
Economics and Finance Association Summer Meeting (Vancouver), the 2018 Canadian Economics
Association Annual Conference (Montre´al), the 2017 Southern Finance Association Annual Meetings
(Key West), the 2017 Financial Management Association Doctoral Student Consortium (Boston),
The Future of Bank Regulation: Bank Colloquium for Young Researchers at the Universite´ de Limo-
ges, and workshop participants at Boston College for helpful questions and comments. All errors
are my own.
1Regarding the annual supervisory stress test, Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan stated:
“It will make you very safe. The question is whether it restricts lending.” (Moynihan (n.d.))
2
ines whether there were changes in lending behavior in the syndicated loan market2
by stress tested U.S. banks following the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program
(SCAP), the first supervisory U.S. bank stress test. Relative to previous studies, I
utilize both non-tested U.S. banks and foreign banks that were active lenders in this
market in order to sharpen identification of the effect of stress testing on firms.
In the first part of this paper, I show that tested banks were significantly less
likely to exit existing loan syndicates than other banks after the SCAP. However,
tested banks were also significantly less likely to enter into new loan syndicates af-
ter the test. Given this contrasting lending behavior, I examine whether firm credit
outcomes and the structure of loan syndicates changed after the SCAP. Firms with
ex-ante greater reliance on tested banks experienced significant reductions in tested
bank syndicate shares, but no difference in the terms of credit after the test. Foreign
banks primarily offset these reductions in risk by entering into syndicates of highly
exposed firms. In the second part of this paper, I quantify the impact of these shocks
on firm-level outcomes. Utilizing a larger sample of firms that obtained syndicated
loans before the SCAP I find that firms highly exposed to tested banks fully substi-
tuted their borrowing from other lenders, smoothing shocks to real business activity.
However, changes in the composition of credit differentially affected firms as a func-
tion of their access to the bond market. Foreign banks fully substituted the reduction
of risks by tested banks in syndicates of investment grade firms. These firms were
2Syndicated loans are an important form of corporate financing that fall on the spectrum between
single-lender bank loans and debt. In a typical syndicated loan agreement, firms solicit funds from a
“lead arranger,” who handles the administrative duties, gathers “participant” lenders, and monitors
and services the loan in exchange for a fee. A typical syndicate (deal) contains multiple tranches,
consisting typically of revolving credit lines and term loans. Sufi (2007) provides a more detailed
discussion of the syndicated loan market.
3
significantly more likely to obtain new loans after the SCAP and to increase intan-
gible investment. In contrast, speculative grade firms were significantly less likely to
borrow on similar terms after the SCAP, leading to reductions in fixed investment
and employment growth.
Understanding how stress testing can afiect the real economy is an important
topic of interest to academics and policymakers alike. Theories of stress testing offer
ambiguous predictions of the impact on bank lending, as increases in capital and
disclosure could potentially affect both aggregate credit or the composition of lend-
ing to the real economy either positively or negatively.3 In fact, a growing empirical
literature has studied how banks adjust lending in response to supervisory stress
tests in the U.S.4 In the context of large corporate loans, tested banks reduced their
exposure to risks (Acharya, Berger, and Roman (2018), Lambertini and Mukherjee
(2016)), although this behavior was partially offset by higher capital required by the
tests (Pierret and Steri (2018)). Other papers have examined the impact of pruden-
tial policies on real outcomes in the context of European capital adequacy exercises:
dynamic provisioning in Spain (Jime´nez, Ongena, Peydro´, and Saurina (2017)) and
increases in capital ratios required by the European Banking Authority (Gropp, Mosk,
Ongena, and Wix (2018)). Whether stress tests themselves affect the economy re-
mains a largely unanswered empirical question. Furthermore, providing insights into
the relative importance of frictions at the bank and firm level can inform policymak-
3Theoretical papers that have modeled the relationship between stress testing and bank lending
decisions include Goldstein, Sapra, et al. (2014), citedogra2018, Shapiro and Zeng (2018).
4Recent papers have examined outcomes at the bank level (Shahhosseini (2014), Flannery, Hirtle,
and Kovner (2017), Bassett and Berrospide (2018)) and state level (P. S. Calem, Correa, and Lee
(2017), Corte´s, Demyanyk, Li, Loutskina, and Strahan (2018)).
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ers and guide theory.
A large theoretical and empirical literature has demonstrated that credit supply
shocks can affect real economic activity, depending crucially on bank health and firm
reliance on external financing. Thus, in order to discipline the analysis of the ultimate
effect of stress testing on firm outcomes, I survey contrasting theoretical implications
linking stress testing to bank lending decisions. The capital channel predicts that
the response of bank lending depends on changes in the quantity and quality of cap-
ital resulting from stress tests. Higher capital can reduce risk-shifting incentives and
strengthen market discipline, leading to increases in credit to safe borrowers. On
the other hand, higher capital can engender increased risk-taking incentives due to
strengthened monitoring, larger capital buffers, and increases in credit risk or reaching
for yield to offset reductions in leverage risk. Higher capital could also reduce lending,
especially to risky borrowers, due to reductions in uninsured creditors’ incentives to
monitor management or due to higher charter values. The disclosure channel also
offers contrasting predictions as to whether tested banks might change their lending
behavior due to the release of information about the methodology, inputs, and results
of stress tests. On the one hand, increased disclosure of bank fundamentals could
strengthen market discipline or result in banks allocating their lending towards assets
more likely to pass the test, resulting in increases in lending to safe borrowers. On
the other hand, lack of supervisory credibility, in combination with the identifica-
tion of the set of systemically important institutions likely to be bailed out in future
crises could encourage moral hazard lending. In addition, too much disclosure of
information about bank fundamentals can impose endogenous costs on tested banks
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and lead to reductions in lending, for example by impairing incentives for liquidity
creation or forcing banks to reduce lending in anticipation of higher future regulatory
costs. Given the contrasting theoretical predictions from the capital channel and the
disclosure channel, whether stress testing affects bank lending remains an empirical
question.
This paper is structured to trace the transmission of changes in tested bank lend-
ing behavior to firm outcomes. In the first part of this paper, I utilize a difference-
in-difference model to test whether the same firm experienced changes in lending
outcomes from tested banks relative to other banks after the SCAP.5 I document
that tested banks were 8 pp significantly less likely to exit from pre-test loan syndi-
cates relative to other banks after the SCAP, although the share of their exposure to
loan syndicates did not change. Much of this continuation of existing lending rela-
tionships occurred for firms with bond market access. On the other hand, I find that
tested banks were simultaneously 7 pp less likely to enter new loan syndicates than
other banks. In particular, tested banks were 21 pp significantly less likely to enter
into new lending relationships with speculative grade firms relative to other banks.
These observed changes in lending behavior by tested banks had important conse-
quences for firms. In order to study outcomes at the firm level, I construct a measure
of exposure to the stress test as a weighted average of tested bank shares in each firm’s
last pre-test syndicate. I first focus on the set of firms obtaining new loans in both
the pre- and post-test periods (approximately 300 firms) in order to study changes
5The pre-test period includes all syndicated loan originations extended between January 2007
and January 2009. The post-test period include all syndicated loan originations extended between
February 2009 and December 2010.
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in syndicate outcomes at the intensive margin. For these firms, the composition of
loan syndicates changed dramatically after the SCAP. Increasing test exposure for a
firm one standard deviation above the mean resulted in a 15 pp reduction in tested
bank shares in post-test syndicates, but did not lead in changes in credit outcomes
for these firms. Foreign banks offset much of this reduction in tested bank shares,
enabling firms with high exposure to tested banks to borrow on similar terms after
the test. While I do not find evidence of changes in the terms of credit on average,
there were important compositional effects across firms as a function of their access
to the bond market. The majority of the reduction in tested bank shares for highly
exposed investment grade firms was offset by foreign banks, leading to no changes in
credit outcomes. In contrast, foreign banks and other U.S. banks more evenly offset
the decline of tested banks in speculative grade firm syndicates, leading to decreases
in the growth of syndicate size and stricter covenants after the SCAP for these firms.
Thus, speculative grade firms faced relatively worse terms of credit in order to attract
new lenders into their syndicates after the SCAP.
In the second part of the paper, I examine changes in firm outcomes at the exten-
sive margin among the set of firms that borrowed in the syndicated loan market during
the pre-test period (approximately 800 firms). Firms with relatively higher exposure
to tested banks did not experience changes in borrowing after the SCAP, and thus did
not differentially adjust real outcomes. However, investment grade firms relatively
more exposed to tested banks experienced a 10 pp higher probability of borrowing
after the SCAP relative to less exposed firms, primarily due to a higher probability
of obtaining new loans. As a result, these firms increased intangible investment after
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the SCAP by 5 pp more than less exposed firms. In contrast, speculative grade firms
relatively more exposed to tested banks faced significantly tighter credit conditions
after the test. Increasing exposure to gap banks for a speculative grade firm one
standard deviation above the mean resulted in an 8 pp lower probability of obtaining
a positive modification, a 3 pp decrease in fixed investment, and a 7 pp reduction
in employment growth after the SCAP. Thus, the transmission of shocks from tested
banks to real business outcomes differed substantially between speculative grade firms
and investment grade firms.
Estimation of a causal channel through which stress testing affects bank lending
is challenged by a number of issues that complicate identification. First, selection
into the SCAP was not random, as banks included in the early rounds of stress tests
were larger than other non-tested U.S. banks. Second, the SCAP was implemented
in the depths of the financial crisis when both firm demand and bank supply of credit
were strained. Third, tested banks might have extended credit to certain types of
firms, potentially biasing estimation of a causal effect. To address the first concern,
I argue that the stress test announcement was plausibly exogenous to future lending
outcomes, as the threshold for inclusion was based on an ex-ante (2008Q4) value of
$100 billion in assets, mitigating concerns that banks near the threshold manipulated
their assets in anticipation of the test. Furthermore, the short time horizon between
the announcement and implementation of the SCAP likely precluded banks from ad-
justing their portfolios quickly. In addition, expected loss rates on corporate loans
under the severely adverse scenario were lower than other loan categories such as
credit cards and mortgages. As such, I argue that much of the expected deterioration
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of capital forecast under stressed scenarios was likely not due to the set of syndicated
loans considered in this paper. In terms of selection into the test, I use the fact
that U.S. bank-holding companies with assets just below the threshold are a natural
control group for tested banks just above the threshold (the treatment group). In
addition, I utilize a dataset of foreign bank-holding companies with an active pres-
ence in the U.S. syndicated loan market as a natural control group for the set of large
tested U.S. banks. Comparing pre-test balance sheet characteristics between the two
groups minimizes concerns that the two groups differed on a number of observable di-
mensions. To address the second concern, I build a matched bank-firm-time dataset
of syndicated loans with the important feature that the same firm borrowed both
before and after the SCAP. I then utilize the Khwaja and Mian (2008) procedure of
estimating changes in loan outcomes from tested banks relative to non-tested banks
holding fixed all time-varying shocks to firm credit demand as a way of isolating
the credit supply channel of stress testing. To address the third concern, I compare
regression estimates for specifications with firm fixed effects relative to those with
just firm controls to show that biases arising from tested banks lending to firms as a
function of their risk are likely minimal among the set of firms obtaining new loans
in both periods.
There are a number of issues that complicate the estimation of a causal effect
of stress test-ing on firm outcomes. First, as the pre-test period contained the fi-
nancial crisis and the post-test period the recovery from the recession, changes in
the distribution of risks in loan syndicates across lenders, as well as borrowing and
real firm business decisions could have been driven by fluctuations in the business
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cycle. Furthermore, observed outcomes could affect changes in credit demand due to
macroeconomic conditions or idiosyncratic firm shocks. Second, firms highly reliant
on borrowing from tested banks could have differed from less reliant firms, potentially
due to tested banks concentrating their lending in the pre-test period to firms as a
function of their risk. Thus, unobserved factors could be driving differences in firm-
level out-comes between these two sets of firms rather than changes in credit extended
by tested banks. Third, highly exposed firms could have experienced reductions in
borrowing and adjusted firm outcomes in anticipation of the SCAP. I take a number
of steps to aid identification of the causal effect of stress testing on firm outcomes.
First, the main estimating equation is estimated in first differences in order to remove
all shocks common to firms. In addition, I include a wide array of proxies for firm
credit demand identified in the bank lending regressions in order to control for shocks
to firm credit demand.6 I also include characteristics of each firm’s primary lead
arranger and control for a measure of bank health and changes in TARP investments
which were likely to affect the ability of firms to borrow. Second, I demonstrate
that firm and deal characteristics did not differ dramatically across different levels
of exposure to tested banks. Third, I present evidence to support the assumption
that borrowing and firm real outcomes followed parallel trends for firms differentially
exposed to tested banks. Therefore, the main identifying assumption throughout the
second part of the paper is that stress testing uniquely affected firm-level outcomes
conditional on the set of proxies for firm credit demand and firm exposure to other
6To illustrate this point, including the set of firm and syndicate controls increases the R-squared
test statistic from 1% to 52% in the investment regressions, suggesting that these variables explain
a large fraction of the variation in investment.
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credit supply shocks.
In extensions of the baseline results, I demonstrate that tested banks that were
found to have insufficient capital buffers as a result of the SCAP responded relatively
more conservatively than other tested banks. However, firms relatively more exposed
to these banks did not experience differential changes in borrowing outcomes. Addi-
tionally, I show that firms with long lending relationships and previous borrowers in
the syndicated loan market were less affected than other firms.
Section 2 provides background on stress testing and reviews the empirical and
theoretical literature. Section 3 discusses construction of the main dataset and sum-
mary statistics. Section 4 details changes in lending outcomes at the bank-firm level.
Section 5 tests for changes in outcomes and the composition of loan syndicates at the
intensive margin. Section 6 examines changes in borrowing at the extensive margin
and tests for real effects. Section 7 extends the baseline analysis to explore heteroge-
neous effects, while Section 8 concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Stress Testing
Stress testing of financial institutions has emerged as one of the major prudential
tools developed by regulators and supervisors in recent years.7 While banks were re-
quired to conduct internal stress tests as part of the Basel capital accords, these tests
typically entailed assessments of trading book exposures to market risks, rather than
7Tarullo (2014) provides a thorough overview of recent topics in macroprudential regulation and
policies aimed at improving financial stability.
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the sensitivity of capital ratios to changes in lending portfolios Wall (2014), Book-
staber, Cetina, Feldberg, Flood, and Glasserman (2014)).8 Since the financial crisis
of 2007-2009, the basic framework of supervisory stress tests has involved estimating
bank fundamentals under baseline and adverse economic scenarios, determining ex-
pected capital levels under those scenarios, and disclosing results to the public (Hirtle
and Lehnert (2015)). In contrast to more traditional supervision of financial institu-
tions, a defining feature of modern supervisory stress testing has been that it not only
assesses bank capital positions from a microprudential perspective, but also accounts
for macroprudential risks.9
1.2.2 SCAP
The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) was the first supervisory
stress test implemented in the United States in response to the financial crisis of
2007-2009 (Bernanke (2009); Hirtle, Schuermann, and Stiroh (2009)). At the time,
the U.S. banking system was under considerable strain due to worsening macroeco-
nomic conditions, depressed asset prices, and eroding capital positions (Bernanke et
al. (2013)). In addition, bank financing was under pressure due to uncertainty about
risks on (or off) bank balance sheets, and potential further depletion of bank capital.
Among the responses to the crisis, the Federal Reserve implemented a number of
8For example, Basel II required banks to assess whether capital requirements under the internal
ratings-based approach would change under stressed scenarios (BIS (2004a)). In practice, surveys of
financial institutions found that banks were primarily conducting stress tests on their trading books,
and were less likely to perform stress tests on loans (BIS (2004b)). Hurdles to implementing stress
tests of loan portfolios included difficulty of marking loans to market, costs of data accumulation,
and lack of broad risk management practices accounting for trading and loan book risks.
9Microprudential regulation involves setting rules to build capital buffers for individual institu-
tions to with-stand idiosyncratic shocks. Macroprudential regulation involves setting rules so that
the financial sector as a whole has sufficient capital to withstand system-wide shocks.
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unconventional policies, including providing liquidity to key markets, the Treasury
Department introduced the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) with the goal of
re-capitalizing banks, and the FDIC agreed to guarantee long-term bank debt and
expand deposit insurance protection. In spite of these efforts, there was still con-
siderable uncertainty about whether financial institutions would be nationalized or
allowed to fail as in the case of Lehman Brothers.
The SCAP was announced in February 2009 with the aim of restoring confi-
dence to financial markets by determining whether large U.S. banks would be able
to maintain sufficient capital buffers to withstand an adverse economic shock and to
continue lending in a crisis (of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2009)). The
SCAP departed significantly from traditional supervisory exercises (Bernanke et al.
(2013)). First, only U.S. bank holding companies with assets exceeding $100 billion
as of 2008Q4 were included in the test. Second, the SCAP was a forward-looking
exercise that calculated projected losses, revenues, and capital ratios under multiple
economic scenarios. In contrast, examinations and capital ratios were generally set
based on backward-looking information. Third, the test was simultaneous, which al-
lowed for supervisors to assess exposures across institutions and risks of contagion.
Finally, results of the SCAP were disclosed publicly on May 7, 2009, in contrast to the
traditional practice of keeping supervisory results confidential. The release included
institution-level projections of pre-provision net revenue, allowance for loan and lease
losses, and losses on different loan categories, securities holdings, and trading port-
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folios.10 Importantly, supervisors also calculated pro forma 2010 year-end levels of
capital and risk-weighted assets based on their projections of bank fundamentals un-
der the adverse scenario. Resulting pro forma capital ratios were assessed relative to
supervisory benchmarks of 6% of Tier 1 capital and 4% of Tier 1 Common capital
as shares of risk-weighted assets. The SCAP release included estimates of each in-
stitution’s capital gap, its supervisory capital level minus its pro forma capital level
calculated under the adverse scenario. Ten of the nineteen institutions tested were
deemed to be insufficiently capitalized to withstand the adverse scenario, resulting
in an aggregate capital gap of $75 billion after accounting for 2009 Q1 performance
and interim capital actions. The bulk of the capital needed to meet the SCAP re-
quirement was in the form of Tier 1 Common capital, which nine institutions were
subsequently able to successfully raise privately.11
One of the key implications of the SCAP was the massive recapitalization that
occurred in the months following the test. As the majority of banks found themselves
in precarious capital positions as a result of the financial crisis, there was a need to re-
store capital buffers in order to remain viable entities going forward. Importantly, the
response to the SCAP differed between banks with and without a capital gap. For the
set of banks without a capital gap, the main regulatory agencies provided them with
the option of exiting TARP in June 2009 conditional on successfully raising capital in
a common stock offering (for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (2011)).12 The main
10The bank-holding companies with significant trading exposures were also subject to a market
shock.
11Only GMAC required assistance from the Treasury through the Capital Assistance Program
(CAP).
12As a condition of exiting TARP, these banks also paid back Treasury’s holdings of preferred
stock. Morgan Stanley, a positive capital gap bank, was also given the opportunity to exit TARP
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reasons for exiting TARP were the stigma associated with government ownership
and the inability to pay dividends and compensate management. The possibility of
TARP exit was not revealed until after the SCAP. Banks with an insufficient capital
buffer were required to submit plans for how they planned to address their capital
gap by June 2009, and were given six months to do so. Capital gaps were generally
filled with some combination of new stock issuance, conversion of preferred securities
for common equity, and asset sales. Gap banks were also given the option to exit
TARP gradually between late 2009 and 2011 by similarly demonstrating ability to
raise private capital in equity issuances. Gap banks thus increased their capital both
in response to the SCAP and as a condition of exiting TARP. Thus, one major dif-
ference between banks included in the SCAP and those not included was the increase
of capital.
The main focus of this paper is the response to the SCAP, as I rely on the in-
stitutional details of that stress test to identify the effect of stress testing on firm
outcomes. Importantly, the outcomes and methodology of the CCAR and DFAST
differ substantially from the SCAP. Additional details of these tests are available in
the appendix.
1.2.3 Related Literature
A growing literature has begun to assess the extent to which supervisory stress
testing affects financial institutions. Early empirical papers studied the impact of
stress tests on bank financial variables, such as the market responses to stress test
early.
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announcements (Petrella and Resti (2013); Morgan, Peristiani, and Savino (2014);
Candelon and Sy (2015); Fernandes and Pinheiro (2017); Gerhardt and Vander Ven-
net (2017); Flannery et al. (2017)). In addition, Kovner and Van Tassel (2018) find
that the cost of capital increased for banks included in the SCAP, but fell for this set
of banks after the DFAST. Theoretical models of stress testing have generally focused
on the question of disclosure of test results (Goldstein et al. (2014)), and whether this
disclosure could change the incentive of banks to allocate lending to projects of vary-
ing risks (Shapiro and Zeng (2018), Leitner and Williams (2017), Corona, Nan, and
Zhang (2017)).
This paper relates more broadly to a third branch of the literature that has be-
gun to quantify the effect of stress testing on bank lending. These papers utilize
bank-level regressions to test for differential responses of tested banks following stress
tests. Shahhosseini (2014) focuses on the largest U.S. bank-holding companies be-
tween 2005 and 2015 and finds that bank man-agers increased capital levels by either
restructuring or removing non-performing loans from their balance sheets in order to
pass the stress tests in the U.S. In addition, she shows that loan growth fell for tested
banks relative to non-tested banks only following the SCAP and not sub-sequent tests.
Acharya et al. (2018) use a similar dataset and find negative responses for lending
driven by banks with capital gaps, especially for risky loan categories. Fernandes
and Pinheiro (2017) build a dataset of the largest U.S. bank-holding companies as
of 2014Q4 and find only an immediate negative response for lending for banks not
passing the test. In contrast, Bassett and Berrospide (2018)look at large U.S. bank-
holding companies between 2013 and 2016 find no evidence that banks required to
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raise additional capital reduced loan growth. However, they do find that some tested
banks that increased capital ratios were able to increase loan growth for certain types
of lending. Flannery et al. (2017) find little evidence in support of loan growth being
affected by differences between the Fed’s and tested bank’s estimates of losses by loan
category for later rounds of stress tests. In the context of Europe, Me´sonnier and
Monks (2015) focus on the 2011 and 2012 European Banking Authority (EBA)’s Cap-
ital Exercises and find that banks with relatively larger capital shortfalls subsequently
reduced loan growth. Eber and Minoiu (2016) utilize the European Comprehensive
Assessment announced in 2012, which was a stress test of Eurozone banks, and find
that banks achieved higher capital ratios generally by not reducing lending. Gropp et
al. (2018) use syndicated loan data to show that banks in the 2011 European Banking
Authority’s (EBA) capital exercise increased capital ratios by reducing lending rather
than raising equity. Hirtle, Kovner, and Plosser (2018) find a causal link between su-
pervision and bank performance.
More closely related to this paper, a number of recent papers have used disaggre-
gated loan-level data in order to attempt to isolate the effect of stress testing from
demand factors. Using a matched sample of syndicated loans to U.S. non- financial
firms from U.S. bank-holding companies, Acharya et al. (2018) find that spreads in-
creased and loan amounts and maturities decreased in syndicates with lead arrangers
that were tested in the SCAP and sub-sequent CCARs. These results were driven
by reductions in credit supply to risky borrowers. They also find some evidence that
banks not passing the SCAP increased pricing and decreased loan size by less than
did passing banks. Lambertini and Mukherjee (2016) also find that spreads increased
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for banks included in the SCAP and CCAR following the release of stress test results.
Using a similar dataset of syndicated loans matched to U.S. bank-holding companies,
Pierret and Steri (2018) show that while higher capital requirements due to stress
tests created incentives to increase risk-taking, monitoring effectively dampened the
magnitude of this effect. Other papers have used matched bank-firm samples of syn-
dicated loans in Europe to study the effect of prudential policies on credit allocation.
Gropp et al. (2018) find that lending decreased at the intensive margin for banks
subject to the EBA’s 2011 capital exercise relative to those not included. As a result,
firms more exposed to EBA banks reduced total assets and fixed assets, and experi-
enced lower sales following the exercise. Focusing on the Eurozone stress tests, Eber
and Minoiu (2016) find some evidence that weakly capitalized tested banks responded
by reducing credit supply. Two recent papers examine the effect of stress testing on
other types of lending. P. S. Calem et al. (2017) study how U.S. bank-holding compa-
nies responded to stress tests by changing the supply of mortgage credit. They find
that the share of jumbo mort-gage origination fell among tested banks, especially
weakly capitalized banks. They also show that the share of speculative-grade term-
loan originations declined following implementation of 2013 supervisory guidelines on
leveraged lending. Corte´s et al. (2018) show that small business lending declined in
counties relatively more exposed to tested banks forecasted to have larger deteriora-
tions in capital under stressed scenarios. Much of this decline in lending occurred in
markets where tested banks had local branches and among relatively riskier loans.
Small, non-tested banks entered markets so that state-level loan growth remained
unchanged as a function of test exposure. Only one paper briefly explores the effects
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of stress testing on local economic conditions. Berger and Roman (2017) find some
evidence that stress-tested banks affect local economic conditions by reducing busi-
ness and personal bankruptcies, but find the opposite result for net job creation and
net hiring at establishments.
Relative to this empirical literature, I make a number of contributions on the im-
pact of stress testing on bank and firm outcomes. In terms of bank lending outcomes,
I examine whether tested banks altered their lending in the syndicated loan market
after stress tests both at the intensive margin, by changing the size of existing loans,
and at the extensive margin, either by exiting existing bank-firm relationships or by
entering new bank-firm relationships. My paper complements Acharya et al. (2018),
who document an important margin of adjustment in lending, namely through the
reduction of exposure to risky borrowers in syndicated loans. As they focus their
analysis only on lead arrangers, their result applies most strongly to firms whose
largest lead arranger was a U.S. bank-holding company that lent to them both before
and after stress tests. As such, their paper offers strong evidence to suggest that
loan outcomes changed for firms reliant on lead arrangers that were included in stress
tests.13 Relative to their paper, I study lending outcomes among bank-firm pairs by
incorporating all lenders in a syndicate (lead arrangers, co-agents, and participants)
into my analysis. In addition, I study the behavior of the most active foreign bank-
holding companies in the U.S. non- financial syndicated loan market, which enables
me to compare changes in lending by the most active lenders in syndicates, regardless
of U.S. affiliation. Including active foreign lenders and participants is particularly
13Lambertini and Mukherjee (2016) find similar results.
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important in this context, as I am interested in studying how syndicate structure
changed in response to stress tests, and whether these changes affected overall firm
borrowing. Pierret and Steri (2018) also study how syndicated loan outcomes changed
among bank-firm pairs, however they focus on separately identifying capital and mon-
itoring channels of stress testing using the introduction of the DFAST. In contrast,
my main focus in terms of bank lending is studying how loan outcomes changed at
the extensive margin for tested banks relative to non-tested banks among bank-firm
relationships. While I provide some evidence in the robustness section regarding
changes in lending for later stress tests, my main analysis focuses on the response to
the SCAP.
To my knowledge, this paper is the first to document how syndicate structure
changed and whether firms adjusted real outcomes in response to changes in lending
by stress-tested banks. My first main contribution is to investigate how the shares
of different lenders changed following stress tests as a function of existing exposure
to tested banks. I show that there is important heterogeneity in this response as a
function of firm financial constraints. My second main contribution is to examine the
extensive margin of firm borrowing outcomes. Rather than focus on firms obtain-
ing syndicated loans in both pre- and post-test periods, I study how loan outcomes
changed as a function of exposure to tested banks. By focusing on this wider set
of firms, I am able to test whether firms substituted changes in borrowing from the
syndicated loan market by issuing debt or equity. Lastly, this is the first paper to ex-
amine how firm-level real outcomes were affected by exposure to stress tested banks.
More broadly, this paper relates to the empirical literature studying the effects
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of credit supply shocks on real economic activity. Frictions at the bank and firm level
produce differential responses of credit supply shocks to borrowers (Bernanke (1983),
Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Kashyap, Lamont,
and Stein (1994), Peek and Rosengren (1997), Peek and Rosengren (2000), Kashyap
and Stein (2000), Campello (2002), Ashcraft (2005), Ashcraft (2006), Ashcraft and
Campello (2007), Gan (2007), Paravisini (2008), Chava and Purnanandam (2011),
Adrian, Colla, and Song Shin (2013), Becker and Ivashina (2014)). This paper uti-
lizes the technique developed by Khwaja and Mian (2008) to isolate credit supply
shocks and examine effects on firm outcomes (Schnabl (2012), Iyer, Peydro´, da Rocha-
Lopes, and Schoar (2013), Jime´nez, Ongena, Peydro´, and Saurina (2014), Cingano,
Manaresi, and Sette (2016)). In the context of syndi-cated lending, this paper relates
most closely to Chodorow-Reich (2013), who shows that bank health causally affected
non- financial firm employment outcomes following the financial crisis of 2007-2009.
This paper also relates to the literature studying the effect of bank capital regulation
on lending (Thakor (1996); Fraisse, Le´, and Thesmar (2015), Bahaj and Malherbe
(2018), Chu, Zhang, and Zhao (2018)).
1.2.4 Theoretical Implications
The theoretical literature predicts an ambiguous between stress testing and lend-
ing, operating through two primary channels. The capital channel of stress testing
predicts that lending behavior by tested banks can change in response to changes
in the quantity and quality of capital required by stress tests.14 Whether lending
14Insufficiently capitalized banks in the SCAP were required to issue equity in the months following
the test, while the set of tested banks receiving TARP funds did as well as a precondition of exiting
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increases or decreases depends crucially on the composition of credit allocation be-
tween safe and risky borrowers. On the one hand, higher levels of capital can result
in increases in lending to relatively safer borrowers due to reduced risk-shifting in-
centives (Furlong and Keeley (1989), Coval and Thakor (2005)) or higher capital
requirements (Bahaj and Malherbe (2018)). On the other hand, more capital could
result in increases in lending to relatively riskier borrowers due to strengthened moni-
toring incentives (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)), larger capital buffers (Bhattacharya
and Thakor (1993), Berger and Udell (1994)), increases in credit risk (P. Calem and
Rob (1999)) or reaching for yield incentives (Bahaj, Bridges, Malherbe, and O’Neill
(2016)). Higher capital could also result in decreases in lending, especially to risky
borrowers, if reductions in uninsured creditors’ risk reduce the incentive to monitor
bank management, weakening market discipline, and increasing borrowing costs for
banks (Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Diamond and Rajan (2001)). Another conse-
quence of higher capital is higher charter values, which lower the likelihood of future
failure, leading to reductions in risky lending (Keeley (1990)).
The disclosure channel predicts that the release of information about the method-
ology, inputs, and results of stress tests could impact bank lending behavior. As with
the capital channel, the degree to which overall lending might change due to increased
disclosure depends on potential changes in the composition of credit. Increases in
lending to relatively safer borrower could result from the ability of uninsured creditors
to more effectively impose market discipline on bank management due to increased
government ownership. Thus, SCAP banks increased both the quantity and the quality of equity
capital in the years following the first stress test. With the subsequent rounds of CCAR and
DFAST, banks with insufficient internal stress test procedures and capital plans were required to
reduce distributions.
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disclosure of bank fundamentals (Goldstein et al. (2014), Balakrishnan and Ertan
(2017)), through incentives to allocate portfolios towards loans more likely to pass
the test (Dogra and Rhee (2018)),15 or due to credibility of the supervisors and fiscal
authorities conducting the stress test (Williams (2017)), Faria-e Castro, Martinez,
and Philippon (2016)). In contrast, weak supervisory discipline can also encourage
banks to allocate their lending towards risky borrowers by signalling favorable treat-
ment on future tests (Shapiro and Zeng (2018)) or future bail-outs (Corona et al.
(2017)). Encouraging banks to disclose bad news could lead to higher risk-taking,
but allow regulatory agencies more control over future investment decisions (Harris
and Raviv (2014)). Increased disclosure could also serve to identify the set of sys-
temically important institutions, encouraging bank management to increase lending
to risky borrowers due to moral hazard incentives (Acharya et al. (2018)). Too much
disclosure could lead to reductions in lending, especially to risky borrowers, due to
endogenous costs associated with the test Goldstein et al. (2014)). Disclosure of bank
fundamentals can also reduce incentives for banks to create liquidity (Dang, Gorton,
Holmstro¨m, and Ordonez (2017)). Additionally, being identified as Too-Big-to-Fail
(TBTF) might force banks to reduce lending due to expectations of increased regula-
tory costs for these firms, such as the need to hold higher levels of capital in the future,
and subsequently reducing risky lending on the margin (Acharya et al. (2018)).
15Leitner and Williams (2017) show that in spite of the latter incentives, revealing stress test
models could still increase socially desirable lending. However, Orlov, Zryumov, and Skrzypacz
(2018) argue that these increases in lending could come at the cost of an increase in systemic risk




The main dataset in this paper combines data on syndicated loans with lender
and firm characteristics. Syndicated loan data come from Loan Pricing Corporation’s
(LPC) Dealscan database, which is collected from SEC lings, originators, and news
sources. Each deal (syndicate) is composed of at least one tranche (facility). I start
by restricting the sample to include all completed term loans16 and revolving credit
facilities17 extended to U.S. firms originated be-tween 2004 and 2016 in U.S. dollars,
a selection which yields 69,045 unique facilities and 44,742 syndicates. I then exclude
real estate and financial firms with SIC codes between 6011 and 6799 (10,946 facilities
and 8,724 syndicates)18 and facilities whose primary purpose is not for real investment
(20,231 facilities and 9,857 syndicates).19 After a nal screen for non-missing lender
data, the main Dealscan dataset contains 37,845 facilities, 26,137 syndicates, 2,394
lenders, 11,537 firms, and 79,570 lender- firm pairs. Dealscan provides information on
certain character-istics for each firm (name, SIC code, state, capital market status)
and facility (names of lenders, loan size, pricing, maturity, purpose, start and end
dates, collateral, covenants, amendments, and allocations). I then merge this dataset
with Compustat following Chava and Roberts (2008) in order to obtain detailed
16Dealscan variable “loantype” equal to the following values: Delay Draw Term Loan, Term Loan,
or Term Loan A through K.
17Dealscan variable “loantype” equal to the following values: 364-Day Facility, Revolver/Line <
1 Yr., Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr., Revolver/Term Loan, Demand Loan, Limited Line.
18Financial firms are excluded due to the fact that the crisis of 2007-2009 originated at those firms
and changes in their lending might be particularly driven by shocks to their demand for credit.
19Dealscan variable “primarypurpose” equal to the following values: Corp. purposes, Work. cap.,
Capital expend., Equip. Purch., Proj. finance.
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income statement, balance sheet, and cash ow data. This reduces the set of firms
considerably, however the resulting coverage of firm-level variables is richer. Finally,
I merge the set of lenders with Bankscope following Schwert (2018) and keep the
most active lenders for which data are available, resulting in a total of 97 bank-
holding companies based either in the U.S. or abroad.
The main unit of analysis in the first part of this paper is a firm-lender-facility
triple. For each facility, Dealscan reports loan allocation shares when available. I fill
in missing allocation shares using a censored regression of available shares on facility
characteristics.20 For the first part of my analysis, I focus exclusively on firms that
borrowed in both pre- and post-test periods.21. This sample selection choice enables
me to control for time-varying shocks to firm credit demand by observing how credit
supply changed for the same firm from tested banks relative to non-tested banks.
However, due both to limited sample size and the nature of the empirical exercise, I
am unable to draw conclusions about the effects of stress testing on firm outcomes. As
a result, the second part of my analysis focuses on a broader set of firms, namely firms
that received a syndicated loan at some point in the pre-test period. This sample
allows for a richer analysis of changes in firm-level outcomes as a function of ex-ante
exposure to tested banks.
20This exercise follows De Haas and Van Horen (2013) and Le (2013). The results are robust
to following the imputation method of Chodorow-Reich (2013) as well. Results from the censored
regression are shown in Appendix Table A1.




U.S.-based bank-holding companies with at least $100 billion in assets as of
2008Q4 were chosen for inclusion in the SCAP. In order to compare the behavior
of tested banks with other banks, I collect data on the most active lenders in the U.S.
non- financial syndicated loan market with sufficient available data in Bankscope.22
Table 1 lists the set of tested banks included in the SCAP and the lower panel includes
the set of other regional U.S. banks. Most of the largest global financial institutions
are represented in this sample (Table 2). The sample of banks exhibits large variation
across regions and size.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for outcome and control variables for the
matched bank-firm analysis in this paper. For the set of firms borrowing in both
periods, exposure to loan syndicates among bank-firm pairs decreased by 2 pp on av-
erage. Approximately 41% of bank-firm pairs that existed in each firm’s last pre-test
syndicate did not appear in the post-test period. Similarly, 45% of bank-firm pairs
that existed in the post-test syndicate did not appear in the pre-test period. Tested
banks were active in approximately 42% of all bank-firm pairs existing in the exit and
entry regressions, while gap banks correspondingly represented less than one-third of
pairs.
Table 4 gives summary statistics for outcome and control variables for the firm-
level analysis in this paper. The upper panel of syndicate-level outcomes shows that
the average firm borrowing in both the pre- and post-test period did not experience
large changes in shares of different lenders. The second panel contains outcomes for
22I keep lenders with at least 25 facilities extended between 2007 and 2010.
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the full sample of firms obtaining a syndicated loan between 2007 and 2008 studied
in this paper. Almost one-half of these firms borrowed between February 2009 and
December 2010, primarily by obtaining a new loan (36%) rather than a positive mod-
ification of an existing loan (14%). The average firm increased fixed investment by
18%, intangible investment by 20%, and employment growth by 4% between 2008
and 2011. The third panel contains regressors for the firm-level analysis. The average
firm was approximately 61% “exposed” to tested banks, measured by the weighted-
average expo-sure of these banks in firms’ pre-test syndicates. Gap banks represented
45% of shares in the average firm’s pre-test syndicate. Approximately half of the firms
in the sample had a credit rating in December 2008 and one-fourth were considered
investment grade (BBB- or higher). Revolving credit lines composed the largest share
of syndicates (82%). Half of syndicates were collateralized, were used for corporate
purposes, and contained at least one covenant. Over half of syndicates contained a
previous lead arranger and previous lender, while 40% of syndicates contained lending
relationships that were over 5 years old.
1.4 Lending Outcomes
The focus of this paper is the transmission of supervisory stress testing to the
real economy via changes in bank behavior. This section uses a matched bank-firm
dataset to test whether lending outcomes to the same firm changed for tested banks
relative to other banks after the SCAP.
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1.4.1 Empirical Strategy
A number of factors complicate identification of a causal effect of stress testing
on lending. First, banks tested in the SCAP were larger than other U.S. banks that
were not included. Second, the SCAP occurred in the depths of the financial crisis
when both shocks to firm credit demand and bank credit supply were strained. Third,
tested banks might have concentrated their lending to particular types of firms as a
function of their risk, potentially biasing coefficient estimates.
To partially mitigate these issues, I utilize a matched bank-firm-time dataset
with the important feature that the same firm borrowed in both pre- and post-test
periods from tested banks and other lenders. The inclusion of firm fixed effects in a
first-differenced model removes all time-varying shocks to credit demand, allowing for
identification of changes in loan growth to the same firm from tested banks relative to
other lenders (Khwaja and Mian (2008)), conditional on controlling for other shocks
to credit supply. Furthermore, this framework allows for a test of the bias due to
tested banks potentially lending to firms as a function of their risk. Calculating the
difference in coefficient estimates obtained with a firm fixed effects model relative
to a model with firm controls proxies for this bias. One limitation of this specifica-
tion is that it is not possible to identify the total effect of stress testing on lending.
Nevertheless, my analysis still provides insights into whether tested banks changed
their lending behavior among bank-firm pairs. Subsequent sections explore whether
changes in lending affected firms’ overall ability to borrow.
Given that selection into the SCAP was not randomly assigned, a major concern
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of the analysis in this paper is that the set of tested banks might have differed on ob-
servable and un-observable dimensions in the years leading up to the SCAP. However,
there are features of the criteria for inclusion into the test which help to mitigate con-
cerns of selection bias. The SCAP was announced in February 2009 to include U.S.
bank holding companies with end-2008 assets in excess of $100 billion. Therefore, it
would not have been possible for banks to manipulate their balance sheets and reduce
their assets in order to fall under the ex-ante threshold. Because of this exogenous
inclusion criterion, financial institutions with assets just below the threshold serve as
a natural control group for those institutions just above the threshold.23 However,
large banks are quite different from those near the threshold. For this reason, I focus
on the market for syndicated lending to U.S. non- financial firms in which foreign
lenders have a large presence. The natural control group for large U.S. bank-holding
companies includes large foreign bank-holding companies that were active lenders of
syndicated loans.24 Results in the upper panel table 5 suggest that observable bank
characteristics did not differ dramatically between tested banks and other banks in
the pre-test period (2007-2008). The major differences included significantly lower
non-performing loans as a share of gross loans and higher equity capital ratios for
tested banks relative to other banks. To partially control for these and other differ-
ences, I include a full set of bank characteristics in subsequent lending regressions.
23Banks with assets between $50 and $100 billion and foreign banking organizations with a sub-
stantial U.S. presence were included in later rounds of the CCAR, but were not subject to supervisory
stress testing under the SCAP.
24Large European banks were subject to supervisory stress tests in both 2009 and 2010. The
2009 stress test was generally viewed as being less credible than the SCAP, in part due to limited
disclosure of test details or bank-level results (Ong and Pazarbasioglu (2013)). The 2010 stress test
provided more information about bank-and country-level exposures. However, its release falls in the
latter part of my sample (July 23, 2010).
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In addition, I include measures of “bank health”25 and the percentage point change
in equity capital ratios due to investments by the U.S. government under Capital
Purchase Program (TARP). These two measures capture differences in asset quality
and capital ratios as a result of the financial crisis. Results in the lower panel of table
5 demonstrate that banks in the SCAP shifted the composition of their assets away
from loans and toward securities and increased their capital ratios primarily through
increases in common equity in the years after the SCAP.
A third feature of the SCAP aids identification of a causal effect. In early 2009
there was considerable uncertainty among market participants regarding nationaliza-
tion of banks and whether this would be effective at aiding the economic recovery
from the recession (Blue Chip March 1, 2009). Morgan et al. (2014) find significant
equity price movements on important announcement dates for the SCAP, suggesting
that the test announcement was plausibly exogenous to other factors that might have
affected lending outcomes. In particular, they find significant abnormal returns for
gap banks after Ben Bernanke clarified that banks would not be nationalized and
after the results were announced. This short time period over which the stress test
was implemented and conducted suggests that the set of tested banks were likely not
able to adjust their portfolios ex-ante in a manner consistent with passing the test. In
addition, expected loss rates on corporate loans under the severely adverse scenario
were lower than other loan categories such as credit cards and mortgages. As such,
I argue that much of the expected deterioration of capital forecast under stressed
25Bank health is calculated as the sum of weighted loan shares from bank b to all firms other than
f in the post-test period relative to the pre-test period (Chodorow-Reich (2013)).
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scenarios was likely not due to the set of syndicated loans considered in this paper.
The analysis in this section con firms and extends the prior literature address-
ing the effect of stress testing on lending. The baseline empirical framework models
loan outcomes as a function of shocks to firm credit demand and lender credit supply
(Khwaja and Mian (2008)). Applied to the syndicated loan market (Chodorow-Reich
(2013)), I utilize a difference-in-difference model that tests whether the same firm
borrowing in both pre- and post-test periods experienced changes in loan outcomes
from tested banks relative to non-tested banks:
Outcomeb,f = αf + β1Testb + δControlsb + γControlsb,f + b,f (1)
In this setting, I consider three loan outcomes of interest. In order to test for changes
at the intensive margin of credit, I calculate the difference of loan size from lender b to
firm f from the last pre-test syndicate (2007-2008) relative to the first new post-test
syndicate (2009-2010) scaled by the total size of firm f ’s last pre-test syndicate. One
potential concern of the estimates from regressions at the intensive margin is that they
could suffer from biases due to measurement error if loan shares are systematically
imputed incorrectly. To address this issue, I also test whether banks included in
the SCAP changed their behavior at the “extensive margin.” The first measure
asks whether lenders removed credit entirely among existing loan syndicates.26 The
dependent variable in those regressions is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank-firm
pair that existed in a pre-test syndicate did not exist in a post-test syndicate and 0
26Darmouni and Rodnyansky (2017) use a similar measure of loan renewal in the context of
syndicated loan pairs in response to the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchases.
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otherwise. Alternatively, tested banks might have reacted to stress tests by changing
their propensity to enter into new lending relationships. In order to capture the entry
dimension, I condition on all bank-firm pairs existing in the post-test syndicate with
at least one tested and one non-tested bank in the syndicate. The dependent variable
in those regressions is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank-firm pair newly existed
in the post-test syndicate that did not exist in the pre-test syndicate and 0 otherwise.
This empirical specification contains an array of controls for factors that might
affect loan outcomes. First, the inclusion of firm fixed effects removes all observable
and unobservable firm-level heterogeneity that might drive firm credit demand (αf ).
In this setting, only factors varying at the bank level or bank- firm level are identified.
In this difference-in-difference framework, the main empirical challenge is to isolate
treatment (being tested) from other shocks to bank fundamentals that might have
affected credit supply. Inclusion of the log of bank assets controls for differences in
the ability of relatively larger banks to extend loans at lower cost. Given observed
differences in capital ratios and asset quality (Table 5), I include ratios of equity
capital to assets and non-performing loans to gross loans. In addition, I also control
for each bank’s asset liquidity (securities/assets), profitability (return on assets), the
liquidity of bank liabilities (deposits and short-term funds to assets), bank health,
and the investment of TARP capital scaled by bank assets. This specification also
includes interactions of all measures of bank risk with dummies for firm bond market
access (Controlsb,f ), in order to address the endogenous matching between banks and
firms (Iosifidi and Kokas (2015)).
A key question of interest in this paper is whether tested banks changed their
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lending to risky firms, given that shocks to bank balance sheets primarily affect
financially constrained firms (Kashyap et al. (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)).
The main measure of financial constraints that I study in this paper is whether a firm
received a credit rating just before the SCAP, and if so, whether that credit rating
was speculative grade (below BBB-) or investment grade (BBB- and above). This
measure is motivated by a literature demonstrating the differential effect of credit
supply as a function of bond market access (Chodorow-Reich (2013), Becker and
Ivashina (2014)).27 This distinction is also important in that loans to firms with
relatively higher credit ratings carried lower risk weights. Furthermore, institutional
investors play a large role in providing credit to speculative grade firm syndicates
(Nini (2017)). In order to examine whether test outcomes and firm risk differentially
contributed to changes in bank lending behavior, I include interactions of all bank risk
measures with dummies for rated firms and rated investment grade firms in additional
specifications.
1.4.2 Results
Results from estimation of the baseline lending regressions are given in Table 6.
First, I find that the same firm did not experience significant changes in loan exposure
from tested banks relative to other banks after the SCAP (column 1). However,
tested banks slightly increased their exposure in investment grade firm syndicates
by 2 pp more than other banks (column 4). In terms of the extensive margin, I
27Chodorow-Reich (2013) also finds a significant transmission of shocks to bank health through
small firms, however the sample that he utilizes encompasses a broader range of firms than the large
corporate borrowers in my sample.
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find that tested banks were 8 pp less likely to exit syndicates to the same firm than
other banks (column 2), especially among firms with a credit rating (column 5).
These results suggest that tested banks were significantly more likely to maintain
existing lending relationships. On the other hand, I also find that tested banks were
7 pp less likely than non-tested banks to enter syndicates to firms borrowing in both
periods (column 3). Much of this result was due to a significantly lower likelihood of
entry into syndicates of speculative grade firms after the SCAP (column 6). Taken
together, these results demonstrate that tested banks responded to the SCAP by
altering credit at the extensive margin of lending, rather than the intensive margin.
Tested banks maintained lending in existing borrower relationships, but behaved more
conservatively by not entering new loan facilities. I explore whether these changes in
lending affected firm borrowing in the following section.
Results from these regressions help to allay concerns that SCAP banks might
have concentrated their lending to firms receiving favorable shocks to credit demand.
While I have presented evidence that the criteria for being included in the SCAP
were unrelated to firm characteristics, tested banks might have differed from other
banks on unobservable dimensions. I test for these differences by comparing point
estimates between the specification in Table 6 estimated with firm fixed effects and
the specification in Appendix Table A6 estimated with firm controls. Comparing
estimates between the models validates this assumption. Under additive separability
of shocks to firm credit demand and the SCAP treatment indicator, the difference
between these coefficients can capture the bias resulting from non-random matching
between banks and firms. For all specifications I find that this bias is small.
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Results in Table 7 provide some evidence that gap banks (those needing to fill
capital gaps) responded more conservatively to the SCAP than non-gap banks. In
particular, I find that the lower likelihood of exit among tested banks was driven
mostly by non-gap banks. However, both sets of tested banks were significantly less
likely to enter syndicates of speculative grade firms, although the magnitude of the
total effect for gap banks was larger (Table 8). These results suggest that gap banks
responded relatively more conservatively to being tested than non-gap banks in terms
of maintaining and establishing lending relationships. While I do not necessarily
conclude that stress testing affected lending behavior through precise channels, these
results suggest that weaker tested banks reduced risk to risky firms after the SCAP.
1.5 Syndicate Outcomes
Results in the previous section demonstrated that tested banks responded to the
SCAP by not exiting loan syndicates, particularly among rated firms, but also by
not entering new syndicates of speculative grade firms. Whether these changes at
the bank- firm level affected credit outcomes at the syndicate level remains an open
question. In this section, I focus on the set of approximately 300 firms that obtained
new loans in both the pre- and post-test periods. Among this sample of firms I study
how exposure to tested banks affected credit supply at the intensive margin. Given
the contrasting lending behavior among bank- firm pairs, I also explore whether syn-
dicate structure changed and if firms might have substituted their borrowing from
different lenders, leading to potential changes in credit outcomes.
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Loan syndicates suffer from asymmetric information problems between borrow-
ers and lenders, which gives rise to delegated monitors to overcome these frictions
(Diamond (1984)). Nevertheless a moral hazard problem exists between “informed”
and “uninformed” lenders (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)). As a consequence, lead
arrangers retain larger shares of syndicated loans and form more concentrated syn-
dicates of relatively more opaque borrowers in order to mitigate these informational
frictions (Lee and Mullineaux (2004), Jones, Lang, and Nigro (2005)), Sufi (2007),
Ivashina (2009)). Risky firms are likely to be most affected by changes in lending
behavior from tested banks that served as lead arrangers, since the loss of lending
relationships could adversely affect the ability of firms to borrow on similar terms
(Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2009)). Tested banks changing their
propensity to lend as participants in syndicated loans could also affect firm borrow-
ing. Commercial banks are relatively more active than non-banks in extending credit
lines, especially to risky borrowers and as participant lenders, owing to the fact that
deposit in ows serve as a hedge for liquidity risk (Gatev and Strahan (2009)). Thus,
the loss of tested banks as participant lenders, due to more active liquidity risk man-
agement, could also affect the terms on which firms subsequently borrow.28 This
section provides evidence that the structure of loan syndicates and credit outcomes
changed after the SCAP.
28Le (2013) finds that following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, lenders exposed to co-syndication
with Lehman reduced their roles, while credit supply remained unchanged, suggesting that changes
in borrowing outcomes is not necessarily obvious ex-ante.
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1.5.1 Firm Exposure Measures
In order to study outcomes at the firm level, I first construct a measure of each
firm’s ex-ante exposure to tested banks, which is an average weighted by loan shares







× I(Testedb = 1)
)
(2)
where I(Testedb = 1) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if bank b was included in the
SCAP and 0 if not. An advantage of this measure is that it assigns greater weights to
exposure to tested banks that served as lead arrangers rather than participants. In
addition, I also construct similar exposure measures based on the share of gap banks
in each firm’s last pre-test syndicate, as well as for the weighted average of exposure to
tested banks as a function of the size of their capital gaps (capital gap/risk-weighted
assets). Summary statistics of these exposure measures are given in Table 4.
1.5.2 Empirical Strategy
The main question of interest in this section is whether credit outcomes and syn-
dicate structure changed for firms with relatively higher ex-ante exposure to tested
banks. Identification of the causal effect of stress testing on changes in the terms of
credit and syndicate structure is complicated by a number of factors. First, macroe-
conomic shocks could have strained the demand for firm borrowing, especially as the
sample period in this paper contains the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Second, firms
29I sum over each bank’s amount lent in each facility s.
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ex-ante more reliant on tested banks could have differed from less reliant firms on
both observable and unobservable dimensions. Third, tested banks could have con-
centrated their lending to particular types of firms, especially risky firms, potentially
resulting in a downward bias of the main estimates. In addition, firms relatively more
exposed to tested banks could have experienced reductions in lending in anticipation
of being tested, violating the parallel trends assumption.
To partially address these concerns, for this analysis I restrict the sample in this
section to the set of firms obtaining new loans in both pre- and post-test periods.
Taking first differences removes macroeconomic shocks common to all firms. In addi-
tion, including the set of firm controls identified in bank lending regressions controls
for observable shocks to firm credit demand. Furthermore, firm and deal character-
istics are well balanced across different levels of exposure to tested banks (Appendix
Tables A2 and A3), reducing concerns that tested banks might have systematically
extended credit to firms as a function of their risk. Likewise, I show that shares of
tested banks changed as a function of pre-test exposure only after the announcement
of the SCAP, satisfying the parallel trends assumption (Appendix Figure 1).
The main estimating equation tests whether syndicate-level outcomes changed
between firm f’s last pre-test and first post-test syndicate as a function of that firm’s
exposure to tested banks and other firm, deal, and lead arranger characteristics:
∆Outcomef,pre,post = α
F + βF1 Testedf,pre + γ
FControlsf,pre + ηf (3)
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where αF is a constant, Testedf,pre is firm f ’s pre-test exposure measure, and Controlsf,pre
is a vector of pre-test firm and syndicate controls. Credit outcomes at the syndicate
level include the growth rate of the size of the syndicate and a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the number of covenants on firm f ’s first post-test syndicate increased relative
to its last pre-test syndicate (0 otherwise). In order to study whether loan pricing
changed, I also match the last pre-test facility of a certain type to the first post-test
facility of the same type.30 In addition to credit outcomes, I investigate whether
shares of four main types of lenders changed as a function of firm test exposure:
tested banks, non-tested U.S. banks, foreign banks, and non-banks.
Firm controls include dummies for 1-digit SIC code, Census region,31 bond mar-
ket access, investment grade credit rating, and lagged values of log assets, book value
of leverage, cash/assets, tangible assets/assets, and profits/assets. Syndicate controls
include the aver-age maturity, collateral, purpose, the shares of revolving credit lines
in the pre-test syndicate, previous lenders, lead arrangers, and whether lenders had
a long relationship with the firm (> 5 years). Lead arranger controls include lagged
values of the log of bank assets, equity capital/assets, securities/assets, deposits and
short-term funds/assets, return on assets, and non-performing loans/gross loans for
the largest lead arranger in the syndicates. In addition, I include firm-level measures
of exposure to bank health and changes in equity capital ratios due to TARP invest-
ments weighted by pre-test syndicate shares.
Shocks to lenders more adversely affect small and opaque firms (Gertler and
30For example, I match based on revolving credit lines or different tranches of term loans (A, B,
etc.).
31Due to the small sample size, I am unable to include more disaggregated industry and geographic
controls without dropping a large number of firms.
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Gilchrist (1994)), suggesting that lenders could reduce their shares in syndicates of
risky firms. This would be consistent with the evidence presented in the lending re-
gressions. However, since lead arrangers hold relatively larger shares of syndicates
in these firms (Sufi (2007)), syndicates could have become more concentrated with
tested banks, especially for relationship borrowers, potentially smoothing shocks to
credit outcomes.32 Given these contrasting predictions, I also investigate whether
there was a differential effect as a function of firm bond market access.
1.5.3 Results
Table 9 presents evidence that firm-level credit outcomes did not change at the
intensive margin for firms with relatively higher test exposure. Test exposure coef-
ficients are standardized and can be interpreted as the percentage point change in
different outcomes for a firm with pre-test tested bank shares one standard deviation
above the mean (30 pp). Thus, increasing pre-test exposure to tested banks by one
standard-deviation above the mean did not correspond to significant changes in the
growth rate of loan syndicates (column 1), stricter covenants (column 2), the growth
rate of individual facilities (column 5), or changes in spreads on similar facilities (col-
umn 6). However, I do find evidence of significant compositional changes for firms
based on their access to the bond market. To be precise, I find that increasing pre-test
exposure to tested banks by one-standard deviation above the mean for speculative
grade firms resulted in a 15 pp reduction in syndicate growth (column 3), an 8 pp
32In fact, Allen and Paligorova (2015) find that banks passed along liquidity shocks to public firms
in Canada rather than private firms, while retaining larger shares in private loan syndicates due to
higher returns.
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higher likelihood of receiving stricter covenants (column 4), and a 14 pp reduction in
facility growth rates (column 7) after the SCAP relative to less exposed firms. I do
not find evidence of significant changes in loan pricing across firm types. Taken to-
gether, these results provide evidence of a contraction in credit supply for speculative
grade firms that were highly exposed to tested banks.
An important question is whether the observed changes in credit outcomes could
affect changes in the composition of loan syndicates after the SCAP. As risky firms
are most likely to be affected by shocks to their lenders, the substitution of firms
towards other types of lenders could have been accompanied by worsened terms of
credit. Results from the syndicate structure analysis are given in Table 10. I find
that the share of tested banks in post-test syndicates fell by 15 pp more for a firm
with ex-ante exposure to tested banks one standard deviation above the mean. More
than half of this reduction in tested bank shares was offset by foreign banks (10 pp),
while non-banks and other U.S. banks marginally increased their shares (2 pp each).
The reduction in tested bank shares in post-test syndicates occurred similarly across
all firms as a function of their access to the bond market (column 5). However, the
composition of changes in syndicate members differed substantially across these firms.
The majority of the reduction in tested bank shares for investment grade firms rela-
tively more exposed tested banks was filled by foreign banks (column 7). In contrast,
foreign banks and non-bank lenders offset the decline of tested banks in syndicates of
speculative grade firms relatively more exposed to tested banks (columns 6 and 7).
Much of these changes in syndicate structure were driven by changes at the ex-
tensive margin. For example, the large increase in foreign bank shares in investment
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grade firm syndicates was due to new foreign banks entering into syndicates relative
to existing foreign banks exiting (Appendix Table A10). I find minimal changes in the
composition of loan syndicates for existing lenders (Appendix Table A9), consistent
with results from the lending regressions.
While credit supply shocks differed at the extensive margin between gap and
non-gap banks, I do not find significant differences in firm-level credit outcomes for
firms as a function of their exposure to gap banks (Appendix Table A7). Thus, I
conclude that the observed changes in credit for speculative grade firms was due to
reductions in risk from all tested banks rather than exclusively from gap banks. In
Section 7 I explore in more depth some of the differences in firm-level outcomes as a
function of exposure to gap banks.
The results from this analysis demonstrate clear segmentation of the syndicated
loan market. Foreign bank shares increased in syndicates of all types of firms that
were relatively more exposed to tested banks, but especially investment grade firms.
In contrast, other US banks played a relatively larger role in offsetting part of the
reduction for relatively riskier borrowers (speculative grade firms). Overall, this evi-
dence is consistent with tested banks reducing both credit risk and liquidity risk after
the SCAP.
1.6 Firm Outcomes
The main focus of this paper is to determine whether firms were affected by
changes in lending behavior by tested banks. In order to examine whether there was
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a transmission of shocks from stress testing of banks to the real economy, I focus on
set of approximately 800 firms that obtained syndicated loans in the pre-test period.
Given the observed changes in lending at the intensive margin, in this section I explore
whether firms experienced changes in their overall ability to borrow as a function of
their exposure to tested banks. Then I test whether these firms subsequently adjusted
real firm-level outcomes.
1.6.1 Total Borrowing: Background
The evidence presented in the previous section suggests that firms relatively more
reliant on tested banks before the SCAP experienced large and significant declines
in tested bank shares after the SCAP. The composition of syndicates shifted towards
foreign banks for most firms, while other U.S. banks also increased their shares in
syndicates of risky firms. Given that speculative grade firms with high exposure to
tested banks experienced reductions in credit at the intensive margin, I test whether
there was a similar change in credit at the extensive margin.
The loss of tested banks as lenders could have affected firms’ ability to borrow on
similar terms after the test. Changes in credit could be driven by the need of lead ar-
rangers to increase spreads or change other non-price terms in order attract additional
lenders in place of tested banks. Lending relationships in the syndicated loan market
exhibit stickiness over time for both lead arrangers and participants (Chodorow-Reich
(2013)). In fact, firms receive lower spreads on subsequent loans when borrowing from
previous lenders (Bharath et al. (2009)). While non-bank financial institutions such
as certain institutional investors could ll in the gap for firms in need of financing, they
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generally extend credit at a higher cost (Nandy and Shao (2010)), especially for finan-
cially constrained firms (Lim, Minton, and Weisbach (2014)). However, Nini (2017)
finds that firms more reliant on borrowing institutional term loans before the finan-
cial crisis fully substituted this exposure by borrowing from the bond market, and
thus experienced no significant change in investment. Becker and Ivashina (2014) find
evidence of firms substituting towards bond issuance following credit supply shocks,
suggesting that firms highly exposed to tested banks could potentially increase debt
or equity to substitute the loss of credit. Given this evidence, whether firms rela-
tively more exposed to tested banks experienced changes in borrowing remains an
open question.
1.6.2 Total Borrowing: Empirical Strategy
The main question studied in this section is whether firms relatively more exposed
to tested banks experienced changes in their borrowing after the SCAP. Relative to
the previous analysis of loan syndicates, I utilize a wider set of firms that either
obtained a new loan in the two years prior to the SCAP or with loans outstanding
at the time of the SCAP, to determine whether certain firms substituted their loss
of credit by borrowing from other lenders or other sources. Many of the factors that
complicate identification of a causal effect of stress testing on syndicate outcomes
likely pose similar challenges for this sample of firms.33 I take a number of steps
to aid identification of the effect of stress testing on firm borrowing. As before, I
include controls for firm- and syndicate-level variables that proxy for credit demand
33Section 5.2 discusses the issues related to endogeneity of these estimates.
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and balance sheet controls of lead arrangers in each syndicate. In Appendix Tables A2
and A3 I demonstrate that firm and deal characteristics are balanced across different
levels of firm exposure to tested banks. Additionally, in Appendix Table A4 I show
that firm borrowing outcomes did not exhibit a systematic trend in the three years
before the SCAP, reducing concerns that firm outcomes might not have followed
parallel trends in the pre-test period.
The main estimating equation for this section models firm borrowing outcomes as
a function of shocks to firm credit demand and firm exposure to credit supply shocks.
∆Outcomef,pre,post = α
F + βF1 Testedf,pre + γ
FControlsf,pre + ηf (4)
where the set of controls are identical to those in the syndicate-level regressions, with
the exception that I use dummies for 2-digit SIC codes and state headquarters of
firms for this larger sample of firms. As syndicated loans are frequently renegotiated,
I define borrowing in this market similar to Chodorow-Reich (2013) as either obtaining
a new loan or a positive modification of an existing loan (increase in size, extension
of maturity, or loosening of existing covenants). In addition, I separately test for
changes in borrowing due either to obtaining a new loan or a positive modification.
Regressions of these discrete outcomes are performed using probit estimation. Firms
that do not borrow in the syndicated loan market could substitute to other types of
borrowing. In order to test whether this type of substitution occurred, I re-estimate
equation (4) using growth rates of the book value of equity and debt.34 For the
34I take three-year harmonized growth rates in order to reduce the reliance of outliers.
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regressions of syndicated loan outcomes, finding βF1 equal to 0 would affect a full
substitution of lenders in post-test syndicates for firms relatively more affected by
exposure to tested banks (Khwaja and Mian (2008)). As in prior sections, I explore
whether firms borrowed on similar terms after the SCAP as a function of their access
to the bond market in order to test for differential effects across firms. Given the
evidence presented so far, it remains an open question whether firm-level frictions
magnified the effect of reductions in risk by tested banks.
1.6.3 Total Borrowing: Results
The aforementioned analysis provides evidence that tested banks shifted their
exposure to safer firms following the SCAP. In addition, syndicates that were highly
concentrated with tested banks before the SCAP adjusted to become less concen-
trated afterward, while increases in shares of new lenders differed across firms.
Table 11 contains estimates from the baseline firm borrowing regressions. I find
no evidence to reject the null hypothesis that firms relatively more exposed to tested
banks experienced no change in their probability of borrowing after the SCAP. The
evidence presented in columns 1-3 suggests that highly exposed firms fully substituted
the loss of tested banks by borrowing on similar terms after the SCAP. Firms also
did not significantly increase equity or debt growth in the three years after the SCAP
as a function of pre-test exposure to tested banks (columns 4 and 5).
Columns 6-10 of Table 11 offer evidence that firms faced different borrowing
outcomes in response to the SCAP as a function of their access to the bond market.
Investment grade firms that were relatively more exposed to tested banks experienced
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significantly higher likelihoods of borrowing than less exposed firms, driven primarily
by higher likelihoods of obtaining new loans (columns 6 and 7). In contrast, specu-
lative grade firms relatively more exposed to tested banks experienced an 8 pp lower
probability of receiving positive modifications of existing loan than less exposed firms
(column 8). This result is consistent with the evidence in Table 10 showing that these
firms faced stricter covenants and obtained worse non-price terms of credit after the
SCAP. Importantly, these firms did not substitute this relative reduction in credit by
issuing new debt or equity after the test (columns 9 and 10).
On the whole, these results suggest that the reduction in risk by tested banks
affected speculative grade firms adversely. However, investment grade firms that were
relatively more exposed to tested banks bene tted from increased borrowing as tested
banks tilted their lending towards safer firms.
1.6.4 Real Outcomes: Background
Did firms that were highly exposed to tested banks in the syndicated loan market
adjust real outcomes after the test? A large empirical literature has demonstrated the
importance of a credit channel affecting real economic outcomes (Peek and Rosengren
(2000), Ashcraft (2005), Gan (2007), Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisben-
ner (2011), Cingano et al. (2016)). In addition, theory predicts that credit supply
shocks are most likely to affect firms reliant on external sources to finance spending
and investment (Bernanke and Gertler (1989)). Firms reliant on external finance that
are unable to borrow following shocks to their lenders respond by adjusting spending
and investment (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)). Chodorow-Reich (2013) shows that
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financially constrained firms responded to credit supply shocks by also reducing em-
ployment.
The evidence in this paper so far suggests that the change in the composition of
syndicates away from tested banks after the SCAP did not affect overall firm bor-
rowing, suggesting likely minimal effects on firm real outcomes. However, speculative
grade firms that were relatively more exposed to tested banks experienced significant
reductions in borrowing, while similarly exposed investment grade firms experienced
significant increases in credit. Given these differences in borrowing outcomes, the
focus of this section is to document how firm real outcomes changed as a function of
exposure to tested banks and financial constraints.
1.6.5 Real Outcomes: Empirical Strategy
This section examines whether firms that were affected by their ability to borrow
adjusted real outcomes in response to the SCAP. The estimation framework is a
difference-in-difference model that estimates changes in real outcomes for firms as a
function of test exposure. The hurdles to identification of the causal effect of stress
testing on firm outcomes are similar to those in the borrowing analysis. I argued in
prior sections that concerns of selection bias and parallel trends are likely less relevant
in this context.35 However, the identifying assumption is that stress testing uniquely
affected firm borrowing and real outcomes, conditional on controlling for firm credit
demand. The main estimating equation tests whether firms responded to the SCAP
35The test of parallel trends for firm real outcomes is given in Table A5.
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The outcomes of interest in this paper are motivated by previous work quantifying
firm-level real effects of credit supply shocks (Chodorow-Reich (2013), Fraisse et al.
(2015), Cingano et al. (2016), Gropp et al. (2018)). The first outcome of interest is
the three-year rate of fixed investment, calculated as cumulative capital expenditures
over 2009-2011, scaled by the 2008 book value of assets for each firm. In addition to
plants and equipment, firms could demand credit for intangible expenditures. The
second outcome that I consider is intangible investment, defined as cumulative net
acquisitions, expenditures on research and development, and advertising expenditures
over 2009-2011, scaled by the 2008 book value of assets. The remaining outcomes
studied are the harmonized growth rate of assets and employment, calculated between
2008 and 2011. I utilize the same proxies for firm demand and firm exposure to credit
supply shocks (lead arranger characteristics) as in prior sections. In addition, I test for
differential changes in real outcomes across firms with different bond market access.
1.6.6 Real Outcomes: Results
Results for the regressions of firm real outcomes are given in table 12. Firms
relatively more exposed to tested banks did not significantly adjust spending on capi-
tal expenditures, intangible expenditures, assets or employment following the SCAP,
conditional on controlling for firm risk characteristics (columns 1-4). These results
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are consistent with the observed substitution of borrowing by these firms. Results
in columns 5 through 8 demonstrate that there was important heterogeneity in the
response of firm real outcomes to their ability to borrow after the SCAP. Consistent
with the fact that highly exposed speculative grade firms borrowed on relatively less
favorable terms after the SCAP, I find that these firms subsequently reduced fixed
investment by 3 pp and employment growth by 7 pp relative to less exposed firms in
the three years after the SCAP (columns 5 and 8). On the other hand, investment
grade firms that were relatively more exposed to tested banks increased intangible
investment by 5 pp more than less exposed firms after the test (column 6).
The results in this section suggest that firms relatively more exposed to tested
banks did not experience changes in their borrowing after the SCAP, and thus did
not adjust real outcomes. However, highly exposed speculative grade firms reduced
fixed investment and employment growth in response to their loss of credit. Invest-
ment grade firms bene tted from increased access to credit from tested banks and
subsequently increased intangible investment after the SCAP.
1.7 Extensions
1.7.1 Bank Heterogeneity: Overview
This section tests for heterogeneity in the treatment effect. Tested banks could
have adjusted their lending behavior differentially as a function of their performance
on the test. I first consider whether bank- and firm-level outcomes changed as a
function of the size of each bank’s capital gap. Then I study the response of banks to
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the 2013 CCAR/DFAST exercise to determine if the observed response to the SCAP
can be extended to later rounds of stress testing.
1.7.2 Bank Heterogeneity: Capital Gaps (SCAP)
The results of supervisory stress tests can potentially affect tested banks in dif-
ferent ways depending on the outcome of tests. Results in Table 7 suggest that banks
with positive capital gaps for the most part did not differentially change their lend-
ing behavior relative to non-gap banks. However, the magnitudes of these estimates
suggest a relatively more conservative lending response than among non-gap banks.36
At the firm level, I do not find sufficient evidence to conclude that firms relatively
more exposed to gap banks experienced significantly worse credit outcomes (Table
A8), significantly different changes in syndicate structure (Table A11), or significant
changes in borrowing (Table A13) or real outcomes (Table A15) relative to less ex-
posed firms.
Stress tests provide information beyond simply classifying institutions based on
deficiencies in their capital planning. In the context of the SCAP, I construct a
proxy which captures the difference between capital ratios under the severely adverse
scenario and current capital ratios:
∆CapRatioActual−Fed = CapRatioActual − CapRatioStressedFed (6)
3636 Identification of the causal effect of failing a stress test on lending and firm outcomes is com-
plicated by the fact that failing banks differed from passing banks not only on observable dimensions,
like measures of bank health, but potentially on unobservable dimensions as well. Gap banks could
have failed the SCAP likely because of weakness in their lending portfolios and reliance on risky
firms. Thus the causal interpretation of these estimates is less straightforward than for estimates of
stress testing itself.
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This measure captures the percentage point increase in capital ratios that failing
banks would be required to raise in response to the test. To be precise, it is calculated
as each failing bank’s capital gap (or SCAP “buffer”) divided by its risk-weighted
assets from the beginning of the test.37 This measure excludes capital actions that
occurred between the time banks were informed of their capital gap and the release
of the results, and thus can be viewed as plausibly exogenous to any changes in
bank behavior that might have occurred before the test. Another way to think of
∆CapRatioActual−Fed is each bank’s likelihood of not having sufficient capital under
a stressed scenario affecting all banks in the economy, or its contribution to systemic
risk (Acharya et al. (2018)). For all of the main regressions, I interact the capital gap
dummy with this measure. Results are given in Appendix Tables A8, A12, A14, and
A16 and are generally similar to those found for the discrete measure of the capital
gap, suggesting that banks with larger capital gaps responded more conservatively
to the test than banks with smaller capital gaps, although firm-level outcomes were
generally not significantly different than for firms less exposed to gap banks.
1.7.3 Firm Heterogeneity: Overview
This section tests for the importance of firm-level frictions in driving the results
in this paper. Credit supply shocks can adversely affect firms when there is large
information asymmetry between lenders and firms. I investigate the extent to which
tested banks reduced their exposure to these firms, and whether firm-level outcomes
were subsequently affected.
37Me´sonnier and Monks (2015) utilize a similar measure for European stress tests
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1.7.4 Firm Heterogeneity: First Time Borrowers
Lead arrangers hold larger shares in syndicates of opaque borrowers as a means
of addressing the moral hazard problem with participant lenders (Sufi (2007)). As a
way to test for the importance of these frictions in the transmission of shocks to firms,
I include interactions of a first-time borrower dummy with tested bank measures in
all specifications to allow for these differential effects. First, I do not find significant
differences in credit outcomes for firms that were highly exposed to tested banks
and were first time borrowers (Table A17). However, syndicates for these unrated
and speculative grade firms became more concentrated with U.S. banks after the
test (Table A19). Table A21 suggests that first time borrowers were significantly
less likely to borrow after the test, and consequently reduced fixed investment and
employment growth (Table A23). These adverse effects were especially pronounced
among speculative grade firms.
1.7.5 Firm Heterogeneity: Lending Relationships
Relationships between lenders and borrowers in the syndicated loan market are
highly persistent over time, both for lead arrangers and participants (Chodorow-
Reich (2013)). Bank-dependent firms benefit by borrowing from highly capitalized
banks, smoothing shocks to the real economy (Schwert (2018)). Moreover, the loss
of lending relationships can adversely affect firm borrowing outcomes (Bharath et
al. (2009)). To examine the importance of lending relationships, I re-estimate all
specifications with additional interactions of a lending relationship dummy (equal to
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1 for lender- firm pairs lasting longer than 5 year, 0 otherwise) and the tested bank
regressors. I do not find strong evidence to suggest that firms with high exposure
to tested banks and longer lending relationships experienced differential changes in
credit outcomes after the SCAP (Table A18) or syndicate structure (Table A20). At
the firm level, I find that investment grade firm with high exposure to tested banks
and long lending relationships were significantly more likely to borrow (Table A22)
and increase intangible investment after the test (Table A24).
1.8 Conclusion
Banks included in the early rounds of U.S. stress tests shifted their lending toward
relatively safer firms after the SCAP. This resulted in a change in the composition
of syndicate members away from tested banks, but did not dramatically affect over-
all borrowing and firm outcomes. However, the response differed importantly across
firms as a function of their access to the bond market. Foreign banks offset much
of the change in post-test syndicates for investment grade firms that were highly ex-
posed to tested banks, resulting in increases in borrowing and investment for these
firms. Speculative grade firms highly reliant on tested banks experienced increases in
syndicate shares across non-tested U.S. banks and foreign banks. As a result, these
firms did not borrow on similar terms after the test and responded by reducing in-
vestment and employment.
Bank stress testing plays an important role in improving financial stability and
restoring confidence in the banking system. However, it can also result in reductions
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in exposures to risk by banks included in stress tests. The change in composition of
risk in post-test syndicates of large corporate firms provides insights into how macro-
prudential policies can reallocate risks in the financial system, while not dramatically
affecting the real economy.
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1.9 Tables
Table 1: List of U.S. Bank-Holding Companies
Passing Tested Banks Failing Tested Banks
American Express Company Ally Financial Inc.
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation Bank of America Corporation
BB&T Corporation Citigroup Inc.
Capital One Financial Corporation Fifth Third Bancorp
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. KeyCorp
JP Morgan Chase & Co. Morgan Stanley
MetLife, Inc. The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.
State Street Corporation Regions Financial Corporation
U.S. Bancorp SunTrust Banks, Inc.
Wells Fargo & Co.
Other Banks Other Banks
Associated Bank Huntington Bancshares
BOK Financial Jefferies
Brown Brothers Harriman M&T Bank
CapitalSource Finance Marshall & Ilsley Corp
CIT Group Mid first Bank
City National Bank Northern Trust Corp
Cobank PrivateBancorp
Comerica Raymond James Financial
First Tennessee National Silicon Valley Bancshares
FirstMerit Bank UMB Bank
Frost National Bank Webster Bank
General Electric Capital Zions Bancorporation
Hancock Bank
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Table 2: List of Foreign Bank-Holding Companies
Bank Name Country Bank Name Country
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Austria Societe Generale France
ANZ Banking Group Australia Barclays Great Britain
Westpac Banking Australia HSBC Banking Group Great Britain
Dexia Bank Belgium Lloyds Banking Group Great Britain
KBC Group Belgium Royal Bank of Scotland Great Britain
BMO Capital Markets Canada Standard Chartered Bank Great Britain
CIBC Canada Allied Irish Banks Ireland
RBC Capital Markets Canada Bank of Ireland Group Ireland
Scotiabank Canada Bank Hapoalim Israel
Toronto Dominion Bank Canada Bank Leumi Le-Israel Israel
Credit Suisse Switzerland Israel Discount Bank Israel
UBS Switzerland Intesa Sanpaolo Italy
Bank of China China UniCredit Italy
Bank of Communications China Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Japan
BayernLB Germany Mizuho Financial Japan
Commerzbank Germany Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Japan
Deutsche Bank Germany ABN AMRO Bank Netherlands
DZ Bank Germany Fortis Bank Netherlands
HSH Nordbank Germany ING Group Netherlands
Landesbank Hessen-Thuringen Germany Rabobank Netherlands
NordLB Group Germany DNB Norway
Portigon Germany Nordea Bank Sweden
BBVA Spain United Overseas Bank Singapore
Banco Santander Spain Cathay United Bank Taiwan
BNP Paribas France Chang Hwa Commercial Bank Taiwan
CM-CIC France First Commercial Bank of Taiwan Taiwan
Credit Agricole France Hua Nan Commercial Bank Taiwan
Natixis France
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Table 3: Matched Bank-Firm Summary Statistics
Bank-Firm Outcomes Number Mean Std. Dev. Min p25 p50 p75 Max
Loan Growth Rate (Pct Change) 2398 -0.02 0.11 -0.35 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.61
Exit (D) 2446 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Enter (D) 2707 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Bank-Firm Regressors Number Mean Std. Dev. Min p25 p50 p75 Max
Tested (D) 5133 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Gap (D) 5133 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Gap Size / Risk-Weighted Assets 5153 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Log Bank Assets 4835 20.19 1.35 15.16 19.27 20.58 21.28 22.08
Equity/Assets 4835 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.17
Securities/Assets 4835 0.33 0.18 0.00 0.18 0.31 0.42 0.86
Return on Assets 4829 0.01 0.01 -0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07
Non-Performing Loans/Gross Loans 4507 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.10
Deposits and S-T Funds/Assets 4814 0.65 0.15 0.11 0.59 0.69 0.76 0.92
CPP Investments/Assets 4835 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bank Health 5153 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Collateral (D) 5153 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Corporate Purpose (D) 5153 0.70 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Maturity 5153 40.65 19.53 0.00 28.00 39.00 60.00 178.00
Log Firm Assets 5153 22.19 1.61 17.89 20.97 21.97 23.37 26.36
Book Value of Leverage 5153 2.77 5.47 0.03 1.01 1.61 2.74 63.76
Cash/Assets 5153 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.09 1.00
Tangible Assets/Assets 5153 0.49 0.27 0.00 0.26 0.48 0.72 0.95
Profits/Assets 5153 0.14 0.06 -0.04 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.41
Rated (D) 5153 0.70 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Investment Grade (D) 5153 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
This table provides summary statistics of the main outcome and explanatory variables for the
matched bank- firm analysis. Dummy variables are denoted by (D).
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Table 4: Firm-Level Summary Statistics
Syndicate-Level Outcomes Number Mean Std. Dev. Min p25 p50 p75 Max
Test Share 307 -0.01 0.28 -1.00 -0.15 0.00 0.11 1.00
Non-Test US Bank Share 307 0.01 0.17 -1.00 -0.03 0.00 0.03 1.00
Non-US Bank Share 307 0.01 0.23 -1.00 -0.09 0.00 0.10 1.00
Non-Bank Share 307 0.00 0.14 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Lead Test Share 307 0.04 0.31 -1.00 -0.07 0.01 0.19 1.00
Lead Non-Test US Bank Share 307 0.01 0.14 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Lead Non-US Bank Share 307 0.02 0.21 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Lead Non-Bank Share 307 0.00 0.11 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Firm-Level Outcomes Number Mean Std. Dev. Min p25 p50 p75 Max
Borrow (D) 897 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
New Loan (D) 897 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Positive Modification (D) 897 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Harmonized 3-year Equity Growth Rate 752 0.12 0.48 -1.99 -0.06 0.14 0.36 1.87
Harmonized 3-year Debt Growth Rate 778 0.08 0.43 -1.70 -0.14 0.06 0.28 1.82
Tangible Investment Rate 3-year 776 0.18 0.22 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.20 1.71
Intangible Investment Rate 3-year 711 0.20 0.41 -1.23 0.01 0.09 0.26 4.96
Harmonized 3-year Assets Growth Rate 780 0.10 0.35 -1.71 -0.07 0.09 0.26 1.66
Harmonized 3-year Emp Growth Rate 744 0.04 0.32 -1.61 -0.08 0.02 0.17 2.00
Harmonized 3-year Sales Growth Rate 778 0.01 0.35 -1.66 -0.15 0.01 0.18 2.00
Firm-Level Regressors Number Mean Std. Dev. Min p25 p50 p75 Max
Test Exposure 897 0.61 0.29 0.00 0.43 0.62 0.85 1.00
Gap Exposure 897 0.45 0.29 0.00 0.26 0.42 0.61 1.00
Gap Size Exposure 897 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
Lead Test Exposure 897 0.36 0.31 0.00 0.16 0.28 0.49 1.00
Threshold Test Exposure 897 0.08 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.00
Rated (D) 897 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Investment Grade (D) 897 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Log Firm Assets 897 21.02 1.78 16.08 19.74 20.88 22.19 27.76
Book Value of Leverage 897 2.19 4.39 0.03 0.73 1.24 2.14 75.17
Cash/Assets 897 0.11 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.13 1.00
Tangible Assets/Assets 897 0.44 0.26 0.00 0.23 0.42 0.64 0.95
Profits/Assets 897 0.12 0.11 -0.74 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.71
First Time Borrower (D) 897 0.65 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Share Revolver 897 0.82 0.34 0.00 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00
Share Term A Loan 897 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Number of Covenants 897 0.94 1.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 5.00
Share Collateralized 897 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.85 1.00 1.00
Maturity 897 48.74 20.17 0.00 36.00 60.00 60.00 168.00
Share Corporate Purpose 897 0.58 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Share Previous Lead 897 0.55 0.29 0.00 0.31 0.47 0.79 1.00
Share Previous Lender 897 0.67 0.38 0.00 0.44 0.84 1.00 1.00
Share Long Relationship 897 0.40 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.75 1.00
Log Lead Bank Assets 897 6.90 1.13 1.84 6.45 7.32 7.48 8.26
Lead Bank Equity/Assets 897 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.24
Lead Bank Securities/Assets 897 0.33 0.15 0.00 0.25 0.32 0.38 0.77
Lead Bank Dep and S-T Funds/Assets 897 0.67 0.14 0.00 0.62 0.69 0.71 1.53
Lead Bank Return on Assets 897 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04
Lead Bank NPL/Gross Loans 897 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04
Lead Bank Exposure 897 0.48 0.30 0.04 0.24 0.37 0.66 1.00
This table provides summary statistics of the main outcome and explanatory variables for the
syndicate-level and firm-level analysis. Dummy variables are denoted by (D).
59
Table 5: Bank Balance-Sheet Characteristics
Pre-SCAP Bank Characteristics (2007-2008)
Characteristic Non-Tested Tested Difference p-value
Total Assets ($ Bln USD) 607.46 612.27 -4.82 0.98
Securities / Assets 30.87 30.88 -0.01 1.00
Gross Loans / Assets 53.82 49.32 4.49 0.37
Non-Performing Loans / Gross Loans 1.93 0.99 0.94 0.02
Return on Assets 0.47 0.40 0.07 0.79
Equity Capital / Assets 5.71 8.08 -2.37 0.00
Deposits and Short-Term Funds / Assets 64.55 60.57 3.98 0.40
Tangible Common Equity / Tangible Assets 4.48 4.06 0.42 0.51
Adjustment of Bank Characteristics (2009-2010 vs. 2007-2008)
Characteristic Non-Tested Tested Difference p-value
Total Assets 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.48
Securities 0.08 0.25 -0.17 0.11
Gross Loans 0.10 -0.04 0.14 0.03
Non-Performing Loans 0.87 1.47 -0.60 0.00
Risk-Weighted Assets -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.64
Tangible Assets 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.50
Securities / Assets 0.17 4.85 -4.68 0.00
Gross Loans / Assets 0.14 -3.42 3.56 0.04
Risk-Weighted Assets / Assets -0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.97
Non-Performing Loans / Gross Loans 1.80 2.34 -0.54 0.37
Return on Assets -0.31 -0.47 0.16 0.46
Total Equity 0.13 0.21 -0.08 0.33
Tangible Common Equity 0.22 0.38 -0.16 0.10
Total Deposits and Short-Term Funds 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.23
Total Equity / Assets 0.33 0.95 -0.62 0.08
Total Deposits and Short-Term Funds / Assets 0.65 -0.73 1.38 0.33
Tangible Common Equity / Tangible Assets 0.35 1.15 -0.80 0.03
The upper panel of this table includes summary statistics of tested and not tested
financial institutions averaged over 2007-2008. Means of bank characteristics are
displayed in columns 1 (non-tested including new CCAR entrants) and 2 (tested only
SCAP banks). Differences of mean values are given in column 3 and p-values from
t-tests of the equality of means in column 4. The lower panel of this table includes
summary statistics of average differences of bank characteristics between 2009-2010
relative to 2007-2008.
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Regressors: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tested 0.01 -0.08** -0.07* 0.01 -0.01 0.04
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06)
× Rated 0.02 -0.13 -0.21**
(0.01) (0.08) (0.08)
× Rated × Inv Grade 0.01 0.01 0.10
(0.01) (0.08) (0.07)
E[Dep Var | Tested = 1]
Speculative Grade Firms 0.01 -0.14** -0.18**
(0.01) (0.07) (0.07)
Investment Grade Firms 0.02* -0.12*** -0.08
(0.01) (0.05) (0.05)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm × Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank-Firms 2083 2131 2335 2083 2131 2335
R-squared 0.50 0.47 0.37 0.51 0.49 0.38
This table provides estimates from regressions of loan outcomes on firm, facility, and bank character-
istics. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 4 is the change in the size of bank b’s commitment to
firm f’s first post-test syndicate (2009-2010) relative to its last pre-test syndicate (2007-2008) scaled
by the total size of the last pre-test syndicate. The dependent variable in columns 2 and 5 is a dummy
equal to 1 if a bank- firm pair existing in the last pre-test syndicate (2007-2008) did not exist in the
first post-test syndicate (2009-2010) and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 6 is
a dummy equal to 1 if a bank- firm pair existing in the first post-test syndicate (2009-2010) newly
entered the syndicate and 0 if a bank- firm pair existing in the first post-test syndicate (2009-2010) also
existed in the last pre-test syndicate (2007-2008). Tested is a dummy equal to 1 if bank b was included
in the SCAP, 0 if not. Firm controls include dummies for 2-digit SIC code, state, bond market access
(rated), investment grade credit rating, and lagged values of the log of assets, book value of leverage,
cash/assets, tangible assets/assets, and profits/assets. Deal controls include the syndicate’s average
maturity, total number of covenants, the number of lead arrangers and total lenders, and dummies
for collateral, whether the loan was used for corpo-rate purposes, and year that the pre-test syndicate
was extended. Bank controls include the share of Capital Purchase Program capital pledged to bank
b scaled by total assets as of 2008Q4 and standardized lagged values of the log of bank assets, equity
capital/assets, securities/total assets, deposits and short-term funds/total assets, return on assets,
non-performing loans/gross loans, and bank health (lending done in the post-test period to all firms
other than f divided by lending done in the pre-test period to all firms other than f). Bank- firm con-
trols include interactions of all bank characteristics with dummies for whether a firm was rated before
the SCAP and whether a rated firm held an investment grade credit rating. The sample of loans in
columns 1-2 and 4-5 includes all loan syndicates with at least one lead arranger and one participant,
and at least one tested bank and one non-tested bank in each pre-test syndicate (the loan growth
regressions also Winsorize at the 2nd and 99th percentile values of loan growth). The sample of loans
in columns 3 and 6 includes all syndicate with at least one lead arranger and one participant, and
at least one tested bank and one non-tested bank in each post-test syndicate. The post-test period
covers Feb 2009-Dec 2010 and the pre-test period cover January 2007-January 2009. Standard errors
given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * denote significance at
the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 61








Regressors: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tested 0.01 -0.10** -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.08
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05)
× Rated 0.02 -0.17* -0.22**
(0.02) (0.10) (0.08)
× Rated × Inv Grade 0.00 -0.02 0.06
(0.01) (0.08) (0.07)
Tested × Gap -0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 -0.09
(0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06)
× Rated -0.01 0.08 0.01
(0.02) (0.09) (0.05)
× Rated × Inv Grade 0.00 0.06 0.07*
(0.01) (0.07) (0.04)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lender Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm × Lender Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank-Firms 2083 2131 2335 2083 2131 2335
R-squared 0.50 0.47 0.37 0.51 0.49 0.38
This table provides estimates from regressions of loan outcomes on firm, facility, and bank character-
istics. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 4 is the change in the size of bank b’s commitment to
firm f ’s first post-test syndicate (2009-2010) relative to its last pre-test syndicate (2007-2008) scaled
by the total size of the last pre-test syndicate. The dependent variable in columns 2 and 5 is a dummy
equal to 1 if a bank- firm pair existing in the last pre-test syndicate (2007-2008) did not exist in the
first post-test syndicate (2009-2010) and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 6 is
a dummy equal to 1 if a bank- firm pair existing in the first post-test syndicate (2009-2010) newly
entered the syndicate and 0 if a bank- firm pair existing in the first post-test syndicate (2009-2010) also
existed in the last pre-test syndicate (2007-2008). Tested is a dummy equal to 1 if bank b was included
in the SCAP, 0 if not. Gap is a dummy equal to 1 if bank b was included in the SCAP and found
to have a positive capital gap, 0 if not. Firm controls include dummies for 2-digit SIC code, state,
bond market access (rated), investment grade credit rating, and lagged values of the log of assets,
book value of leverage, cash/assets, tangible assets/assets, and profits/assets. Deal controls include
the syndicate’s average maturity, total number of covenants, the number of lead arrangers and total
lenders, and dummies for collateral, whether the loan was used for corporate purposes, and year that
the pre-test syndicate was extended. Bank controls include the share of Capital Purchase Program
capital pledged to bank b scaled by total assets as of 2008Q4 and standardized lagged values of the
log of bank assets, equity capital/assets, securities/total assets, deposits and short-term funds/total
assets, return on assets, non-performing loans/gross loans, and bank health (lending done in the post-
test period to all firms other than f divided by lending done in the pre-test period to all firms other
than f). Bank- firm controls include interactions of all bank characteristics with dummies for whether
a firm was rated before the SCAP and whether a rated firm held an investment grade credit rating.
The sample of loans in columns 1-2 and 4-5 includes all loan syndicates with at least one lead arranger
and one participant, and at least one tested bank and one non-tested bank in each pre-test syndicate
(the loan growth regressions also Winsorize at the 2nd and 99th percentile values of loan growth).
The sample of loans in columns 3 and 6 includes all syndicate with at least one lead arranger and one
participant, and at least one tested bank and one non-tested bank in each post-test syndicate. The
post-test period covers Feb 2009-Dec 2010 and the pre-test period cover January 2007-January 2009.
Standard errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Total Effects: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
E[DepVar | Tested = 1]
Non-Gap Banks
All Firms 0.01 -0.10** -0.03
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Unrated Firms -0.01 0.01 0.08
(0.02) (0.06) (0.05)
Speculative Grade Firms 0.02 -0.16** -0.14*
(0.01) (0.08) (0.08)
Investment Grade Firms 0.02** -0.18*** -0.08
(0.01) (0.05) (0.05)
Gap Banks
All Firms 0.01 -0.07** -0.10*
(0.01) (0.03) (0.05)
Unrated Firms -0.01 -0.03 -0.01
(0.02) (0.06) (0.07)
Speculative Grade Firms 0.01 -0.12 -0.22***
(0.01) (0.08) (0.08)
Investment Grade Firms 0.01 -0.09* -0.08
(0.01) (0.05) (0.05)
This table provides estimates of total effects from regressions of loan outcomes on firm, facility, and
bank characteristics in Table 7. Standard errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the
bank level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 9: Firm-Level Intensive Margin Regressions (SCAP: Testing)
Dependent Variables:
Syndicate-Level Facility-Level
Syndicate Covenant Syndicate Covenant Facility ∆Spread Facility ∆Spread
Growth Increase Growth Increase Growth Growth
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Test Exp -0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.05 5.90 0.09 -7.40
× Rated (0.07) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.06) (9.21) (0.10) (14.24)
-0.11 0.08 -0.23 7.59
× Rated (0.10) (0.04) (0.12) (16.26)
0.21 -0.07 0.27 9.86
× Inv Grade (0.13) (0.05) (0.08) (26.21)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp]
Speculative Grade Firms -0.15** 0.08** -0.14* 0.19
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (14.33)
Investment Grade Firms 0.06 0.01 0.13 10.05
(0.14) (0.06) (0.10) (19.67)
Firm and Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Bank Controls N N Y Y N N Y Y
R-squared 0.21 0.16 0.26 0.25 0.21 0.23 0.35 0.36
Number of Firms 298 330 298 330 233 250 233 250
This table provides estimates from regressions of firm-level borrowing outcomes on firm, facility, and
bank characteristics. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 3 is the percent change in the size of firm
f ’s first post-test syndicate (2009-2010) relative to its last pre-test syndicate (2007-2008). The dependent
variable in columns 2 and 4 is a dummy equal to 1 if the number of covenants in firm f’s first post-
test syndicate (2009-2010) exceeded the number in its last pre-test syndicate (2007-2008). Coefficient
estimates reported in columns 2 and 4 are marginal effects. The dependent variable in columns 5 and 7
is the percent change in the size of firm f’s first post-test facility (2009-2010) relative to its last pre-test
facility (2007-2008), where facilities from different periods are matched according to their type (revolving
credit line, term loan A, B, ...). The dependent variable in columns 6 and 8 is the basis point change
in firm f ’s first post-test facility (2009-2010) relative to its last pre-test facility (2007-2008), where
facilities from different periods are matched according to their type (revolving credit line, term loan A,
B, ...). Test Exp equals firm f’s exposure to tested banks in its last pre-test syndicate (weighted by
loan shares). Firm controls include dummies for 1-digit SIC code, Census region, bond market access,
investment grade credit rating, and lagged values of log assets, book value of leverage, cash/assets,
tangible assets/assets, and profits/assets. Syndicate controls include the average maturity, collateral,
purpose, number of lead arrangers and lenders in the last pre-test syndicate, the share of previous lead
arrangers and lenders in the last pre-test syndicate, whether lenders had a long relationship with the
firm (¿ 5 years), and whether the firm borrowed from the syndicated loan market for the first time.
Bank controls include standardized values of the largest lead arranger’s lagged log of bank assets, equity
capital/assets, securities/assets, deposits and short-term funds/assets, return on assets, non-performing
loans/gross loans, bank health (lending done in the post-test period to all firms other than f divided by
lending done in the pre-test period to all firms other than f), and the weighted average of the size of
Capital Purchase Program investments scaled by total assets in 2008Q4 (for U.S. banks). Bank- firm
controls include interactions of all bank characteristics with dummies for whether a firm was rated before
the SCAP and whether a rated firm held an investment grade credit rating. The sample of loans in all
columns includes the set of firms that either obtained a new loan in both periods or received some form
of modification of an existing loan in the post-test period. Growth rates in columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 are
Winsorized at the 90th percentile (growth rates exceeding 193% and 220%, respectively). Changes in
spreads in columns 6 and 8 exclude values exceeding 400 bp increases. The post-test period covers Feb
2009-Dec 2010 and the pre-test period cover January 2007-January 2009. Standard errors given below
coefficient estimates are clustered at the level of the largest lead arranger in each pre-test syndicate.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 10: Syndicate Structure Regression Results (SCAP: Testing)
Dependent Variables: Change in Syndicate Shares
Tested Other US Foreign Non-Bank Tested Other US Foreign Non-Bank
Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Test Exp -0.15 0.02 0.10 0.02 -0.13 0.03 0.09 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
× Rated -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
× Rated × Inv Grade -0.05 -0.08 0.11 0.02
(0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp]
Speculative Grade Firms -0.15*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Investment Grade Firms -0.21*** -0.02 0.20*** 0.03
(0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Firm and Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Bank Controls N N N N Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.36 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.41 0.31 0.34 0.34
Number of Firms 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331
Number of Clusters 23 22 23 23 23 22 23 23
This table provides estimates from regressions of syndicate structure on firm and deal characteristics.
The dependent variable is the change in the share of different lenders in firm f’s first post-test syndicate
minus the share of the same type of lender in its last pre-test syndicate, where shares are calculated using
loan weights. Test Exp equals firm f’s exposure to tested banks in its last pre-test syndicate (weighted by
loan shares). Firm controls include dummies for 1-digit SIC code, Census region, bond market access,
investment grade credit rating, and lagged values of log assets, book value of leverage, cash/assets,
tangible assets/assets, and profits/assets. Syndicate controls include the average maturity, collateral,
purpose, number of lead arrangers and lenders in the last pre-test syndicate, the share of previous lead
arrangers and lenders in the last pre-test syndicate, whether lenders had a long relationship with the
firm (> 5 years), and whether the firm borrowed from the syndicated loan market for the first time.
Bank controls include standardized values of the largest lead arranger’s lagged log of bank assets, equity
capital/assets, securities/assets, deposits and short-term funds/assets, return on assets, non-performing
loans/gross loans, bank health (lending done in the post-test period to all firms other than f divided by
lending done in the pre-test period to all firms other than f), and the weighted average of the size of
Capital Purchase Program investments scaled by total assets in 2008Q4 (for U.S. banks). Bank- firm
controls include interactions of all bank characteristics with dummies for whether a firm was rated before
the SCAP and whether a rated firm held an investment grade credit rating. Standard errors given below
coefficient estimates are clustered at the level of the largest lead arranger in each pre-test syndicate.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 11: Total Borrowing Regression Results (SCAP: Testing)
Dependent Variables:
Borrow New Modify Equity Debt Borrow New Modify Equity Debt
Loan Growth Growth Loan Growth Growth
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Test Exp 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
× Rated -0.05 -0.02 -0.08 -0.05 0.01
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
× Rated × Inv Grade 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp]
Spec Grade -0.05 -0.01 -0.08*** -0.04 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Invest Grade 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.06 -0.04 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.22
Number of Firms 751 747 716 692 714 751 747 716 692 714
Number of Clusters 30 30 29 29 29 30 30 29 29 29
This table provides estimates from regressions of borrowing outcomes on firm and deal characteristics.
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 6 is a dummy equal to 1 if firm f received either a new loan or a
positive modification in its first syndicate after the SCAP (over 2009-2010) and 0 if not. The dependent
variable in columns 2 and 7 is a dummy equal to 1 if firm f received a new loan in its first syndicate after
the SCAP (over 2009-2010) and 0 if not. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 8 is a dummy equal
to 1 if firm f received a positive modification in its first syndicate after the SCAP (over 2009-2010) and
0 if not. The dependent variable in columns 4, 5, 9, and 10 are the three-year harmonized growth rates
(over 2009-2011) of equity and debt, respectively. Test Exp equals firm f’s exposure to tested banks in
its last pre-test syndicate (weighted by loan shares). Firm controls include dummies for 2-digit SIC code,
state, bond market access, investment grade credit rating, and lagged values of log assets, book value of
leverage, cash/assets, tangible assets/assets, and profits/assets. Syndicate controls include the average
maturity, collateral, purpose, number of lead arrangers and lenders in the last pre-test syndicate, the
share of previous lead arrangers and lenders in the last pre-test syndicate, whether lenders had a long
relationship with the firm (¿ 5 years), and whether the firm borrowed from the syndicated loan market
for the first time. Bank controls include standardized values of the largest lead arranger’s lagged log
of bank assets, equity capital/assets, securities/assets, deposits and short-term funds/assets, return on
assets, non-performing loans/gross loans, bank health (lending done in the post-test period to all firms
other than f divided by lending done in the pre-test period to all firms other than f), and the weighted
average of the size of Capital Purchase Program investments scaled by total assets in 2008Q4 (for U.S.
banks). Bank- firm controls include interactions of all bank characteristics with dummies for whether
a firm was rated before the SCAP and whether a rated firm held an investment grade credit rating.
Standard errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the level of the largest lead arranger
in each pre-test syndicate. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 12: Firm Real Outcomes (SCAP: Testing)
Dependent Variables (3-Year Growth Rates):
Fixed Int Assets Emp Fixed Int Assets Emp
Explanatory Invest Invest Invest Invest
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Test Exp -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
× Rated -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.07
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
× Rated × Inv Grade 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp]
Spec Grade Firms -0.03* 0.01 -0.03 -0.07**
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Invest Grade Firms 0.00 0.05*** 0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Bank Controls N N N N Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.54 0.37 0.24 0.21 0.55 0.38 0.25 0.23
Number of Firms 753 687 753 719 753 687 753 719
Number of Clusters 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
This table provides estimates from regressions of firm real outcomes on firm and deal character-
istics. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 5 is firm f’s 3-year investment rate, calculated
as capital expenditures from 2009-2011 divided by total assets in 2008. The dependent variable
in columns 2 and 6 is firm f’s 3-year investment rate, calculated as capital expenditures from
2009-2011 divided by total assets in 2008. The dependent variables in columns 3 and 7 are firm
f’s harmonized 3-year growth rate (from 2009-2011 relative to 2008) of assets. The dependent
variables in columns 4 and 8 are firm f’s harmonized 3-year growth rate (from 2009-2011 relative
to 2008) of employment. Test Exp equals firm f’s exposure to tested banks in its last pre-test
syndicate (weighted by loan shares). Firm controls include dummies for 2-digit SIC code, state,
bond market access, investment grade credit rating, and lagged values of log assets, book value
of leverage, cash/assets, tangible assets/assets, and profits/assets. Syndicate controls include
the average maturity, collateral, purpose, number of lead arrangers and lenders in the last pre-
test syndicate, the share of previous lead arrangers and lenders in the last pre-test syndicate,
whether lenders had a long relationship with the firm (¿ 5 years), and whether the firm borrowed
from the syndicated loan market for the first time. Bank controls include standardized values
of the largest lead arranger’s lagged log of bank assets, equity capital/assets, securities/assets,
deposits and short-term funds/assets, return on assets, non-performing loans/gross loans, bank
health (lending done in the post-test period to all firms other than f divided by lending done
in the pre-test period to all firms other than f), and the weighted average of the size of Cap-
ital Purchase Program investments scaled by total assets in 2008Q4 (for U.S. banks). Bank-
firm controls include interactions of all bank characteristics with dummies for whether a firm
was rated before the SCAP and whether a rated firm held an investment grade credit rating.
Standard errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the level of the largest lead





Figure A.1: Trends in Syndicate Structure
This figure shows trends of syndicate structure across terciles of pre-test firm
exposure to SCAP banks between 2007Q1 and 2010Q4.
68
1.10.2 Tables
Table A.1: Censored Regression of Bank Allocation Shares
Dependent Variable:
Actual Bank Allocation Share
Regressors (1)












Origination Year Controls Y
Bank-Firms 56,490
R-squared 0.48
This table provides estimates from censored regressions of actual loan allocations on
facility-level characteristics for all loans used for either corporate or working capital
purposes extended to U.S. non-financial firms between 2004 and 2016.
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Table A.2: Firm Balancing on Observable Characteristics Split by Test Exposure
Percentile of Test Exposure Percentile of Test Exposure
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
mean mean mean mean std dev mean mean mean mean std dev
All Firms Unrated Firms
Revolver Share 0.74 0.83 0.86 0.86 0.34 0.78 0.87 0.90 1.00 0.29
Term Loan A Share 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.15
Term Loan B Share 0.21 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.31 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.26
Number of Covenants 1.08 1.00 0.97 0.73 1.19 1.08 1.25 0.75 4.00 1.27
log of Firm Assets 20.94 21.64 21.43 20.03 1.79 19.69 20.33 19.69 18.48 1.24
BV of Leverage 1.97 2.65 2.20 1.74 4.28 1.39 2.33 1.30 0.70 3.75
Cash/Assets 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.08 0.15 0.01 0.18
Tangible Assets/Assets 0.46 0.43 0.45 0.41 0.26 0.42 0.38 0.40 0.32 0.27
Profits/Assets 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.13 0.18 0.13
Corporate Purpose Share 0.57 0.60 0.65 0.51 0.49 0.45 0.48 0.46 0.00 0.50
Maturity 48.51 50.10 51.79 44.69 20.27 46.17 51.24 44.77 36.00 19.78
Collateralized Share 0.64 0.44 0.37 0.59 0.50 0.74 0.53 0.57 1.00 0.49
Previous Lead Share 0.53 0.41 0.45 0.79 0.29 0.61 0.38 0.70 0.43 0.32
Previous Lender Share 0.56 0.76 0.77 0.60 0.38 0.42 0.67 0.55 0.43 0.42
Long Relationship Share 0.30 0.46 0.49 0.33 0.38 0.19 0.29 0.29 0.43 0.36
Speculative Grade Firms Investment Grade Firms
Revolver Share 0.67 0.66 0.78 0.59 0.41 0.76 0.92 0.90 0.97 0.30
Term Loan A Share 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.15
Term Loan B Share 0.30 0.32 0.18 0.37 0.40 0.18 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.27
Number of Covenants 1.34 1.12 1.22 1.19 1.26 0.81 0.66 0.63 0.48 0.82
log of Firm Assets 21.69 21.31 21.50 21.23 1.10 23.18 23.26 22.93 22.75 1.28
BV of Leverage 3.21 3.11 2.35 4.65 6.21 1.86 2.60 2.39 1.79 2.32
Cash/Assets 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08
Tangible Assets/Assets 0.56 0.51 0.44 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.49 0.43 0.54 0.23
Profits/Assets 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.06
Corporate Purpose Share 0.60 0.63 0.65 0.74 0.47 0.79 0.70 0.79 0.76 0.43
Maturity 57.42 57.86 53.18 56.54 17.57 43.93 42.88 47.68 48.50 21.98
Collateralized Share 0.86 0.77 0.62 0.67 0.44 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.29
Previous Lead Share 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.66 0.27 0.39 0.41 0.50 0.56 0.21
Previous Lender Share 0.67 0.76 0.81 0.82 0.28 0.75 0.85 0.90 0.88 0.27
Long Relationship Share 0.32 0.41 0.50 0.42 0.34 0.58 0.66 0.72 0.65 0.32
Small Firms Large Firms
Revolver Share 0.77 0.88 0.91 1.00 0.28 0.71 0.82 0.86 0.82 0.36
Term Loan A Share 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.16
Term Loan B Share 0.19 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.26 0.24 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.33
Number of Covenants 0.91 1.16 0.71 4.00 1.29 1.18 0.89 1.09 0.76 1.13
log of Firm Assets 18.97 19.49 19.01 18.48 0.84 22.09 22.26 21.90 21.58 1.34
BV of Leverage 1.51 1.88 1.62 0.70 4.82 2.17 3.04 2.48 1.85 3.96
Cash/Assets 0.22 0.08 0.18 0.01 0.21 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.09
Tangible Assets/Assets 0.38 0.42 0.38 0.32 0.27 0.49 0.45 0.43 0.49 0.25
Profits/Assets 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.09
Corporate Purpose Share 0.41 0.44 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.65 0.65 0.70 0.69 0.47
Maturity 44.16 48.90 42.74 36.00 20.23 52.37 49.51 51.10 50.46 19.98
Collateralized Share 0.88 0.68 0.69 1.00 0.44 0.55 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.49
Previous Lead Share 0.76 0.42 0.81 0.43 0.31 0.41 0.41 0.45 0.61 0.25
Previous Lender Share 0.32 0.65 0.50 0.43 0.44 0.68 0.80 0.80 0.78 0.31
Long Relationship Share 0.18 0.25 0.27 0.43 0.38 0.38 0.52 0.54 0.46 0.36
This table provides estimates of averages of firm characteristics split by quartiles of test ex-
posure. The last column is the standard deviation of each variable.
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Table A.3: Firm Balancing on Observable Characteristics Split by Gap Exposure
Percentile of Test Exposure Percentile of Test Exposure
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
mean mean mean mean std dev mean mean mean mean std dev
All Firms Unrated Firms
Revolver Share 0.77 0.81 0.85 0.86 0.34 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.90 0.29
Term Loan A Share 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.15
Term Loan B Share 0.20 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.31 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.26
Number of Covenants 0.97 1.08 0.97 0.78 1.19 0.85 1.41 1.03 0.56 1.27
log of Firm Assets 20.78 21.85 21.42 19.99 1.79 19.52 20.42 20.26 19.18 1.24
BV of Leverage 1.91 2.34 2.49 1.83 4.28 1.32 2.37 1.38 1.23 3.75
Cash/Assets 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.18
Tangible Assets/Assets 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.41 0.26 0.41 0.38 0.43 0.39 0.27
Profits/Assets 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.16 0.10 0.13
Corporate Purpose Share 0.56 0.63 0.61 0.52 0.49 0.44 0.46 0.55 0.41 0.50
Maturity 46.37 50.73 51.39 46.62 20.27 43.38 51.91 51.99 39.54 19.78
Collateralized Share 0.64 0.40 0.41 0.59 0.50 0.75 0.54 0.41 0.72 0.49
Previous Lead Share 0.59 0.41 0.47 0.71 0.29 0.73 0.35 0.45 0.88 0.32
Previous Lender Share 0.55 0.76 0.76 0.61 0.38 0.42 0.63 0.69 0.45 0.42
Long Relationship Share 0.31 0.48 0.47 0.33 0.38 0.22 0.25 0.34 0.26 0.36
Speculative Grade Firms Investment Grade Firms
Revolver Share 0.66 0.60 0.74 0.69 0.41 0.79 0.90 0.95 0.91 0.30
Term Loan A Share 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.15
Term Loan B Share 0.32 0.35 0.25 0.26 0.40 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.27
Number of Covenants 1.29 1.14 1.28 1.18 1.26 0.76 0.72 0.59 0.50 0.82
log of Firm Assets 21.57 21.60 21.61 20.96 1.10 23.06 23.48 22.98 22.60 1.28
BV of Leverage 3.31 2.94 2.83 4.23 6.21 2.07 1.97 2.20 2.41 2.32
Cash/Assets 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08
Tangible Assets/Assets 0.55 0.48 0.49 0.43 0.25 0.44 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.23
Profits/Assets 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.06
Corporate Purpose Share 0.67 0.66 0.57 0.72 0.47 0.79 0.72 0.80 0.73 0.43
Maturity 55.02 57.96 57.46 54.52 17.57 43.00 41.98 50.10 47.89 21.98
Collateralized Share 0.81 0.79 0.68 0.65 0.44 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.29
Previous Lead Share 0.47 0.44 0.50 0.61 0.27 0.41 0.41 0.50 0.53 0.21
Previous Lender Share 0.71 0.75 0.80 0.81 0.28 0.71 0.90 0.93 0.84 0.27
Long Relationship Share 0.31 0.42 0.45 0.48 0.34 0.55 0.72 0.73 0.61 0.32
Small Firms Large Firms
Revolver Share 0.81 0.86 0.89 1.00 0.28 0.72 0.81 0.85 0.84 0.36
Term Loan A Share 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.16
Term Loan B Share 0.17 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.26 0.24 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.33
Number of Covenants 0.69 1.36 0.72 4.00 1.29 1.08 0.99 1.06 0.79 1.13
log of Firm Assets 18.85 19.55 19.04 18.48 0.84 22.15 22.28 21.93 21.47 1.34
BV of Leverage 1.38 1.83 1.71 0.70 4.82 2.35 2.34 2.61 2.25 3.96
Cash/Assets 0.23 0.10 0.16 0.01 0.21 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.09
Tangible Assets/Assets 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.32 0.27 0.49 0.47 0.44 0.46 0.25
Profits/Assets 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.09
Corporate Purpose Share 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.00 0.49 0.67 0.67 0.64 0.70 0.47
Maturity 37.79 51.20 44.80 36.00 20.23 50.13 50.56 52.91 49.84 19.98
Collateralized Share 0.86 0.69 0.69 1.00 0.44 0.48 0.35 0.39 0.37 0.49
Previous Lead Share 0.86 0.41 0.76 0.43 0.31 0.44 0.41 0.47 0.56 0.25
Previous Lender Share 0.34 0.57 0.53 0.43 0.44 0.70 0.79 0.81 0.75 0.31
Long Relationship Share 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.43 0.38 0.38 0.53 0.53 0.46 0.36
This table provides estimates of averages of firm characteristics split by quartiles of gap expo-
sure. The last column is the standard deviation of each variable.
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Table A.4: Trends in Firm Borrowing Outcomes 2006-2008
Borrow = 1 Equity Growth Rate Debt Growth Rate
(1-yr) (1-yr)
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
Test Exp ↑ 1σ -0.07*** -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
R-squared 0.44 0.34 0.52 0.24 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.33
Number of Firms 534 601 617 534 599 598 534 608 617
Unrated
Test Exp ↑ 1σ -0.08** -0.07** 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Spec Grade
Test Exp ↑ 1σ -0.07 0.05 -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.03
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Inv Grade
Test Exp ↑ 1σ -0.08** 0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.06* 0.01 0.06*
(0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
R-squared 0.44 0.35 0.52 0.24 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.34
Number of Firms 534 601 617 534 599 598 534 608 617
Med/Large
Test Exp ↑ 1σ -0.11*** 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Small
Test Exp ↑ 1σ -0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.04* 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
R-squared 0.44 0.34 0.52 0.24 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.33
Number of Firms 534 601 617 534 599 598 534 608 617
This table provides estimates of the expected change in rm borrowing outcomes calculated
from rm borrowing regressions (unreported). All regressions include firm and deal controls.
Firm controls include dummies for 2-digit SIC code, state, bond market access, investment
grade credit rating, and lagged values of log assets, book value of leverage, cash/assets, tangible
assets/assets, and profits/assets. Syndicate controls include the average maturity, collateral,
purpose, the shares of revolving credit lines in the pre-test syndicate, previous lenders, lead
arrangers, and whether lenders had a long relationship with the firm (¿ 5 years). Each estimate
is the expected value of the change in the dependent variable going from a firm at the 10th
percentile of test exposure to one at the 90th percentile of test exposure. Marginal effects and
pseudo R-squared values are reported for columns 1 through 3. Borrow is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if a firm either obtained a new loan or a positive modi cation of an existing loan
in a given year. The harmonized growth rates of equity and debt are taken relative to 2004
values of each. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively
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Table A.5: Trends in Firm Real Outcomes 2006-2008
Borrow = 1 Equity Growth Rate Debt Growth Rate
(1-yr) (1-yr)
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
Test Exp ↑ 1σ -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 -0.03*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
R-squared 0.62 0.53 0.55 0.33 0.36 0.4 0.31 0.29 0.35
Number of Firms 709 717 728 710 726 738 665 680 690
Unrated
Test Exp ↑ 1σ 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Spec Grade
Test Exp ↑ 1σ -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Inv Grade
Test Exp ↑ 1σ -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.04* -0.01 0.00 -0.03* -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
R-squared 0.62 0.53 0.55 0.33 0.29 0.35 0.31 0.29 0.53
Number of Firms 709 717 728 710 680 690 665 680 717
Med/Large
Test Exp ↑ 1σ -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05*** 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Small
Test Exp ↑ 1σ 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
R-squared 0.62 0.53 0.55 0.33 0.37 0.4 0.31 0.29 0.35
Number of Firms 709 717 728 710 726 738 665 680 690
This table provides estimates of the expected change in firm real outcomes calculated from
firm outcome regressions (unreported). All regressions include firm and deal controls. Firm
controls include dummies for 2-digit SIC code, state, bond market access, investment grade
credit rating, and lagged values of log assets, book value of leverage, cash/assets, tangible
assets/assets, and profits/assets. Syndicate controls include the average maturity, collateral,
purpose, the shares of revolving credit lines in the pre-test syndicate, previous lenders, lead
arrangers, and whether lenders had a long relationship with the firm (¿ 5 years). Each estimate
is the expected value of the change in the dependent variable going from a firm at the 10th
percentile of test exposure to one at the 90th percentile of test exposure. The investment rate
is calculated as capital expenditures over a given year scaled by 2004 assets. The harmonized
growth rates of assets, employment, and sales are taken relative to 2004 values of each. ***,
**, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Regressors: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tested 0.01 -0.09* -0.07* -0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06)
× Rated 0.02 -0.20 -0.19
(0.03) (0.08) (0.09)
× Rated × Inv Grade 0.01 0.06 0.08
(0.02) (0.08) (0.06)
E[Dep Var | Tested = 1]
Speculative Grade Firms 0.01 -0.19** -0.17**
(0.01) (0.07) (0.06)
Investment Grade Firms 0.01 -0.13*** -0.09*
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm × Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank-Firms 2083 2131 2335 2083 2131 2335
R-squared 0.17 0.28 0.19 0.18 0.29 0.21
This table provides estimates from regressions of loan outcomes on firm, facility, and bank character-
istics. The specifications are identical to those in Table 7 with the except of being estimated with only
firm controls and not firm fixed effects.
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Table A.7: Firm-Level Intensive Margin Regressions (SCAP: Gap)
Dependent Variables:
Syndicate-Level Facility-Level
Syndicate Covenant Syndicate Covenant Facility ∆Spread Facility ∆Spread
Growth Increase Growth Increase Growth Growth
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Test Exp -0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 7.98 0.11 -18.84
(0.08) (0.04) (0.11) (0.03) (0.07) (14.24) (0.16) (15.61)
× Rated -0.19 0.11 -0.58 85.14
(0.14) (0.06) (0.20) (22.94)
× Rated × Inv Grade 0.31 -0.04 0.62 -29.16
(0.16) (0.10) (0.11) (28.15)
Test Exp × Gap Exp -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.02 -2.77 -0.01 11.69
(0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (10.22) (0.10) (16.86)
× Rated 0.11 0.11 0.45 -96.59
(0.10) (0.06) (0.18) (21.88)
× Rated × Inv Grade -0.17 -0.04 -0.45 33.52
(0.13) (0.10) (0.18) (25.31)
E[Dep Var | High Test
and Gap Exp]
All Firms -0.07 0.01 0.06 5.21
(0.07) (0.02) (0.05) (8.61)
Unrated Firms -0.05 0.00 0.10 -7.14
(0.08) (0.02) (0.09) (14.19)
Spec Grade Firms -0.13* 0.08** -0.04 -18.59
(0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (13.21)
Invest Grade Firms 0.01 -0.02 0.13 -14.23
(0.17) (0.05) (0.11) (10.78)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N Y Y N N Y Y
R-squared 0.21 0.16 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.23 0.38 0.39
Number of Firms 298 330 298 330 233 250 233 250
This table provides estimates from regressions of firm-level borrowing outcomes on firm, facility,
and bank characteristics. The specifications are identical to those in Table 9.
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Table A.8: Firm-Level Intensive Margin Regressions (SCAP: Gap Size)
Dependent Variables:
Syndicate-Level Facility-Level
Syndicate Covenant Syndicate Covenant Facility ∆Spread Facility ∆Spread
Growth Increase Growth Increase Growth Growth
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Test Exp -0.05 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 2.55 0.10 -15.72
(0.09) (0.03) (0.13) (0.03) (0.09) (11.25) (0.16) (15.78)
× Rated -0.11 0.09 -0.46 55.07
(0.17) (0.07) (0.22) (18.57)
× Rated × Inv Grade 0.28 -0.04 0.52 -5.45
(0.19) (0.09) (0.17) (26.66)
Test Exp × Gap Exp -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 5.05 -0.01 9.51
(0.05) (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (6.76) (0.10) (16.68)
× Rated 0.00 0.09 0.32 -64.16
(0.13) (0.07) (0.27) (20.76)
× Rated × Inv Grade -0.15 -0.04 -0.39 -10.33
(0.25) (0.09) (0.22) (21.67)
E[Dep Var | High Test
and Gap Exp]
All Firms -0.07 0.02 0.06 7.60
(0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (8.63)
Unrated Firms -0.04 0.01 0.10 -6.21
(0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (15.45)
Spec Grade Firms -0.15** 0.08** -0.04 -15.31
(0.08) (0.04) (0.12) (14.81)
Invest Grade Firms -0.02 -0.01 0.09 -31.08***
(0.18) (0.07) (0.11) (10.53)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N Y Y N N Y Y
R-squared 0.21 0.16 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.23 0.37 0.38
Number of Firms 298 330 298 330 233 250 233 250
This table provides estimates from regressions of firm-level borrowing outcomes on firm, facility,
and bank characteristics. The specifications are identical to those in Table 9.
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Table A.9: Syndicate Structure Regression Results (SCAP: Existing Lenders)
Dependent Variables: Change in Syndicate Shares
Lenders Existing in Both Periods
Total Tested Other US Foreign Non- Total Tested Other US Foreign Non-
Explanatory Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Test Exp -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
× Rated -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00)
× Rated 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01
× Inv Grade (0.09) (0.07) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp]
Spec Grade Firms -0.02 -0.05* 0.00 0.04 -0.01*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Invest Grade Firms -0.02 -0.08 0.01 0.04 0.00
(0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.31 0.27 0.17 0.25 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.29 0.36
Number of Firms 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331
Number of Clusters 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
This table provides estimates from regressions of syndicate structure on firm and deal characteristics.
The specifications are identical to those in Table 10.
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Table A.10: Syndicate Structure Regression Results (SCAP: Entering - Exiting
Lenders)
Dependent Variables: Change in Syndicate Shares
Entering Lenders - Exiting Lenders
Total Tested Other US Foreign Non- Total Tested Other US Foreign Non-
Explanatory Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Test Exp 0.03 -0.09 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.07 0.04 0.04 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01)
× Rated 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
× Rated 0.00 -0.03 -0.10 0.11 0.01
× Inv Grade (0.09) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp]
Spec Grade Firms 0.02 -0.10*** 0.06*** 0.04 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Invest Grade Firms 0.02 -0.13*** -0.03* 0.16*** 0.03
(0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.31 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.33 0.28 0.32 0.31 0.33
Number of Firms 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331
Number of Clusters 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
This table provides estimates from regressions of syndicate structure on firm and deal characteristics.
The specifications are identical to those in Table 10.
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Table A.11: Syndicate Structure Regression Results (SCAP: Gap)
Dependent Variables: Change in Syndicate Shares
Tested Other US Foreign Non-Bank Tested Other US Foreign Non-Bank
Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Test Exp -0.15 0.02 0.10 0.03 -0.13 0.02 0.10 0.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
× Rated -0.04 0.05 -0.05 0.04
(0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
× Rated × Inv Grade -0.02 -0.09 0.15 -0.04
(0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Test Exp × Gap Exp 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
× Rated 0.02 -0.04 0.06 -0.05
(0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
× Rated × Inv Grade -0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.09
(0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp and Gap Exp]
All Firms -0.15*** 0.03* 0.11*** 0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Unrated Firms -0.13*** 0.04* 0.09** 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01)
Spec Grade Firms -0.15*** 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Invest Grade Firms -0.22*** -0.03 0.20*** 0.05
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N N N Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.31 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.33 0.28 0.32 0.31
Number of Firms 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331
Number of Clusters 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
This table provides estimates from regressions of syndicate structure on firm and deal characteristics.
The specifications are identical to those in Table 10.
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Table A.12: Syndicate Structure Regression Results (SCAP: Gap Size)
Dependent Variables: Change in Syndicate Shares
Tested Other US Foreign Non-Bank Tested Other US Foreign Non-Bank
Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Test Exp -0.15 0.02 0.10 0.02 -0.13 0.03 0.10 0.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
× Rated -0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.01
(0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
× Rated × Inv Grade -0.04 -0.10 0.15 -0.01
(0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Test Exp 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00
× Gap Size Exp (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
× Rated -0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.02
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
× Rated × Inv Grade -0.03 0.03 -0.06 0.06
(0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp and Gap Size Exp]
All Firms -0.15*** 0.02 0.10*** 0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Unrated Firms -0.13*** 0.04 0.09** 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01)
Spec Grade Firms -0.15*** 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Invest Grade Firms -0.22*** -0.02 0.19*** 0.05
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N N N Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.36 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.41 0.31 0.35 0.34
Number of Firms 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331
Number of Clusters 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
This table provides estimates from regressions of syndicate structure on firm and deal characteristics.
The specifications are identical to those in Table 10.
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Table A.13: Total Borrowing Regression Results (SCAP: Gap)
Dependent Variables:
Borrow New Modify Equity Debt Borrow New Modify Equity Debt
Loan Growth Growth Loan Growth Growth
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Test Exp -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
× Rated 0.01 0.01 -0.08 -0.11 -0.06
(0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
× Rated 0.27 0.22 0.17 0.12 0.07
× Inv Grade (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09)
Test Exp × Gap Exp 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
× Rated -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.03
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
× Rated -0.21 -0.22 -0.06 -0.09 -0.06
× Inv Grade (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp and Gap Exp]
All Firms 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.03*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Unrated 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Spec Grade Firms -0.04 0.00 -0.08** -0.05 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
Invest Grade Firms 0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.21 0.20 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.22
Number of Firms 751 747 716 668 691 751 747 716 668 691
Number of Clusters 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
This table provides estimates from regressions of firm borrowing outcomes on firm and deal character-
istics. The specifications are identical to those in Table 11.
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Table A.14: Total Borrowing Regression Results (SCAP: Gap Size)
Dependent Variables:
Borrow New Modify Equity Debt Borrow New Modify Equity Debt
Loan Growth Growth Loan Growth Growth
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Test Exp -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
× Rated 0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.09 -0.04
(0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
× Rated 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.04
× Inv Grade (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07)
Test Exp × Gap 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05
Size Exp (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
× Rated -0.14 -0.07 -0.08 0.03 0.01
(0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
× Rated -0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.02
× Inv Grade (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.08) (0.05)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp and Gap Size Exp]
All Firms 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Unrated 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Spec Grade Firms -0.06 -0.02 -0.10*** -0.05 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
Invest Grade Firms 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.21 0.20 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.22
Number of Firms 751 747 716 668 691 751 747 716 668 691
Number of Clusters 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
This table provides estimates from regressions of firm borrowing outcomes on firm and deal character-
istics. The specifications are identical to those in Table 11.
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Table A.15: Firm Real Outcomes (SCAP: Gap)
Dependent Variables (3-Year Growth Rates):
Fixed Int Assets Emp Fixed Int Assets Emp
Explanatory Invest Invest Invest Invest
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Test Exp -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
× Rated 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 0.00
(0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
× Rated × Inv Grade 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.01
(0.02) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05)
Test Exp × Gap Exp 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
× Rated -0.03 0.05 0.04 -0.08
(0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
× Rated × Inv Grade 0.01 -0.07 -0.07 0.08
(0.02) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp and Gap Exp]
All Firms -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Unrated Firms 0.00 0.02 0.04** 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Spec Grade Firms -0.03** 0.03 0.00 -0.06**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Invest Grade Firms 0.00 0.05** 0.04 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N N N Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.54 0.37 0.25 0.17 0.55 0.39 0.27 0.19
Number of Firms 753 687 743 715 753 687 743 715
Number of Clusters 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
This table provides estimates from regressions of firm real outcomes on firm and deal charac-
teristics. The specifications are identical to those in Table 12.
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Table A.16: Firm Real Outcomes (SCAP: Gap Size)
Dependent Variables (3-Year Growth Rates):
Fixed Int Assets Emp Fixed Int Assets Emp
Explanatory Invest Invest Invest Invest
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Test Exp -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
× Rated 0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.00
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
× Rated × Inv Grade 0.02 0.04 0.05 -0.01
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
Test Exp × Gap Size Exp 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
× Rated -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.09
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
× Rated × Inv Grade 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.13
(0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp and Gap Size Exp]
All Firms 0.00 0.02 0.04* 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Unrated Firms 0.00 0.02 0.04** 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Spec Grade Firms -0.03** 0.00 0.00 -0.07***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 0.00
Invest Grade Firms 0.00 0.05* 0.04 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N N N Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.54 0.37 0.25 0.17 0.55 0.39 0.27 0.19
Number of Firms 753 687 743 715 753 687 743 715
Number of Clusters 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
This table provides estimates from regressions of firm real outcomes on firm and deal charac-
teristics. The specifications are identical to those in Table 12.
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Table A.17: Firm-Level Intensive Margin Regressions (SCAP: First Time Borrowers)
Dependent Variables:
Syndicate-Level Facility-Level
Syndicate Covenant Syndicate Covenant Facility ∆Spread Facility ∆Spread
Growth Increase Growth Increase Growth Growth
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Test Exp -0.03 0 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 2.68 0.11 -14.56
(0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (11.15) (0.09) (14.55)
× Rated -0.11 0.09 -0.2 0.54
(0.11) (0.04) (0.13) (15.56)
× Rated × Inv Grade 0.22 -0.07 0.28 1.05
(0.13) (0.06) (0.08) (21.79)
Test Exp × First Time -0.08 0.02 -0.09 0.02 -0.05 7.48 -0.03 17.45
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (13.52) (0.09) (17.24)
× Rated 0.05 0.09 -0.04 -1.57
(0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (15.29)
× Rated × Inv Grade -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 47.3
(0.10) (0.06) (0.13) (32.97)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp and First Time]
All Firms -0.10 0.02 0.02 10.17
(0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (11.55)
Unrated Firms -0.1 0.02 0.07 2.89
(0.11) (0.05) (0.12) (18.79)
Spec Grade Firms -0.16* 0.03 -0.17 1.85
(0.09) (0.06) (0.13) (15.76)
Invest Grade Firms -0.02 -0.03 0.06 50.21*
(0.17) (0.10) (0.16) (25.71)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N Y Y N N Y Y
R-squared 0.21 0.16 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.23 0.35 0.38
Number of Firms 298 330 298 330 233 250 233 250
This table provides estimates from regressions of firm-level borrowing outcomes on firm, facility,
and bank characteristics. The specifications are identical to those in Table 9.
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Table A.18: Firm-Level Intensive Margin Regressions (SCAP: Long Relationship)
Dependent Variables:
Syndicate-Level Facility-Level
Syndicate Covenant Syndicate Covenant Facility ∆Spread Facility ∆Spread
Growth Increase Growth Increase Growth Growth
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Test Exp -0.06 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.1 12.35 0.12 2.87
(0.08) (0.03) (0.10) (0.02) (0.06) (9.26) (0.09) (14.33)
× Rated -0.18 0.03 -0.31 15.62
(0.07) (0.03) (0.10) (18.54)
× Rated × Inv Grade 0.15 0.03 0.29 -6.59
(0.19) (0.06) (0.22) (34.27)
Test Exp × 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0 -0.14 -16.62 -0.09 -29.22
Long Relationship (0.07) (0.05) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (13.83) (0.09) (16.16)
× Rated 0.22 0.03 0.22 -10.57
(0.10) (0.03) (0.07) (20.44)
× Rated × Inv Grade -0.05 0.03 -0.1 25.11
(0.10) (0.06) (0.27) (28.94)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp and Long Relationship]
All Firms -0.05 0.02 -0.03 -4.27
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (14.02)
Unrated Firms -0.07 -0.01 0.04 -26.35
(0.08) (0.05) (0.12) (18.37)
Spec Grade Firms -0.04 0.12*** -0.05 -21.31
(0.10) (0.03) (0.08) (20.21)
Invest Grade Firms 0.07 0.01 0.14 -2.79
(0.10) (0.06) (0.12) (20.68)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N Y Y N N Y Y
R-squared 0.21 0.16 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.37 0.37
Number of Firms 298 330 298 330 233 250 233 250
This table provides estimates from regressions of firm-level borrowing outcomes on firm, facility,
and bank characteristics. The specifications are identical to those in Table 9.
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Table A.19: Syndicate Structure Regression Results (SCAP: First Time Borrowers)
Dependent Variables: Change in Syndicate Shares
Tested Other US Foreign Non- Tested Other US Foreign Non-
Explanatory Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Test Exp -0.16 0.01 0.13 0.02 -0.14 0.02 0.11 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
× Rated -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
× Rated × Inv Grade -0.04 -0.08 0.10 0.02
(0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Test Exp × First Time 0.02 0.04 -0.07 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
× Rated 0.08 -0.01 -0.08 0.01
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
× Rated × Inv Grade -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.00
(0.08) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp and First Time Borrower]
All Firms -0.14*** 0.05** 0.07** 0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Unrated Firms -0.13*** 0.06*** 0.06 0.00
(0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01)
Spec Grade Firms -0.09** 0.08* 0.00 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Invest Grade Firms -0.16* 0.00 0.13** 0.03
(0.08) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N N N Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.36 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.42 0.31 0.36 0.34
Number of Firms 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331
Number of Clusters 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
This table provides estimates from regressions of syndicate structure on firm and deal character-
istics. The specifications are identical to those in Table 10.
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Table A.20: Syndicate Structure Regression Results (SCAP: Long Relationship)
Dependent Variables: Change in Syndicate Shares
Tested Other US Foreign Non- Tested Other US Foreign Non-
Explanatory Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Test Exp -0.14 0.03 0.09 0.02 -0.12 0.03 0.09 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01)
× Rated -0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
× Rated × Inv Grade -0.07 -0.09 0.15 0.01
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
Test Exp × -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01
Long Relationship (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
× Rated 0.03 -0.05 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
× Rated × Inv Grade 0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp and Long Relationship]
All Firms -0.17*** 0.02 0.12*** 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Unrated Firms -0.15*** 0.04 0.09** 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Spec Grade Firms -0.15*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.02
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Invest Grade Firms -0.21*** -0.03 0.20*** 0.04
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N N N Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.36 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.41 0.31 0.35 0.34
Number of Firms 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331
Number of Clusters 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
This table provides estimates from regressions of syndicate structure on firm and deal character-
istics. The specifications are identical to those in Table 10.
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Table A.21: Total Borrowing Regression Results (SCAP: First Time Borrower)
Dependent Variables:
Borrow New Modify Equity Debt Borrow New Modify Equity Debt
Explanatory Loan Growth Growth Loan Growth Growth
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Test Exp 0.08 0.07 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
× Rated -0.03 -0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
× Rated 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.03
× Inv Grade (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Test Exp -0.17 -0.13 -0.09 0.02 0.05 -0.16 -0.13 -0.10 0.01 0.05
× First Time (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
× Rated -0.08 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
× Rated 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.08
× Inv Grade (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp and First Time Borrower]
All Firms -0.08*** -0.06** -0.06* 0.00 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Unrated -0.08* -0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.05**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Spec Grade Firms -0.19*** -0.13* -0.14*** -0.06 0.04
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
Invest Grade Firms -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.21 0.20 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.22
Number of Firms 751 747 716 668 691 751 747 716 668 691
Number of Clusters 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
This table provides estimates from regressions of firm borrowing outcomes on firm and deal charac-
teristics. The specifications are identical to those in Table 11.
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Table A.22: Total Borrowing Regression Results (SCAP: Long Relationship)
Dependent Variables:
Borrow New Modify Equity Debt Borrow New Modify Equity Debt
Explanatory Loan Growth Growth Loan Growth Growth
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Test Exp -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
× Rated -0.08 -0.04 -0.10 -0.05 -0.01
(0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
× Rated 0.09 0.03 0.20 0.06 -0.04
× Inv Grade (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07)
Test Exp 0.07 0.07 0.03 -0.09 -0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.06 -0.02
× Long Relation (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
× Rated 0.06 0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
× Rated 0.05 0.06 -0.09 0.01 0.09
× Inv Grade (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp and Long Relationship]
All Firms 0.05 0.06 0.01 -0.07** 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Unrated 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.01
(0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Spec Grade Firms 0.02 0.05 -0.06 -0.12** -0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Invest Grade Firms 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.05 -0.04 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.22 0.19 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.22
Number of Firms 751 747 716 668 691 751 747 716 668 691
Number of Clusters 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
This table provides estimates from regressions of firm borrowing outcomes on firm and deal character-
istics. The specifications are identical to those in Table 11.
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Table A.23: Firm Real Outcomes (SCAP: First Time Borrowers)
Dependent Variables (3-Year Growth Rates):
Fixed Int Assets Emp Fixed Int Assets Emp
Explanatory Invest Invest Invest Invest
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Test Exp 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
× Rated 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.06
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
× Rated × Inv Grade 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Test Exp -0.04 0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.07 0.01 -0.03
× First Time (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
× Rated -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.02
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
× Rated × Inv Grade 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.03
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp and First Time Borrower]
All Firms -0.03** 0.05* 0.03 -0.01
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Unrated Firms -0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Spec Grade Firms -0.08*** 0.06* -0.01 -0.09*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Invest Grade Firms -0.05*** 0.07** 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N N N Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.54 0.38 0.24 0.16 0.56 0.39 0.26 0.18
Number of Firms 753 687 743 715 753 687 743 715
Number of Clusters 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
This table provides estimates from regressions of firm real outcomes on firm and deal charac-
teristics. The specifications are identical to those in Table 12.
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Table A.24: Firm Real Outcomes (SCAP: Long Relationship)
Dependent Variables (3-Year Growth Rates):
Fixed Int Assets Emp Fixed Int Assets Emp
Explanatory Invest Invest Invest Invest
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Test Exp -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
× Rated -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
× Rated × Inv Grade 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Test Exp × Gap Size Exp 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
× Rated 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
× Rated × Inv Grade -0.01 0.04 0.07 0.08
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
E[Dep Var | High Test Exp and Long Relationship]
All Firms 0.00 0.03* 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Unrated Firms 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Spec Grade Firms -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.07
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Invest Grade Firms 0.01 0.06*** 0.04 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-Bank Controls N N N N Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.54 0.37 0.24 0.16 0.55 0.39 0.26 0.19
Number of Firms 753 687 743 715 753 687 743 715
Number of Clusters 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
This table provides estimates from regressions of firm real outcomes on firm and deal charac-
teristics. The specifications are identical to those in Table 12.
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2 Lender Cross-Subsidization and Credit Supply
in the Fannie Mae MBS Market
(Joint with Igor Karagodsky)
Abstract
Large market-share sellers of mortgages to Fannie Mae received discounts on mort-
gage insurance payments (guarantee fees) relative to small market-share sellers until
2012. These guarantee-fee discounts created incentives for small sellers to originate
and sell mortgages to large sellers, rather than directly to Fannie Mae, foregoing the
opportunity to service loans and establish lending relationships with local borrowers.
We exploit an exogenous change in guarantee fees charged between large and small
market-share sellers of mortgages to identify the impact of these cross-lender subsidies
on credit supply. In response to the removal of these subsidies, small market-share
sellers increased their share of originations of single-family mortgages sold directly
to Fannie Mae relative to large sellers. Preliminary evidence suggests that as a con-
sequence, states with high concentrations of large market-share sellers experienced
relative reductions in credit quantities, suggesting that these subsidies previously
increased credit supply.
We would like to thank Meagan McCollum for her helpful discussion of the paper, as well as
participants at 2018 Midwest Finance Association Annual Meeting, the 2017 Southern Finance Asso-
ciation Annual Meetings, and workshop participants at Boston College for questions and comments.
This paper is a significantly revised version of an earlier draft “The Impact of Asymmetric Infor-
mation on Mortgage Servicer Compensation.” We appreciate numerous useful discussions on the
earlier version of the paper. All errors are our own.
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2.1 Introduction
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the major government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs),
are a dominant presence in the single-family mortgage finance market in the United
States. The GSEs insure credit risk on loans backing mortgage-backed securities
(agency MBS) in exchange for “guarantee fees,” a fraction of principal and interest
payments on each loan. While this business model proved lucrative during the hous-
ing boom period of 2002-2006, the increase in defaults and foreclosures following the
financial crisis of 2007-2009 exposed the GSEs to tremendous losses on insured loans.
Following government conservatorship of the GSEs in 2008, the Federal Housing Fi-
nance Agency (FHFA) and Congress have begun to enact policies to reduce the GSEs’
burden on taxpayers by gradually shrinking their market share in the single-family
MBS market. While the GSEs have begun to align pricing of guarantee fees with
underlying credit risk, certain borrowers, lenders, and products continue to receive
large subsidies in the agency MBS market. Quantifying the impact of these subsi-
dies has become an important question of interest in the mortgage finance literature.
Whether the removal of these subsidies affects credit supply remains an unexplored
question.
This paper studies the unwinding of one particular subsidy in the Fannie Mae
single-family MBS market, that of offering guarantee-fee discounts to large-volume
sellers of MBS relative to small-volume sellers. Large-volume sellers relied primarily
on swap transactions with Fannie Mae, the exchange of pools of mortgages of par-
ticular characteristics for MBS. In contrast, small-volume sellers utilized cash win-
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dow sales, the direct purchase of mortgages by Fannie Mae in exchange for cash.
Guarantee-fee pricing depended crucially on the volume of mortgages sold through
each channel, as fees paid on MBS swaps were significantly lower than those paid on
cash window sales for many years, in part due to negotiations between Fannie Mae
and large-volume sellers (FHFA (2013)). In late 2012, the FHFA directed Fannie Mae
to increase guarantee fees on MBS swap transactions by relatively more than cash
window sales, effectively removing subsidies paid by small-volume sellers to large-
volume sellers.
Recent research has begun to quantify the effect of geographic and credit-risk
subsidies across borrowers of GSE mortgages (Hurst, Keys, Seru, and Vavra (2016),
Dagher and Sun (2016), Gete and Zecchetto (2017)). While the GSEs have begun to
increase risk-based pricing of guarantee fees, geographic subsidies still remain in place.
We contribute to this literature by quantifying the impact of removing lender-based
subsidies. This research has important implications for mortgage finance reform, as
small sellers typically sold mortgages to large lenders due to this subsidy, foregoing
the opportunity to service mortgages and establish lending relationships with local
borrowers. Only recently have small sellers begun to increase their business with
the GSEs, resulting in increases in GSE counterparty credit risk (FHFA (2014)), but
more even distribution of risks across lenders.
In the first part of the paper, we quantify whether the implementation of guarantee-
fee parity was effective at changing the incentives of small-volume sellers to sell mort-
gages to Fannie Mae relative to large-volume sellers. We find that the likelihood of
selling to the cash window for sellers with market shares ranked between 26 and 100
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increased by 5 percentage points more than for large sellers ranked between 1 and 5.
In the second part of the paper, we investigate whether small-volume sellers dif-
ferentially allocated more of their credit in the 30-year Fannie Mae MBS market
toward the cash window relative to swap transactions following the guarantee-fee
policy change. We find that small-volume sellers increased the relative share of cash-
window volume sales by 14-18 percentage points more than did large-volume sellers.
Much of this relative allocation of credit was driven by observably less risky loans
(high credit score and low LTV ratio).
Given these results, we provide some preliminary evidence to investigate the ag-
gregate effect of this change in lending behavior. At the state-month level, we average
loan size and interest rates, and aggregate total loan volume. In addition, we calculate
a measure of market concentration of large-volume sellers by squaring market shares
of sellers in the 1-5 rank of the distribution in a given state-month pair. We find that
going from a state at the 10th percentile (2.1%) of large-volume seller concentration
to one at the 90th percentile (12.8%) resulted in a 1.2 percentage point decline in
average loan size and a 5.9 percentage point decline in total loan volume in a given
state following the implementation of guarantee fee parity across sellers. In contrast,
we find no such change in credit supply for interest rates. These results offer pre-
liminary evidence that the removal of lender-based subsidies resulted in the relative
loss of credit for borrowers in states that were highly reliant on large-volume sellers,




2.2.1 Fannie Mae MBS Market
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) is one of the government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs) tasked with increasing liquidity in the secondary mort-
gage market in the U.S.38 Its main business model involves the issuance of mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) on pools of mortgages that it purchases from financial insti-
tutions in exchange for a guarantee of the timely payment of principal and interest
to investors. Strict credit quality guidelines ensure that only conforming mortgages
are eligible to be acquired by Fannie Mae.39 In exchange for effectively assuming the
credit risk on pools of mortgages underlying its MBS, Fannie Mae is compensated
with “guarantee fees,” which are payments on a fixed percentage of the outstanding
principal balance on a mortgage.40
Before the financial crisis of 2007-2009, Fannie Mae benefitted from the implicit
backing of the U.S. government, which enabled it to borrow at a small spread above
Treasury rates (Frame and White (2005)). With easy access to low-cost borrowing
rates on its debt, this created strong moral hazard incentives whereby Fannie Mae
bought increasingly risky securities, such as Alt-A and subprime MBS. In addition,
Fannie Mae was able to set guarantee fees below the level required by private in-
38The other major GSEs involved in housing finance include the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac), the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), and the
Federal Home Loan Banks. This paper focuses on Fannie Mae due to superior data provided on
mortgages underlying its MBS and its role as the largest GSE.
39Conforming mortgages have limits on size ($417,000 except in high-cost areas), credit score, and
loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios.
40Guarantee fees increased from approximately 20 bp in the mid-2000s to over 60 bp in recent
years (FHFA July 16, 2013).
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surance companies to earn a profit. This business model was quite lucrative during
the housing boom when default rates were low. However, as defaults on mortgages
increased during the early stages of the financial crisis, Fannie Mae became insolvent
and was placed into government conservatorship in 2008 (Frame, Fuster, Tracy, and
Vickery (2015)). In the post-crisis period, Fannie Mae’s regulator, the FHFA, has
begun to increase guarantee fees paid on MBS in order to both remove the agencies’
market share and to encourage participation from the private sector in the conforming
MBS market. Nevertheless, Fannie Mae and the other GSEs have maintained large
market shares in the MBS market in recent years (Hurst et al. (2016)).
There are two main channels through which Fannie Mae provides liquidity to
lenders.41 In an MBS swap transaction, sellers bundle and deliver loans of similar
characteristics to Fannie Mae in exchange for MBS (Figure 13). While sellers in
swap transactions may deliver loans originated through the retail channel (i.e. by the
institution itself), they also pool loans originated by third parties, either a correspon-
dent lender or broker. When acquired from a third party, the originating institution
typically sells the mortgage to the seller “servicing released,” foregoing the ability to
service the loan. Thus, the seller typically retains MSR in MBS swap transactions,
giving the institution the ability to establish a relationship with and market future
products to mortgage borrowers. Historically, benefits of swap transactions included
relatively low guarantee fees paid by large sellers, which enabled them to issue large
volumes of MBS at a comparative advantage to private-label MBS. The main cost
41Financial institutions that sell mortgages to Fannie Mae through either channel are referred to
as “sellers.” “Servicers” are the institutions that administer the loans, for example by collecting
monthly mortgage payments, managing the relationship with mortgagors, and remitting payments
to the trust (Fannie Mae) in exchange for servicing fees.
98
to a seller of utilizing swap transaction includes having to re-underwrite third-party
mortgages, buyback provisions on loans failing to meet Fannie Mae credit quality
guidelines, and having to monitor third-party originators.
In a cash window (whole loan conduit) transaction, Fannie Mae purchases mort-
gages directly from sellers for cash and bundles them into MBS, which they subse-
quently sell to investors (Figure 14). Sellers typically retain MSR on mortgages that
they sell in these transactions, but forego the ability to sell MBS to investors. Benefits
of the cash window include quick liquidity to lenders, reduced warehousing risk, less
concern about structuring MBS in order to abide by Fannie Mae’s guidelines, and
the option to retain MSR. However, cash-window sellers pay guarantee fees upfront
for lower proceeds than they would get in a swap transaction. As a result, the cash
window is more frequently utilized by small sellers.
2.2.2 Cross-Subsidization
An important market friction in the agency MBS market throughout the 2000s
was cross-subsidization across different market segments. For example, guarantee
fees did not fully reflect risks across loan product, geographic region, borrower, and
seller characteristics.42 In the after-math of the financial crisis, the GSEs began to
implement risk-based pricing of guarantee fees to eliminate these cross subsidies.
The focus of this paper is the Fannie Mae policy of charging higher guarantee
fees to small-volume sellers of MBS relative to large-volume sellers. In particular,
42For example, major cross-subsidies included: fixed 15-year and adjustable-rate mortgage MBS
subsidizing fixed 30-year MBS; non-judicial foreclosure states subsidizing judicial foreclosure states;
low loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and high credit scores subsidizing high LTVs and low credit scores;
small-volume sellers subsidized large-volume sellers.
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guarantee fees charged via the cash window exceeded those charged in swap transac-
tions. In addition, sellers with large market share were able to negotiate guarantee-fee
discounts directly with Fannie Mae due to their market power (FHFA (2013)).43 This
policy discouraged small financial institutions from selling mortgages directly to Fan-
nie Mae. For many years, large-volume sellers exploited this pricing difference by
buying directly from small sellers and “aggregating” pools of MBS to be sold through
swap transactions (FHFA (2014)).44 Small financial institutions benefitted from these
sales due to the superior sales price offered by aggregators relative to sales through
the cash window. However, as mentioned previously, these institutions typically sold
mortgages to aggregators servicing released, and thus were unable to benefit from ser-
vicing relationships with mortgage borrowers. From Fannie Mae’s perspective, this
system reduced their counterparty credit risk by not having to monitor the smallest
sellers and remained a lucrative business model through the housing boom, as rela-
tively low default rates on single-family mortgages enabled them to easily cover their
cost of capital.
Guarantee fees increased between 2008 and 2011, consistent with the aim of
encouraging private-sector participation in the secondary mortgage market. These
increases resulted in the gradual reduction of risk-based cross-subsidization. One
such policy change resulted from the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act
43“The Enterprises traditionally charged high-volume mortgage sellers guarantee fees that were
lower than those charged to low-volume sellers. The Enterprises did so, in part, because large lenders
were able to negotiate reductions in fees based upon the large volume of loans they were able to
deliver.” (FHFA (2013), p. 23)
44“By combining their own mortgages with those originated by smaller lenders, the aggregators
received larger guarantee fee discounts from the Enterprises. In turn, the aggregators passed along
a portion of their discounted guarantee fees to smaller lenders in the form of better prices than the
Enterprises could offer them.” (FHFA (2014), p.14)
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of 2011, which increased upfront guarantee fees by at least 10 basis points above the
2011 average on single-family MBS, effective April 1, 2012. This fee increase was
used by Congress to raise revenue as a means of offsetting payroll tax cuts. The
Federal Housing Finance Authority (FHFA)45 issued guidance on August 31, 2012
which instructed the agencies to further increase guarantee fees by 10 basis points,
particularly to reduce differences between 15-year and 30-year MBS, and between
large-volume and small-volume sellers. The policy became effective on November 1,
2012 for the cash window and December 1, 2012 for swap transactions. This policy
was effective at narrowing the gap in guarantee fees between high market-share and
low market-share sellers (Figure 15).
2.2.3 Literature Review
A growing literature has considered the implications of GSE cross-subsidies on
transfers of wealth across different demographics.46 Hurst et al. (2016) demonstrate
the lack of geographic risk-based pricing of mortgages in GSE loans, even though
private-label mortgage rates do price regional default risk ex-ante. This constant
interest-rate policy results in a large transfer in wealth from regions experiencing pos-
itive economic shocks to those experiencing negative shocks, and this transfer benefits
middle-income households more that are reliant on the GSEs for mortgage finance.
Dagher and Sun (2016) find that credit supply at the jumbo-loan size threshold falls
for judicial relative to non-judicial foreclosure states, although the GSEs mitigate the
45The FHFA is the regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
46Other related papers in this area include Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013), Elenev, Landvoigt,
and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016), and J. Kim and Wang (2018). In addition, a number of papers have
studied the implicit funding subsidy provided to the GSEs (Passmore, Sparks, and Ingpen (2002)).
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aggregate effects using cross-subsidies. Gete and Zecchetto (2017) use a model of
the housing market to show that the removal of credit-risk subsidies in GSE mort-
gages increases wealth inequality by benefitting high-income households and home-
owners. Our paper also relates to a literature showing that the GSE policies affect
credit supply and the structure of MBS. Around the GSE jumbo loan cut-off, credit
supply changes discretely for more liquid and more concentrated lenders (Loutskina
and Strahan (2009), Loutskina and Strahan (2011)). Adelino, Frame, and Gerardi
(2017) document within-deal performance differences between loans destined for the
GSEs relative to other non-GSE mortgages backing the same securities. Relative to
these papers we focus on the GSE policy of cross-subsidizing lenders, and not on
the distributional implications for borrowers. In addition, we show that these GSE
cross-subsidies affected the composition of credit within the GSE mortgage market.
Our also paper relates to a broad literature studying the effect of securitization
on the incentives for retention of mortgage risk. Demiroglu and James (2012) show
that originator-sponsor and originator-servicer affiliation in private-label MBS deals
results in significantly lower deal default rates, but also lower yield spread. Other pa-
pers show more generally that the originate-to-distribute model resulted in excessive
origination of low-quality mortgages (Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2009),Keys,
Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010), Purnanandam (2010), Keys, Seru, and Vig (2012),
Nadauld and Sherlund (2013), Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2013), Bubb and Kaufman
(2014), Rajan, Seru, and Vig (2015), Begley and Purnanandam (2016)). Relative to
these papers, we study how GSE cross-subsidies affected the decision to retain servic-
ing. Importantly, we can make this distinction from pure risk retention, as the credit
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risk on GSE loans is fully insured, unlike in the market for private-label MBS.
2.3 Data and Summary Statistics
The main dataset that we utilize in our analysis is monthly loan- and pool-level
data on conventional long-term, single-family MBS generally maturing or due in 30
years or less, downloaded using the Fannie Mae PoolTalkr portal for securities is-
sued between 2012 and 2013. For each loan, we keep at-issuance data on loan size,
the original interest rate, the name of the seller and servicer, credit score, the loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio, month of first payment, state in which the property resides,
loan purpose (purchase or re finance), and occupancy status (principal, second, or
investor). In addition, for pools beginning in June 2012, we also observe the origina-
tion channel (retail, correspondent, or broker), property type (single-family, condo,
etc.), and whether the borrower is a first-time buyer. For each pool, we also keep the
pool number and whether the MBS was sold through the cash window or through a
swap transaction.47 While many of the sellers in our dataset are non-banks, we collect
for the commercial bank sample data from the CALL reports of balance sheets and
income. The main bank characteristics that we keep are bank assets and ratios of
deposits, equity capital, cash, and non-performing loans to assets.
Summary statistics for the main loan-level dataset are given in Table 13. Each
row contains averages split by seller market shares of key variables of interest and
standard deviations given in brackets below. On average, utilization of the cash win-
dow and originator/serivcer affiliation are higher for smaller sellers relative to larger
47Before June 2013, cash window loans were denoted by the pool prefix “AB.”
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sellers. In addition, small-volume sellers sell higher LTV and lower credit score mort-
gages than do large-volume sellers. However, they also sell more retail and fewer
refinance mortgages. At first glance, it is not obvious that the riskiness of mortgage
pools necessarily differed across sellers of different market shares. Nevertheless, we
include a full set of controls for loan and borrower risk in all specifications.
Following the implementation of guarantee-fee parity, total issuance of 30-year
fixed-rate MBS volumes increased (Figure 16). This increase was driven primarily by
increases in cash window volume sales, which took some of the market share (Fig-
ure 17) from swap transactions, especially in the months after the announcement.48
In addition, Figures 18 and 19 show that much of this increase in the volume of
MBS issuance and relative changes in market share occurred for small and medium
sellers relative to large sellers. While all sellers increased cash window volume sales
in the months following the policy change (Figure 20), this increase was especially
pronounced for small- and extra-small volume sellers. Figure 9 shows that much of
the eventual increase in cash-window market share was driven by these small sellers.
Overall, these figures provide visual evidence that the implementation of guarantee-
fee parity resulted in relative shifts in MBS issuance toward the cash window.
48Note that the increase in guarantee fees for the cash window occurred in November 2012 (month
2 in all figures) and for swap transaction in December 2012 (month 3 in all figures).
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2.4 Loan-Level Evidence
2.4.1 Cash Window Sales
A key relationship we want to estimate in this paper is between cross-subsidization
and credit supply. Identification of the main relationship is complicated due to reverse
causality. On the one hand, sellers might pool and sell relatively more mortgages des-
tined for swap trans-actions rather than through the cash window due to guarantee-fee
pricing differentials. On the other hand, Fannie Mae might charge different guaran-
tee fees to sellers in response to their issuance of MBS. To identify this relationship,
we focus on the implementation of guarantee-fee parity between large-volume and
small-volume sellers in late-2012. Summary statistics in the previous section suggest
that in aggregate small sellers increased MBS sales to the Fannie Mae cash window
relative to large sellers following the implementation of guarantee-fee parity. In this
section, we investigate whether this behavior applied at the loan level as well. The
main outcome of interest for this empirical model is whether a loan is sold to the cash
window or not. Our main loan-level estimating equation for loan i sold by seller s in
year-month t is the following:
Cash Window Salei,s,t = α + β1Market Share Dummiess,t−1
+ β2Market Share Dummiess,t−1 × Postt + γControlsi,t
+ δControlsi,t × Postt + ζSeller Controlss,t−1 + αs + αt + i,s,t
where αs and αt are seller and year-month fixed effects, Market Share Dummiess,t−1
equal 1 for sellers with medium (6-25), small (26-100), and extra-small (100+) mar-
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ket shares in the previous month and 0 otherwise, Postt is a dummy equal to 1 after
August 2012 and 0 otherwise, Controlsi,t are borrower- and loan-specific risk char-
acteristics, and Seller Controlss,t−1 are lagged quarter values of seller characteristics
for institutions for whom data are available. The coefficients of interest from these
regressions are β2, which capture the likelihood of selling to the cash window for
non-large sellers relative to large sellers after the implementation of guarantee-fee
parity, conditional on risk characteristics. Formally, we test the null hypothesis that
the likelihood of being sold to the cash window did not change for medium, small,
and extra-small sellers relative to large sellers following the removal of volume-based
cross-subsidies (H1).
Results from loan-level regressions are given in Table 14. Each regression is esti-
mated using OLS with the inclusion of seller fixed effects.49 Using the full sample of
sellers (columns 1-2), we find strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis (H1) for
small sellers. Following the removal of volume-based cross-subsidies, the likelihood
of a small seller (26-100) selling to the cash window increased by 5 percentage points
more than for a large seller conditional on risk characteristics. This result is robust
to the inclusion of additional characteristics available only after June 2012 (column
2), and the inclusion of time-varying seller controls (columns 3 and 4). Much of the
relative change in cash window utilization seems to have occurred for small sellers
and not for medium or extra-small sellers.
49All results are robust to estimation via Probit.
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2.4.2 Borrower Heterogeneity
In this section we explore whether the increase in likelihood of cash window sales
for small-relative to large-volume sellers was driven by ex-ante riskier borrowers. In
particular, we split the sample based on proxies of loan riskiness identified in the
literature: low credit score threshold (FICO score below 660) and high loan-to-value
ratio (LTV ratio above 80). Results from loan-level regressions split by borrower
characteristics are given in Tables 15 and 16. Each regression is estimated using
OLS with the inclusion of seller fixed effects. Across both the full and bank samples,
we again find strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis (H1) for small sellers.
Following the removal of volume-based cross-subsidies, the likelihood of a small seller
(26-100) selling to the cash window increased by 4-7 percentage points more than for
a large seller conditional on risk characteristics for both the high- and low-credit score
samples. We similarly find that across the high- and low-LTV samples, the likelihood
of sale to the cash window is 4-7 percentage points higher for small relative to large
sellers. We conclude that this increased sale to the cash window was not necessarily
driven by marginally risky borrowers.
2.4.3 Servicing Retention and Compensation
One of the main factors cited in the removal of volume-based cross-subsidies
was the ability of small-volume sellers to be able to retain servicing rights, thus
reducing their reliance on sales to aggregators.50 We test whether sellers were more
50“Lenders are more readily able to follow the historically traditional organic growth path from
a pure servicing-released model, to a servicing-retained model with subservicing, and finally to an
end-to-end origination to servicing model in the hopes of capitalizing on the customer relationship,
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likely to retain servicing on loans originated by the same institution following the
introduction of guarantee-fee parity. For these regressions, we split the sample into
cash-window and MBS swap sales, but due to data limitations we use the full sample
of sellers, rather than the commercial bank sample. Results are presented in Table
17 columns 1 and 2. Overall, we do not find evidence to reject the null hypothesis
that smaller sellers did not retain servicing on loans originated through the retail
channel by more than did larger sellers. While the coefficient magnitudes for the cash
window sample (column 1) do support this hypothesis, coefficient estimates are not
statistically different from zero. While we do not find significant differences between
the likelihood of retain servicing for sellers as a function of market share after the
implementation of guarantee-fee parity, we hypothesize that smaller sellers might
have been compensated relatively more on retained loans than large sellers after the
policy change. To proxy for servicer compensation, we take the difference between the
interest rate on each loan and the pass-through rate for the MBS pool. Conditional
on seller fixed effects and the riskiness of the loan, this variable should proxy for
the servicing fees going to the seller. Results are given in columns 3 and 4 in Table
17. Overall, the coefficient magnitudes do support the hypothesis that smaller sellers
earned more in servicing on retained loans, but the point estimates do not allow for
us to reject the null hypothesis of no change.
the servicing cash flows, and the re finance or the next purchase opportunity.” (MBA (2015))
108
2.5 Aggregate Evidence
2.5.1 Cash Window and MBS Swap Issuance
We have provided loan-level evidence to suggest that on the margin, small-volume
sellers were more likely to sell to the cash window than large-volume sellers follow-
ing the implementation of guarantee-fee parity across sellers. With the removal of
this cross-subsidy, we test whether sellers allocated relatively more credit to the cash
window than to MBS swaps as a function of market share. Given that the gap in
guarantee fees narrowed as a function of seller market share, we would expect that
small sellers were more affected by this policy change relative to medium-sized sell-
ers.
In order to estimate the causal relationship of cross-subsidization on MBS is-
suance, we consider a standard model of credit allocation which models an institu-
tion’s volume of MBS issuance (both to the cash window and to swap transactions)
as a function of shocks to the supply and demand for credit. Similar to Loutskina
and Strahan (2009) and Loutskina and Strahan (2011), we take differences in volumes
between the cash window and swaps at the seller-month level to purge unobserved
heterogeneity that might affect the demand for MBS in either market. Dividing by
the total volume of MBS issuance for each seller, the outcome of interest is then the
share of cash-window relative to swap volume issuance. Our main estimating equation
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for seller s in year-month t is the following:
∆(CW-Swap)s,t
Vol Total Issuances,t
= α + β1Market Share Dummiess,t−1
+ β2Market Share Dummiess,t−1 × Postt + γControlss,t
+ δSeller Controlss,t−1 + αs + αt + s,t
where s and t are seller and year-month fixed effects, Market Share Dummiess,t−1
equal 1 for sellers with medium (6-25), small (26-100), and extra-small (100+) market
shares in the previous month and 0 otherwise, Postt is a dummy equal to 1 after
August 2012 and 0 otherwise, Controlss,t are averages of the characteristics of the
pool of MBS issued by seller s in year-month t, and Seller Controlss,t−1 are lagged
quarter values of seller characteristics for institutions for whom data are available.
The coefficients of interest from these regressions are β2, which capture the relative
change in shares of cash window relative to swap issuance for non-large sellers relative
to large sellers after the implementation of guarantee-fee parity, conditional on risk
characteristics. Formally, we test the null hypothesis that medium, small, and extra-
small sellers did not change the share of MBS issued through the cash window relative
to swaps by more than did large sellers following the removal of volume-based cross-
subsidies (H2).
Results from the regression in equation (1) are given in Table 18. Each model
is estimated after performing the within-transformation across sellers to remove all
time-invariant heterogeneity at the seller level. Across all specifications, we can reject
the null hypothesis (H2) that small sellers did not differentially allocate credit to
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the cash window relative to large sellers. Sellers with market share in the 26-100
range (small) increased their share of cash window relative to swap MBS volume
issuance by 14-18 percentage points more than did sellers in the 1-5 range of the
distribution (large) following guarantee-fee parity. This result holds with the inclusion
of month fixed effects, controls for the average riskiness of loan pools, and controls
for time-varying seller characteristics for the commercial bank sample (column 4).
We also find that extra-small sellers marginally increased their relative cash window
issuance as well, although this result is less robust than for small sellers. Finally, we
find little evidence to reject the null hypothesis for medium sellers. Overall, these
results indicate that the FHFA implementation of guarantee-fee parity across sellers
was effective at encouraging a relative allocation of credit toward the cash window,
especially for small sellers.
2.5.2 Sales Split by Borrower Heterogeneity
In the prior analysis, we established that small-volume sellers increased the al-
location of their sales to Fannie Mae relatively more to the cash window than did
large-volume sellers. In this section, we explore whether this was driven by a rela-
tive change by borrower characteristics. For each specification we calculate relative
shares of cash window and MBS swap volume sales by high/low credit scores (660
FICO score threshold) and LTV ratios (80%). Results from this exercise are given in
Table 19. Overall, we find that much of the relative increase in cash window sales by
small and extra-small sellers relative to large sellers was driven by increases in high
credit score and low LTV loans (columns 2 and 4), rather than by observably riskier
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loans (columns 1 and 3).
2.5.3 Credit Supply and Large-Seller Concentration
In this section, we try to quantify the aggregate effects of the removal of volume-
based cross-subsidies on borrowers. For each state, we calculate the average loan size
and interest rate, as well as the sum of all loan volume in a given month. We also
calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for large sellers in a given month, which we
include as a lag in each regression. We then regress these credit supply outcomes in
a state- fixed effects model with controls for month, and average borrower and loan
characteristics in a given state-month. Results from this exercise are given in Table 20.
Going from a state at the 10th percentile (2.1%) of large-volume seller concentration
to one at the 90th percentile (12.8%) results in a 1.2 percentage point decline in the
average loan size and a 5.9 percentage point decline in the total loan volume in a
given state following the implementation of guarantee fee parity across sellers. We
find no such change in credit supply for interest rates. These results suggest that
the relative increase in cash window sales by small sellers did not offset the overall
reduction in credit for states that were relatively more reliant on large-volume sellers.
Nevertheless, we do not necessarily argue for a causal interpretation of these results




This study is the first to evaluate the impact of removing volume-based cross-
subsidies in the Fannie Mae MBS market. On the margin, small sellers benefitted
from differentially favorable guarantee-fee pricing by allocating relatively more credit
to the cash window than to swap transactions. Nevertheless, this did not significantly
change the incentive to retain servicing or to earn higher servicing fees on mortgages
for which servicing rights were retained. We provide some evidence that credit supply
fell in states with relatively higher concentration of large-volume sellers, although
we do not entirely rule out alternative explanations. In conclusion, our estimates
provide some context for considering the implications for credit supply of removing
cross-subsidies in a highly-liquid market.
113
2.7 Figures
Figure 13: MBS Swap Transaction
Figure 14: Cash Window Transaction
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Figure 15: Single-Family Guarantee Fees by Acquisition-Volume Group
FHFA Report: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Single-Family Guarantee Fees in 2014
Figure 16: 30-Year Fannie Mae Total Volume MBS Issuance
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Figure 17: Market Shares of 30-Year Fannie Mae Total Volume MBS Issuance
Figure 18: 30-Year Fannie Mae Total Volume MBS Issuance by Seller Size
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Figure 19: Market Shares of 30-Year Fannie Mae Total Volume MBS Issuance by
Seller Size
Figure 20: 30-Year Fannie Mae Cash Window MBS Issuance by Seller Size
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Figure 21: Cash Window Market Shares of 30-Year Fannie Mae Total Volume MBS
Issuance by Seller Size
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2.8 Tables
Table 13: Mean Loan-Level Summary Statistics
Market Share Group: Large Medium Small Extra-Small
Cash Window Sale (D) 0.01 0.18 0.54 0.86
(0.08) (0.39) (0.50) (0.35)
Same Originator-Servicer 0.50 0.49 0.68 0.82
(0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.39)
Interest Rate - Pass-Through Rate 0.57 0.57 0.53 0.51
(0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
LTV Ratio 73.10 74.08 74.48 76.00
(17.39) (17.54) (16.62) (16.76)
Credit Score 756.16 753.19 758.19 754.70
(48.96) (49.91) (43.29) (45.45)
Refinance (D) 0.71 0.76 0.63 0.63
(0.45) (0.43) (0.48) (0.48)
Number of Units 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.03
(0.24) (0.25) (0.29) (0.24)
Retail Channel Origination (D) 0.50 0.50 0.69 0.82
(0.50) (0.50) (0.46) (0.39)
First-Time Buyer (D) 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.12
(0.30) (0.26) (0.33) (0.33)
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Table 14: Likelihood of Cash Window Sale
Dependent Variable: Sale to Cash Window = 1
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Medium Seller × Post 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Small Seller × Post 0.05*** 0.04** 0.06* 0.06*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Extra-Small Seller × Post 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Sample Full Full Banks Banks
Loan and Borrower Controls Y Y Y Y
Additional Controls N Y N Y
Seller Controls N N Y Y
Month Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Seller Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Number of Observations 2,146,802 1,653,902 1,209,913 905,410
Number of Clusters 369 369 134 134
R-squared (within) 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.04
This table presents estimates from linear regressions of cash window sales on
loan, borrower, and seller characteristics. Medium, small, and extra-small sellers
denote financial institutions in the 6-25, 25-100, and 100+ market shares of the
Fannie Mae 30-year single-family MBS market. The omitted category in each
regression includes large (1-5) sellers. The sample period in columns 1 and 3
includes March 2012 through May 2013, and the Post variable takes a value equal
to 1 after November 2012 and 0 else (note that September and October 2012
are omitted from the regression). Due to data availability, the sample period
in columns 2 and 4 includes loans sold to Fannie Mae between June 2012 and
April 2013. Loan and borrower controls include the original LTV ratio, original
credit score, number of units, the percentage of the mortgage that is insured
privately, and dummy variables for origination month, property type, occupancy
status, loan purpose, and state. In addition, all loan and borrower controls
are interacted with the post dummy. Additional controls include dummies for
whether the loan was originated through the retail channel, mortgage property
type, and whether the borrower was a first-time buyer, as well as interactions of
each with the post dummy. Seller controls are available for all commercial banks
and include lagged values of the log of total assets, and ratios of deposits, equity
capital, cash, and non-performing loans-to-assets by seller-quarter. Columns 1
and 2 contain the full sample of sellers while columns 3 and 4 contain only the
sample of commercial banks for which data are available. Standard errors are
clustered by seller. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10%
levels, respectively.
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Table 15: Likelihood of Cash Window Sale Split by Credit Score
Dependent Variable: Sale to Cash Window = 1
High Credit Score Low Credit Score
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Medium Seller × Post 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Small Seller × Post 0.04** 0.06* 0.04** 0.04**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Extra-Small Seller × Post 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Sample Full Banks Full Banks
Loan and Borrower Controls Y Y Y Y
Seller Controls N Y N Y
Month Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Seller Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Number of Observations 1,582,535 861,992 71,367 43,418
Number of Clusters 369 134 368 133
R-squared (within) 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05
This table presents estimates from linear regressions of cash window sales on
loan, borrower, and seller characteristics. Medium, small, and extra-small sellers
denote financial institutions in the 6-25, 25-100, and 100+ market shares of the
Fannie Mae 30-year single-family MBS market. The omitted category in each
regression includes large (1-5) sellers. The sample period in columns 1 and 3
includes March 2012 through May 2013, and the Post variable takes a value equal
to 1 after November 2012 and 0 else (note that September and October 2012
are omitted from the regression). Due to data availability, the sample period
in columns 2 and 4 includes loans sold to Fannie Mae between June 2012 and
April 2013. Loan and borrower controls include the original LTV ratio, original
credit score, number of units, the percentage of the mortgage that is insured
privately, and dummy variables for origination month, property type, occupancy
status, loan purpose, and state. In addition, all loan and borrower controls
are interacted with the post dummy. Additional controls include dummies for
whether the loan was originated through the retail channel, mortgage property
type, and whether the borrower was a first-time buyer, as well as interactions of
each with the post dummy. Seller controls are available for all commercial banks
and include lagged values of the log of total assets, and ratios of deposits, equity
capital, cash, and non-performing loans-to-assets by seller-quarter. Columns 1
and 2 contain the full sample of sellers while columns 3 and 4 contain only the
sample of commercial banks for which data are available. Standard errors are
clustered by seller. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10%
levels, respectively.
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Table 16: Likelihood of Cash Window Sale Split by Loan-to-Value Ratio
Dependent Variable: Sale to Cash Window = 1
High LTV Low LTV
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Medium Seller × Post 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
Small Seller × Post 0.05*** 0.06 0.04** 0.07*
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Extra-Small Seller × Post 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Sample Full Banks Full Banks
Loan and Borrower Controls Y Y Y Y
Seller Controls N Y N Y
Month Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Seller Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Number of Observations 469,833 255,026 1,184,069 650,384
Number of Clusters 368 133 369 134
R-squared (within) 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
This table presents estimates from linear regressions of cash window sales on
loan, borrower, and seller characteristics. Medium, small, and extra-small sellers
denote financial institutions in the 6-25, 25-100, and 100+ market shares of the
Fannie Mae 30-year single-family MBS market. The omitted category in each
regression includes large (1-5) sellers. The sample period in columns 1 and 3
includes March 2012 through May 2013, and the Post variable takes a value equal
to 1 after November 2012 and 0 else (note that September and October 2012
are omitted from the regression). Due to data availability, the sample period
in columns 2 and 4 includes loans sold to Fannie Mae between June 2012 and
April 2013. Loan and borrower controls include the original LTV ratio, original
credit score, number of units, the percentage of the mortgage that is insured
privately, and dummy variables for origination month, property type, occupancy
status, loan purpose, and state. In addition, all loan and borrower controls
are interacted with the post dummy. Additional controls include dummies for
whether the loan was originated through the retail channel, mortgage property
type, and whether the borrower was a first-time buyer, as well as interactions of
each with the post dummy. Seller controls are available for all commercial banks
and include lagged values of the log of total assets, and ratios of deposits, equity
capital, cash, and non-performing loans-to-assets by seller-quarter. Columns 1
and 2 contain the full sample of sellers while columns 3 and 4 contain only the
sample of commercial banks for which data are available. Standard errors are
clustered by seller. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10%
levels, respectively.
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Table 17: Servicing Retention and Compensation
Dependent Variables: Originator-Servicer Interest Rate -
Affiliation Pass-Through Rate
Sample: Cash MBS Cash MBS
Window Swap Window Swap
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Medium Seller × Post 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.01
(0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Small Seller × Post 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Extra-Small Seller × Post 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.04
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Sample Full Full Full Full
Loan and Borrower Controls Y Y Y Y
Seller Controls N N N N
Month Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Seller Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Number of Observations 434,017 1,182,176 293,044 633,776
Number of Clusters 353 93 345 91
R-squared (within) 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.07
This table presents estimates from linear regressions of originator/servicer dum-
mies (columns 1 and 2) and the difference between loan interest rates and pass-
through rates (columns 3 and 4) on loan, borrower, and seller characteristics
split by borrower credit score. Medium, small, and extra-small sellers denote
financial institutions in the 6-25, 25-100, and 100+ market shares of the Fannie
Mae 30-year single-family MBS market. The omitted category in each regression
includes large (1-5) sellers. The sample period includes June 2012 through April
2013, and the Post variable takes a value equal to 1 after November 2012 and 0
else (note that September and October 2012 are omitted from the regression).
Loan and borrower controls include the original LTV ratio, original credit score,
number of units, the percentage of the mortgage that is insured privately, and
dummy variables for origination month, property type, occupancy status, loan
purpose, and state. In addition, all loan and borrower controls are interacted
with the post dummy. Additional controls include dummies for whether the loan
was originated through the mortgage property type, and whether the borrower
was a first-time buyer, as well as interactions of each with the post dummy.
Seller controls are available for all commercial banks and include lagged val-
ues of the log of total assets, and ratios of deposits, equity capital, cash, and
non-performing loans-to-assets by seller-quarter. All columns contain the full
sample of sellers. The samples in columns 1 and 3 condition on sale to the cash
window, while columns 2 and 4 condition on MBS swap sales. Standard errors
are clustered by seller. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10%
levels, respectively.
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Table 18: Relative Change in Cash Window vs. MBS Swap Volumes
Dependent Variable: ∆Vol(CW-Swaps)Vol(Total)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Medium Seller × Post 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02)
Small Seller × Post 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.18**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09)
Extra-Small Seller × Post 0.07* 0.06 0.06* 0.08**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Sample Full Full Banks Banks
Loan Pool Controls N Y Y Y
Seller Controls N N N Y
Month Fixed Effects N N Y Y
Seller Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Number of Observations 4,185 4,185 4,185 1,576
Number of Clusters 352 352 352 133
R-squared (within) 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.09
This table presents estimates from regressions of the difference between
cash window volume and MBS swap volume scaled by total volume of 30-
year single-family MBS sales on pool and seller characteristics. Medium,
small, and extra-small sellers denote financial institutions in the 6-25, 25-
100, and 100+ market shares of the Fannie Mae 30-year single-family MBS
market. The omitted category in each regression includes large (1-5) sellers.
The sample period includes March 2012 through May 2013, and the Post
variable takes a value equal to 1 after November 2012 and 0 else (note
that September and October 2012 are omitted from the regression). Loan
pool controls include the average LTV ratio, credit score, number of units,
and shares of single-family, occupancy status, loan purpose, and Census
regions for each seller in a given month. Seller controls are available for
all commercial banks and include lagged values of the log of total assets,
and ratios of deposits, equity capital, cash, and non-performing loans-to-
assets by seller-quarter. All regressions also include the unemployment
rate in each state averaged across all loans for each seller in a given month.
Standard errors are clustered by seller. ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 19: Relative Change in Volumes: Split by Credit Scores and LTV ratios
Dependent Variables: ∆Vol(CW-Swaps)Vol(Total)
Sample: Low Credit High Credit High LTV Low LTV
Score Score Ratio Ratio
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Medium Seller × Post -0.01 0.03 -0.07** 0.09*
(0.01) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
Small Seller × Post 0.00 0.15*** (0.02) 0.18***
(0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Extra-Small Seller × Post 0.00 0.07** -0.06** 0.12***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Sample Full Full Full Full
Loan Pool Controls Y Y Y Y
Seller Controls N N N N
Month Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Seller Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Number of Observations 4,185 4,185 4,185 4,185
Number of Clusters 352 352 352 352
R-squared (within) 0.17 0.04 0.23 0.08
This table presents estimates from regressions of the difference between
cash window volume and MBS swap volume scaled by total volume of 30-
year single-family MBS sales on pool and seller characteristics. Medium,
small, and extra-small sellers denote financial institutions in the 6-25, 25-
100, and 100+ market shares of the Fannie Mae 30-year single-family MBS
market. The omitted category in each regression includes large (1-5) sellers.
The sample period includes March 2012 through May 2013, and the Post
variable takes a value equal to 1 after November 2012 and 0 else (note
that September and October 2012 are omitted from the regression). Loan
pool controls include the average LTV ratio, credit score, number of units,
and shares of single-family, occupancy status, loan purpose, and Census
regions for each seller in a given month. Seller controls are available for
all commercial banks and include lagged values of the log of total assets,
and ratios of deposits, equity capital, cash, and non-performing loans-to-
assets by seller-quarter. All regressions also include the unemployment
rate in each state averaged across all loans for each seller in a given month.
Standard errors are clustered by seller. ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 20: State-Level Credit Supply
Dependent Variable: log(Average Average Interest log(Total
Loan Size) Rate Loan Volume)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3)
Large-Seller Concentration -0.11* -0.02 -0.54**
× Post (0.06) (0.06) (0.20)
Average State-Level Y Y Y
Characteristics
Number of Observations 663 663 663
Number of Clusters 51 51 51
R-squared (within) 0.62 0.98 0.82
This table presents estimates from regressions of average loan size, average in-
terest rates, and total loan volume issuance by state-month. Each regression
includes state fixed effects, month fixed effects, average state-level borrower and
loan characteristics (with post-November 2012 interactions), and state unem-
ployment rates. Large HHI Index equals the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for
large sellers in a given month (sum of squared market shares, taking a value be-
tween 0 and 1). The sample period includes March 2012 through May 2013, and
the Post variable takes a value equal to 1 after November 2012 and 0 else (note
that September and October 2012 are omitted from the regression). Standard
errors are clustered by state. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and
10% levels, respectively.
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3 Survey Forecasts and Bond Return Decomposi-
tions
Abstract
Unexpected excess bond returns can be decomposed into news about future short-
term interest rates and news about future excess bond returns. This paper uses
consensus survey forecasts to directly measure expectations of future interest rates
and provides two new preliminary empirical facts: (1) News about future short-term
interest rates explains relatively more of the variation in unexpected excess bond
returns for short-maturity bonds relative to long-maturity bonds. (2) The share
of news explained by future short-term interest rates increases with horizon for all
maturities.
I thank Pierluigi Balduzzi for his tremendous support and persistence in advising this project. I
also thank participants at the Boston College Macro Lunch and the Becker-Friedman Institute’s 2016
Macro-Financial Modeling Summer Session for Young Scholars for helpful questions and comments.
All errors are my own.
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3.1 Introduction
What drives fluctuations in bond returns? Under the Expectations Hypothesis
of the term structure of interest rates, long-term bond yields should fully reflect ex-
pectations of short-term interest rates over the life of the bond. However, a long
literature in finance has found strong evidence against the validity of the hypothesis
(Fama and Bliss (1987), Campbell and Shiller (1991), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005)).
A starting point for studying the drivers of the variance of bond returns is the
decomposition that states that unexpected excess bond returns must reflect either
unexpected changes in expectations of future short-term interest rates (interest-rate
news) or future excess returns (excess-return news). Under the Expectations Hy-
pothesis, interest-rate news should be the primary driver of the unconditional vari-
ance of unexpected returns on long-term bonds. Campbell and Ammer (1993) find
that excess-return news and inflation news (as a component of interest-rate news)
explained large fractions of the unconditional variance of excess bond returns in the
1970s and 1980s. Using survey forecasts to directly proxy for expectations, Duffee
(2018) finds less of a role for inflation news, while Crump, Eusepi, and Moench (2018)
strongly reject the Expectations Hypothesis at long horizons for the level and changes
in realized forward rates.
Given this recent evidence concerning the importance of survey forecasts, this pa-
per revisits the fundamental question of the validity of the Expectations Hypothesis
in the context of variance decompositions of bond returns. Relative to the existing
literature, this paper measures expectations of both unexpected bond returns and
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future short-term interest rates using survey forecasts in order to understand the
relative importance of interest-rate news across horizons. Two new empirical facts
emerge from this analysis:
1. Interest-rate news explains relatively more of the variation in unexpected excess
bond returns for short-maturity bonds relative to long-maturity bonds. For ex-
ample, at a one-month horizon, these shares are approximately 89%, 41%, and
11% for 6-month, 2-year, and 10-year bonds, respectively.
2. The relative importance of interest-rate news increases with horizon for all ma-
turities. For example, the variance share of unexpected excess returns on 5- and
10-year bonds explained by interest-rate news increases from 16% and 11% at
a one-month horizon to over 50% and 33% after eighteen months, respectively.
This paper takes the approach of measuring expectations of interest rates using sur-
vey forecasts of market participants. A number of recent papers have employed
survey forecasts in similar settings as alternatives to Vector Autoregressions (VAR)
that impose the assumption of full-information rational expectations (Duffee (2018),
Buraschi, Piatti, and Whelan (2018), Crump et al. (2018)). Relative to these papers,
I exploit strong correlations of the term structure of interest-rate forecasts to factors
in the yield curve to interpolate survey forecasts across maturity, horizon, and time.
More precisely, I use consensus forecasts of nominal interest rates made by partic-
ipants in the Blue Chip Financial Forecastsr survey (henceforth Blue Chip) as an
empirical proxy for interest-rate expectations. I bootstrap both current and expected
zero-coupon yield curves from Treasury constant maturity yields following Balduzzi,
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Marcus, and Zhao (2019). With these estimates in hand, I then utilize forecasts of the
full term structure of interest rates to directly measure expectations of both future
short-term interest rates and future excess bond returns across different maturities.
A long literature in finance has used present-value models of asset prices to de-
compose unexpected returns into news about cash flows and news about discount
rates. An early approach, pioneered by Campbell and Shiller (1988a), Campbell and
Shiller (1988b), Campbell (1991), and Campbell and Ammer (1993), obtains expecta-
tions of excess returns from a VAR and backs out cash flow news as a residual. These
papers find that a substantial fraction of the variation in unexpected returns in both
stocks and bonds is due to news about future expected returns (risk premia). In
addition, Campbell and Ammer (1993) argue that news about future inflation rates
explained a large fraction of unexpected bond returns from the 1950s-1980s.
These early papers embedded the full-information rational expectations assump-
tion in order to project forward expectations of asset returns into the future. However,
a more recent literature has suggested caution in drawing conclusions from model-
based asset-price decompositions. In particular, measures of subjective expectations
of asset prices, proxied by survey forecasts of investors and professional economists,
have been increasingly utilized to study decompositions.51 At a minimum, these pa-
pers suggest that the way in which expectations are modeled can crucially change
interpretations of results from asset-price decompositions.
Unexpected bond returns must reflect unexpected news about future discount
51Recent papers have performed these decompositions for a range of asset classes: stocks (Chen,
Da, and Zhao (2013), De la O and Myers (2018)), bonds (Cieslak (2018), Duffee (2018), Crump et
al. (2018)), and currencies (Stavrakeva and Tang (2018)).
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rates, as nominal cash flows are known in advance. Campbell and Ammer (1993) use
bond-price identities to further decompose discount rate news of unexpected bond
returns into news about future short-term real rates, news about future inflation, and
news about future excess bond returns. Using a VAR of financial market variables,
they find that the bulk of the variation in unexpected returns before the 1980s was
due to news about future excess returns and inflation. However, these model-based
decompositions might not accurately reflect beliefs of market participants, either due
to omitted factors (Chen and Zhao (2009)) leading to model misspecification, or due
to spurious assumptions of the statistical model used to construct expectations (Duf-
fee (2018)).
A recent empirical literature has exploited information in survey forecasts to pro-
vide insights on asset price movements. Chen and Zhao (2009) argue that incorrectly
modeling discount rate news can lead to overattributing its relative importance in
return decompositions. In addition, a number of papers have found substantial devi-
ations from rational expectations among investors and professional forecasters across
different asset classes (Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), Piazzesi, Salomao, and Schnei-
der (2015), Stavrakeva and Tang (2018), Cieslak (2018)). Survey forecasts have also
been used to shed light on asset-price decompositions. Chen et al. (2013) find that
news about expected future cash flows explain most the variance of excess stock
returns. Balduzzi and Lan (2014) use survey forecasts to construct news and find
that risk premium news explain a large fraction of the variance of returns. De la
O and Myers (2018) find that news about cash flows (dividend growth rates) rather
than discount rates can explain variation in unexpected stock returns. Duffee (2018)
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measures inflation news directly using survey forecasts, rather than via a VAR, and
finds that it explains a small fraction of the variance of yield innovations. Crump
et al. (2018) use all known survey forecasts and a model with time-varying means
to construct expectations of future short-term real rates and future inflation rates.
They find that the fraction of the variance of forward rates (both levels and changes)
explained by expectations of future short-term real rates is high at short horizons, but
decreases at long horizons. Buraschi et al. (2018) use the cross section of Blue Chip
survey forecasts of interest rates to document large deviations from full-information
rational expectations. Relative to this literature, this paper uses consensus survey
forecasts of interest rates to perform unconditional variance decompositions of unex-
pected changes in excess bond returns.
3.2 Bond Return Decompositions
The yield on a zero-coupon bond maturing in n periods, y
(n)
t , can be decom-
posed into expectations of future nominal short-term rates and future excess returns


















where t denotes date t, y
(1)
t is the yield on a nominal one-period zero-coupon bond
and ex
(n)
t+1 is the log return from holding a zero-coupon bond maturing in n periods
from t to t + 1 in excess of the risk-free rate. Taking expectations at time t and
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Rearranging terms then gives:
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Innovations in excess returns, e
(n)
t+h, can then be expressed as news about future nom-









Under the “Expectations Hypothesis” of the term structure of interest rates, η
(n)
ex,t+h =








































Each of the terms on the right-hand side of (14) can be interpreted as coefficients




























































3.3.1 Constructing Zero-Coupon Yields
Balduzzi et al. (2019) bootstrap the zero-coupon curve from prices of off-the-run
Treasury securities by employing a first-order approximation of spot rates to yields.52
In particular, they model the yield of a Treasury bond at time t maturing in τN




















Since participants in the Blue Chip survey forecast “constant maturity” Treasury
yields, I follow their procedure to bootstrap a zero-coupon curve using these yields
instead.53 To be precise, I estimate equation 18 where cfn is the coupon rate on an n-
month constant maturity Treasury bond. As these yields are derived from on-the-run
securities, I assume that they trade at par, and thus the coupon rate equals the bond
yield. I use coupon rates to match forecasted maturities from the Blue Chip survey
from 1988-2018 of the following maturities: 3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 2-year, 5-year,
and 10-year bonds. From these regressions, I extract factors xˆci(t) from a polynomial of
52Relative to Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006), their yields exhibit substantially less volatility
and are less affected by outliers.
53These yields are modeled as a cubic spline with closing bids of Treasury on-the-run securities as
inputs.
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order 3 (I = 3), where the superscript c denotes that these are “current” factors. Plots
of these factors are shown in Figure 22. For each order of the polynomial, I calculate
root mean square errors (RMSE) for fitted yields relative to constant maturity yields.
I choose a polynomial of order 3 in order to avoid issues of over-fitting and as the
fits are marginally improved by increasing the order of the polynomial (see top panel
of Table 22). With the current factors in hand, I obtain fitted values of zero-coupon
yields from equation 19, yˆz(t, τN), across maturities N = 1, ..., 120. These extracted
zero-coupon yields correspond closely with those obtained from Balduzzi et al. (2019),
even though the model inputs differ (see Figure 23).
3.3.2 Constructing Interest-Rate Expectations
Each of the terms in equation 12 presents a challenge to measure when taken to
the data. One approach, developed by Campbell and Ammer (1993), is to estimate
a VAR of financial variables and project forward expectations to obtain news about
each component in the identity: excess bond returns, real interest rates, and inflation
rates.54 They find that both inflation news and excess return news explain the bulk
of the variation in unexpected returns. Duffee (2018) argues that their approach as-
sumes cointegration of inflation rates and bond yields, leading to substantially larger
attribution of inflation news than suggested by survey forecasts. His approach di-
rectly measures innovations in inflation rates from Blue Chip survey forecasts. As
the focus of his paper is to measure the share of yield innovations explained by in-
54They use the Fisher relation to further decompose nominal interest rate news into news about
inflation and real interest rates. Their VAR includes excess stock returns, the real interest rate,
the change in nominal interest rate, the long-short yield spread, the dividend-price ratio, and the
relative bill rate.
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flation news, he obtains yield innovations from a statistical model in order to obtain
conservative estimates of the inflation-variance ratio relative to those obtained via
survey forecasts. He finds ratios of 10-20%, suggesting a significantly smaller role
for inflation news than found in Campbell and Ammer (1993). A number of other
papers have utilized survey forecasts to discipline the dynamics of a statistical model
(D. H. Kim and Wright (2005), D. H. Kim and Orphanides (2012), Piazzesi et al.
(2015), Crump et al. (2018)).
In contrast to these papers, my focus is to accurately calculate news about ex-
pected future nominal interest rates, rather than inflation news, using a parsimonious
extension of the model used to bootstrap the zero-coupon yield curve. The main
identifying assumption of this approach is that this model accurately captures the
cross-sectional fit of survey forecasts to factors of the yield curve on forecast dates
across both maturities and forecast horizons. I assume that this relationship holds
as well on non-forecast dates, and project on the current factors of the yield curve to
obtain fitted survey forecasts on all dates.
Consensus (mean) forecasts of Treasury rates from the Blue Chip survey are used
to proxy for interest-rate expectations. The Blue Chip is a closely followed survey of
market participants produced each month since 1982.55 Approximately 45 economists
are asked their views on the future trajectory of a range of financial market variables.
In particular, participants report their expectation of average Treasury “constant ma-
turity” rates for short horizons (1-6 quarters ahead) at a monthly frequency and for
long horizons (1-6 and 7-11 years ahead) semi-annually. In order to ensure consistent
55Cieslak (2018) documents significant coverage of the survey in minutes of FOMC meetings.
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coverage of responses over time, I utilize forecasts from 1988-2018 of the following
maturities: 3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year bonds. Full details
of the coverage of Blue Chip interest-rate forecasts are given in Table 21. I follow
the same procedure for bootstrapping the zero-coupon curve from current constant
maturity yields, with the only difference being that I perform estimation with the
information set available to forecasters on survey forecast dates, typically one week
before the release date. The time-t forecast of a Treasury yield with maturity τN at
horizon h is similarly modeled as a polynomial function of cash flows and maturity:











From this procedure, I extract “forecast” factors at each date t, xˆfi (t, h), where the
superscript f denotes that this is a forecast of a particular Treasury security’s yield.
These factors at the nearest horizon (1- to 3-months ahead) are plotted in Figure 24.
Fitted forecasts from this routine almost perfectly fit actual forecasts across maturities
and horizons (Figures 25 and 26). With the factors in hand, I then fit forecasts of
zero-coupon yields across all maturities at forecast horizons on survey dates:






Fitted values from this procedure, yˆfz (t, τN , h), can be thought of as h-period ahead
forecasts of zero-coupon yields made at date t for a bond of maturity τN . I follow a
similar procedure of fitting Treasury forecasts by choosing a third-order polynomial
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in the estimation of equation 20 (see lower panel of Table 22). Figure 27 shows plots
of fitted survey forecasts of zero-coupon yields on survey forecast dates. There is not
much dispersion in short-term forecasts for all maturities (first two rows). However,
long-term forecasts across horizons narrow at the end of monetary policy tightening
cycles and widen during periods of monetary easing
As survey forecasts of interest rates are only available at a monthly frequency, I
implement a simple interpolation procedure that relies on fitting survey forecasts to
the current factors of the yield curve, xˆci(t). This estimation procedure fits survey
forecasts on forecast dates as a polynomial function of forecast horizon h and maturity
τN .
yfz (t, τN , h) =
I∑
i=0



















The coefficient of polynomial term i, βi(h, t), is modeled as a polynomial function
of forecast horizon and a time trend. I allow for full flexibility of the polynomial
by considering three separate specifications: the coefficients only vary by forecast
horizon, β
(0)
i (h); the coefficients vary by forecast horizon and there is time variation
in the mean, β
(1)
i (h, t); all coefficients vary by forecast horizon and time, β
(2)
i (h, t).
The routine proceeds by running stepwise fit regressions that progressively exclude
regressors whose t-ratios are smaller than one in absolute value for each value P and
K. I then select the regression specification that maximizes the adjusted R-squared
statistic and choose orders P and K of each polynomial. The functional form for each
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Table 23 gives results from estimation of equation 22 for these three cases allow-
ing orders of both the horizon and time trend polynomials to vary. In all cases I
use a third-order polynomial of the maturity τN (I = 3) in order to estimate the
routine. The fit marginally improves beyond a second-order polynomial in terms of
adjusted R-squares and RMSEs. I make the conservative choice of selecting fourth-
order polynomials for both horizons and time trends (P = 4, K = 4) in order to
avoid over-fitting. In the robustness section, I show that the main results hold for
different orders of the polynomial. For each case, I calculate the sum of coefficients
for all time-invariant (βi(h)) and time-varying (βi(h, t)) terms. I choose case 3 as
the main specification for my analysis, as the sum of coefficients for all time-varying
and time-invariant terms are significant at the 95th percentile. Results are robust to
choosing one of the other two cases. I then project estimated loadings on the factors
on all dates in order to construct expectations for each horizon h and maturity τN
at a daily frequency. Figures 28 and 29 plot “actual” and fitted survey forecasts of
zero-coupon yields on survey dates. The former forecasts are those obtained from




This section presents results from the decomposition exercise. The objective of
this analysis is to quantify the shares of the variance of excess return innovations
explained by interest rate news relative to excess return news. I estimate equation 20
for separate maturities at horizons of 1-24 months ahead. News about future short-
term interest rates are obtained from estimation of equation 22. I similarly obtain
news about future yields and construct forecasts of excess bond returns at each date.
Excess-return news are obtained as a residual. Results from the variance decomposi-
tions of excess-return innovations are shown in Figures 30 and 31, with darker lines
corresponding to shorter-maturity bonds.
The first main result is that expectations of future short-term interest rates ex-
plain relatively more of the variation in unexpected excess bond returns for short-
maturity bonds relative to long-maturity bonds across all forecast horizons. For ex-
ample, at a one-month horizon, these shares are approximately 89%, 41%, and 11%
for 6-month, 2-year, and 10-year bonds, respectively. Results for these estimates are
all statistically significant at 99% confidence intervals. Table 24 includes coefficient
estimates of β
(n)
y (h) with Newey-West standard errors corrected for overlapping ob-
servations.
The second main result is that the share of news explained by future short-term
interest rates increases with horizon for all maturities. The variance shares of unex-
pected excess returns on 6-month, 1-year, and 2-year bonds increases from 89%, 73%,
141
and 41% at a one-month horizon to 98% at horizons just before maturity. For 10-year
bonds, the variance shares explained by interest-rate news increases from 11% at a
one-month horizon to over 33% after eighteen months. The majority of the variation
in unexpected excess returns on 10-year bonds is due to news about future excess
returns.
Figure 32 further illustrates these two main results graphically by depicting
excess-return innovations (gray line) and interest-rate news (black line) over time.
The pattern across all sub-figures is that interest-rate news tracks innovations more
closely for 1- and 2-year bond yields than for 10-year bond yields at both horizons
(1-month and 9-months ahead). However, the fluctuations in interest-rate news follow
innovations relatively more closely at 9-month horizons.
The results from this exercise present new evidence on validity of the Expecta-
tions Hypothesis of interest rates. Using survey forecasts to proxy for interest-rate
expectations, I show that the Expectations Hypothesis can explain relatively more of
the variation in unexpected news about excess bond returns for short-maturity bonds
than for long-maturity bonds. Stated differently, unexpected shocks to interest rates
persist for short-maturity bonds, and thus explain most of the variation in returns.
These results are broadly consistent with Cieslak (2018), who finds that unexpected
excess returns explain most of realized excess bond returns for two-year Treasury
bonds. Interestingly, while ER news matter relatively more for long-maturity bonds
at short horizons, as the maturity of bonds shortens, IR news explains increasingly
larger shares of the variance than ER news.
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3.5 Extensions
3.5.1 Comparison to Other Papers
Results from the baseline regressions apply to the unconditional variance of un-
expected excess bond returns. However, these results do not speak to potential het-
eroskedasticity (Balduzzi and Lan (2014)). In Tables 26-29, I present results for the
relative shares of IR news and ER news across different sub-samples. The shares of
IR news explains relatively more of the variance of unexpected excess returns in the
post-1998 period. In addition, excluding the zero-lower bound (post-2008) increases
all estimates, especially for long-maturity bonds. These results are indicative of IR
news explaining innovations in excess bond returns during periods where monetary
policy was less constrained.
3.5.2 Comparison to Other Papers
These results are broadly consistent with the findings of Crump et al. (2018), who
show that the share of the variance of the change in forward rates due to interest-
rate news is generally larger for short-maturity bonds, although the magnitudes fall
significantly beyond two years. They also show that shares of interest rate news
explain less of this variation at changes over longer horizons (1-month relative to
12-month changes). My empirical setting differs from their paper in that I construct
unexpected changes in excess bond returns rather than realized changes in interest
rates. This distinction is important, as I construct subjective forecasts of excess




magnitudes of my estimates are generally larger, suggesting that interest-rate news
plays a relatively larger role in explaining unexpected excess returns than realized
changes.
Campbell and Ammer (1993) decompose the variance of excess-return innovations
into the sum of the variances and covariances of individual components. Duffee (2018)
updates their paper for the period March 1987-December 2013, broadly corresponding
to the sample in this paper. He finds that inflation news explain the bulk of the
variation in excess-return innovations of 10-year bond yields. I perform a similar
decomposition and calculate variance shares of each component in equation 17 using
fitted survey forecasts. Results from this exercise are shown in Table 30. In contrast
to the Campbell and Ammer (1993) paper, I find that at a one-month horizon, news
about future excess returns are the primary driver of excess-return innovations of 10-
year bonds (87%). Duffee (2018) estimates a VAR of survey forecasts from the Survey
of Professional Forecasters and calculates the variance shares of yield innovations
(y
(n)
t − Et−1[y(n)t ]). He finds that at short maturities the variance of news about real
interest rates is the primary driver of innovations, but he is unable to distinguish
relative shares for longer maturities. My estimates for 6-month and 1-year bonds are
consistent with his findings, however I attribute more of the variation in innovations
in excess returns on long-term bonds to excess-return news across all horizons.
3.5.3 Choice of Polynomials
In this section, I explore whether the choice of polynomials affects the main results
of the paper. In my baseline analysis, I utilize a polynomial of order 3 to bootstrap the
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Treasury yield curve in order to reduce concerns of overfitting. The variance decom-
position of excess-return innovations is robust to a fourth-order polynomial (Table
A.3.1). A second choice is to model the relationship between the forecast factors and
current factors. In my baseline analysis, I allow for a fully flexible polynomial of fore-
cast horizon h and time trend t. In Table A.3.2 I show that results from a polynomial
specification where the coefficients in equation 16 vary by forecast horizon, but there
is only time variation in the mean, do not affect the main conclusions.
3.6 Conclusion
Understanding the drivers of the variation in unexpected returns has presented
an empirical challenge to researchers in finance. This paper measures expectations of
interest rates directly from survey forecasts, rather than rely on a statistical model
embedded with the full-information rational expectations assumption. Relative to
the existing literature, I document a large role for news about future nominal short-
term interest rates in explaining the variation of unexpected bond returns. At short
horizons, this news is relatively more important for short-maturity relative to long-
maturity bonds. However, interest-rate news explains an increasingly larger frac-
tion as the forecast horizon increases. These results contribute to an existing litera-




Figure 22: Treasury Yield Curve Current Factors









































This figure shows factors extracted from the bootstrapping procedure of Treasury bond yields.
Factors, xˆci (t) are obtained by estimating equation 18.
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Figure 23: Zero-Coupon Yields
This figure shows zero-coupon yields fitted from the bootstrapping procedure in this paper (black
line). Yields, yˆz(t, τN ) are obtained from equation 19. The gray line contains zero-coupon yields
from Balduzzi et al. (2019).
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Figure 24: Treasury Yield Curve “Forecast” Factors






































This figure shows factors extracted from the bootstrapping procedure of survey forecasts. Factors,
xˆfi (t) are obtained by estimating equation 20.
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This figure shows short-term forecasts of Treasury bond yields from fitted values of survey
forecasts (i.e. the left- and right-hand sides of equation 20 post-estimation). Each row represents a
particular Treasury maturity, while columns correspond to forecast horizons. The black lines are
actual survey forecasts, while the gray lines are fitted survey forecasts.
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This figure shows long-term forecasts of Treasury bond yields from fitted values of survey forecasts
(i.e. the left- and right-hand sides of equation 20 post-estimation). Each row represents a
particular Treasury maturity, while columns correspond to forecast horizons. The black lines are
actual survey forecasts, while the gray lines are fitted survey forecasts.
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Figure 27: Fitted Survey Forecasts of Zero-Coupon Yields from Forecast Factors




































































































































This figure shows fitted values of survey forecasts of the zero-coupon yield curve for the following
bond maturities: 3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year. The first two rows plot
short-term forecasts (1-6 quarters), while the last two rows plot long-term forecasts (2-6 years and
11 years ahead).
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This figure shows short-term forecasts of Treasury zero-coupon yields from fitted values of survey
forecasts (i.e. the left- and right-hand sides of equation 22 post-estimation). Each row represents a
particular Treasury maturity, while columns correspond to forecast horizons. The black lines are
actual survey forecasts, while the gray lines are fitted survey forecasts.
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This figure shows long-term forecasts of Treasury zero-coupon yields from fitted values of survey
forecasts (i.e. the left- and right-hand sides of equation 22 post-estimation). Each row represents a
particular Treasury maturity, while columns correspond to forecast horizons. The black lines are
actual survey forecasts, while the gray lines are fitted survey forecasts.
153
Figure 30: Excess-Return Innovations and Interest-Rate News






























































This figure plots excess-return innovations (gray line) and interest-rate news (black line) for 1-year,
2-year, and 10-year bond yields at 1-month and 9-month horizons.
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Figure 31: Shares of Variance of Excess-Return Innovations Explained by Interest-
Rate News




















This figure shows estimates of β
(n)
y (h) from equation 15, the shares of variance of excess-return
innovations due to interest-rate news.
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Figure 32: Shares of Variance of Excess-Return Innovations Explained by Excess-
Return News




















This figure shows estimates of β
(n)
ex (h) from equation 15, the shares of variance of excess-return
innovations due to excess-return news.
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3.8 Tables
Table 21: Coverage of Blue Chip Interest-Rate Forecasts (1983-2018)
Horizons Frequency Maturity
3 6, 12, 24, 60, 120
1Q, 3Q, 5Q Monthly 11/1982-12/2018 1/1988-12/2018
2Q, 4Q Monthly 4/1983-12/2018 1/1988-12/2018
6Q Monthly 1/1997-12/2018 1/1988-12/2018
2Y, 3Y, 4Y, 5Y, 6Y Semi-Annually 10/1983-12/2018 3/1988-12/2018
Average 7-11Y Semi-Annually 3/1986-12/2018 3/1988-12/2018
This table provides a breakdown of the availability of interest-rate forecasts in
the Blue Chip Financial Forecastsr survey from 1983-2018. In order to obtain
a consistent series over time, I exclude forecasts of the interest rates on 3-year,
7-year, 20-year, 30-year, and average “long-term” bonds. In addition, the first
releases in November and December 1982 contained a more detailed coverage of
bonds across maturities. However, interest-rate forecasts for these bonds were
not included in subsequent releases consistently until 1988.
Table 22: RMSEs of Treasury Current Yield Curve and Forecasts (1988-2018)
Root Mean Square Errors (%)
Polynomial Order
1 2 3 4 5
Zero-Coupon Curve 0.2437 0.1461 0.1190 0.1116 0.1006
N = 54,084
Survey Forecasts 0.1843 0.0832 0.0297 0.0150 0.0000
N = 14,952
The top panel of this table gives root mean square errors from fits of equation 18.
Treasury constant maturity yields are fitted to polynomials of order 1-5 as a function
of coupon rates and maturity between Dec 1982 and Dec 2018. The bottom panel
of this table gives root mean square errors from fits of equation 20. Forecasts of
Treasury constant maturity yields are fitted to polynomials of order 1-5 as a function
of coupon rates and maturity between 1988 and 2018 for each horizon.
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Table 23: Fits of Zero-Coupon Yield Forecasts (1988-2018)
Case 1 Case 2
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4
p Adj R2 RMSE p Adj R2 RMSE Adj R2 RMSE Adj R2 RMSE Adj R2 RMSE
1 0.9866 0.0027 1 0.9879 0.0026 0.9881 0.0026 0.9886 0.0025 0.9895 0.0024
2 0.9891 0.0024 2 0.9906 0.0023 0.9908 0.0023 0.9914 0.0022 0.9924 0.0020
3 0.9892 0.0024 3 0.9907 0.0023 0.9909 0.0022 0.9915 0.0022 0.9926 0.0020
4 0.9893 0.0024 4 0.9908 0.0022 0.9910 0.0022 0.9917 0.0021 0.9928 0.0020
5 0.9894 0.0024 5 0.9908 0.0022 0.9911 0.0022 0.9917 0.0021 0.9928 0.0020
6 0.9894 0.0024 6 0.9909 0.0022 0.9911 0.0022 0.9917 0.0021 0.9928 0.0020
Case 3
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4
p Adj R2 RMSE Adj R2 RMSE Adj R2 RMSE Adj R2 RMSE
1 0.9884 0.0025 0.9890 0.0025 0.9897 0.0024 0.9903 0.0023
2 0.9911 0.0022 0.9918 0.0021 0.9926 0.0020 0.9933 0.0019
3 0.9913 0.0022 0.9920 0.0021 0.9929 0.0020 0.9936 0.0019
4 0.9914 0.0022 0.9921 0.0021 0.9930 0.0020 0.9938 0.0019
5 0.9914 0.0022 0.9922 0.0021 0.9931 0.0020 0.9938 0.0019
6 0.9915 0.0022 0.9922 0.0021 0.9931 0.0020 0.9939 0.0018
This table presents adjusted R-square and root mean square errors from fitting equation 22 for
each case given in 23. Given below are the polynomial specifications for the loadings on factors
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p=1 βi,ph
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Table 24: Summary Statistics
Means Standard Deviations
Horizon Maturity (months) Maturity (months)
(months) 6 12 24 60 120 6 12 24 60 120
1 IR News 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.18 0.22 0.09 0.18 0.31 0.48 0.84
ER News -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.25 0.21 0.03 0.10 0.38 1.27 2.47
ER Innov 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.07 0.43 0.09 0.21 0.51 1.44 2.65
3 IR News 0.03 0.10 0.25 0.52 0.63 0.11 0.31 0.63 1.04 1.76
ER News -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.13 0.54 0.02 0.11 0.55 2.08 3.93
ER Innov 0.02 0.08 0.21 0.40 1.17 0.12 0.35 0.89 2.49 4.35
6 IR News 0.13 0.43 1.01 1.19 0.36 0.95 1.74 2.91
ER News -0.02 -0.03 0.07 1.06 0.06 0.56 2.65 5.24
ER Innov 0.12 0.40 1.08 2.25 0.38 1.13 3.34 5.84
9 IR News 0.10 0.55 1.46 1.69 0.25 1.10 2.31 3.87
ER News -0.01 -0.02 0.26 1.56 0.02 0.45 2.74 5.92
ER Innov 0.09 0.53 1.73 3.25 0.26 1.19 3.70 6.58
12 IR News 0.60 1.88 2.14 1.10 2.79 4.67
ER News -0.01 0.42 2.04 0.32 2.80 6.52
ER Innov 0.58 2.30 4.18 1.16 4.06 7.24
15 IR News 0.57 2.25 2.55 0.97 3.12 5.26
ER News -0.01 0.57 2.51 0.19 2.69 6.95
ER Innov 0.56 2.83 5.07 1.00 4.22 7.69
18 IR News 0.47 2.59 2.93 0.72 3.34 5.68
ER News -0.01 0.69 2.97 0.08 2.41 7.19
ER Innov 0.45 3.28 5.90 0.74 4.21 7.87
21 IR News 0.28 2.85 3.25 0.39 3.47 5.98
ER News -0.01 0.75 3.37 0.02 2.07 7.37
ER Innov 0.26 3.60 6.62 0.40 4.18 8.00
24 IR News 3.05 3.53 3.51 6.17
ER News 0.76 3.72 1.69 7.44
ER Innov 3.81 7.25 4.05 7.99
This table presents summary statistics of changes in expectations of future interest rates (IR
news), future excess returns (ER news), and excess-return innovations (ER Innov). The first
set of column for each variable contains the mean and the second contain its standard deviation.
All statistics are given as annualized percents.
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Table 25: Variance Decomposition of Excess-Return Innovations
Share of Interest-Rate News Share of Excess-Return News
Horizon Maturity (months) Maturity (months)
(months) 6 12 24 60 120 6 12 24 60 120
1 0.89 0.73 0.41 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.27 0.59 0.83 0.88
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
2 0.94 0.81 0.49 0.21 0.15 0.06 0.19 0.51 0.79 0.85
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
3 0.96 0.86 0.56 0.24 0.17 0.04 0.14 0.44 0.76 0.83
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
4 0.97 0.90 0.62 0.27 0.19 0.03 0.10 0.38 0.73 0.81
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
5 0.93 0.67 0.29 0.21 0.07 0.33 0.71 0.79
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
6 0.95 0.73 0.32 0.22 0.05 0.27 0.68 0.78
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
9 0.98 0.85 0.42 0.27 0.02 0.15 0.58 0.73
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
12 0.91 0.50 0.30 0.09 0.50 0.70
(0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09)
15 0.95 0.57 0.33 0.05 0.43 0.67
(0.02) (0.06) (0.10) (0.02) (0.06) (0.10)
18 0.97 0.65 0.34 0.03 0.35 0.66
(0.01) (0.06) (0.11) (0.01) (0.06) (0.11)
21 0.98 0.72 0.36 0.02 0.28 0.64
(0.01) (0.05) (0.12) (0.01) (0.05) (0.12)
24 0.79 0.36 0.21 0.64
(0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.12)
This table presents estimates of β
(n)
y (h) and β
(n)
ex (h) from equation 15, the shares of variance of
excess-return innovations due to interest-rate news and excess-return news, respectively. Newey-
West corrected standard errors are given below coefficient estimates to account for overlapping
observations.
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Table 26: Variance Decomposition of Excess-Return Innovations (Pre-1998)
Share of Interest-Rate News Share of Excess-Return News
Horizon Maturity (months) Maturity (months)
(months) 6 12 24 60 120 6 12 24 60 120
1 0.85 0.66 0.40 0.21 0.16 0.15 0.34 0.60 0.79 0.84
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
2 0.92 0.73 0.44 0.25 0.21 0.08 0.27 0.56 0.75 0.79
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
3 0.95 0.79 0.49 0.28 0.25 0.05 0.21 0.51 0.72 0.75
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
4 0.98 0.84 0.54 0.30 0.27 0.02 0.16 0.46 0.70 0.73
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
5 0.88 0.59 0.32 0.28 0.12 0.41 0.68 0.72
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
6 0.92 0.64 0.34 0.30 0.08 0.36 0.66 0.70
(0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
9 0.97 0.77 0.41 0.34 0.03 0.23 0.59 0.66
(0.02) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
12 0.85 0.47 0.38 0.15 0.53 0.62
(0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09)
15 0.92 0.52 0.42 0.08 0.48 0.58
(0.05) (0.11) (0.10) (0.05) (0.11) (0.10)
18 0.97 0.61 0.48 0.03 0.39 0.52
(0.02) (0.12) (0.12) (0.02) (0.12) (0.12)
21 0.99 0.71 0.55 0.01 0.29 0.45
(0.01) (0.11) (0.12) (0.01) (0.11) (0.12)
24 0.81 0.63 0.19 0.37
(0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12)
This table presents estimates of β
(n)
y (h) and β
(n)
ex (h) from equation 15, the shares of variance of
excess-return innovations due to interest-rate news and excess-return news, respectively. Newey-
West corrected standard errors are given below coefficient estimates to account for overlapping
observations.
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Table 27: Variance Decomposition of Excess-Return Innovations (Post-1998)
Share of Interest-Rate News Share of Excess-Return News
Horizon Maturity (months) Maturity (months)
(months) 6 12 24 60 120 6 12 24 60 120
1 0.94 0.80 0.42 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.20 0.58 0.87 0.91
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
2 0.97 0.88 0.53 0.16 0.10 0.03 0.12 0.47 0.84 0.90
(0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
3 0.97 0.92 0.62 0.19 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.38 0.81 0.87
(0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
4 0.97 0.95 0.68 0.22 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.32 0.78 0.86
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
5 0.97 0.74 0.25 0.16 0.03 0.26 0.75 0.84
(0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
6 0.98 0.79 0.28 0.18 0.02 0.21 0.72 0.82
(0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
9 0.97 0.90 0.40 0.23 0.03 0.10 0.60 0.77
(0.01) (0.04) (0.09) (0.10) (0.01) (0.04) (0.09) (0.10)
12 0.95 0.49 0.26 0.05 0.51 0.74
(0.04) (0.10) (0.12) (0.04) (0.10) (0.12)
15 0.97 0.58 0.29 0.03 0.42 0.71
(0.03) (0.11) (0.14) (0.03) (0.11) (0.14)
18 0.97 0.66 0.30 0.03 0.34 0.70
(0.02) (0.10) (0.15) (0.02) (0.10) (0.15)
21 0.97 0.72 0.29 0.03 0.28 0.71
(0.01) (0.10) (0.15) (0.01) (0.10) (0.15)
24 0.76 0.29 0.24 0.71
(0.09) (0.15) (0.09) (0.15)
This table presents estimates of β
(n)
y (h) and β
(n)
ex (h) from equation 15, the shares of variance of
excess-return innovations due to interest-rate news and excess-return news, respectively. Newey-
West corrected standard errors are given below coefficient estimates to account for overlapping
observations.
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Table 28: Variance Decomposition of Excess-Return Innovations (Post-1998 (no
ZLB))
Share of Interest-Rate News Share of Excess-Return News
Horizon Maturity (months) Maturity (months)
(months) 6 12 24 60 120 6 12 24 60 120
1 0.96 0.81 0.43 0.14 0.11 0.04 0.19 0.57 0.86 0.89
(0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
2 0.97 0.89 0.52 0.16 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.48 0.84 0.87
(0.01) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
3 0.98 0.93 0.61 0.21 0.18 0.02 0.07 0.39 0.79 0.82
(0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
4 0.97 0.96 0.69 0.26 0.25 0.03 0.04 0.31 0.74 0.75
(0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09)
5 0.98 0.75 0.29 0.29 0.02 0.25 0.71 0.71
(0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10)
6 0.99 0.81 0.34 0.35 0.01 0.19 0.66 0.65
(0.01) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11) (0.01) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11)
9 0.98 0.93 0.48 0.51 0.02 0.07 0.52 0.49
(0.01) (0.04) (0.09) (0.11) (0.01) (0.04) (0.09) (0.11)
12 0.97 0.56 0.59 0.03 0.44 0.41
(0.04) (0.11) (0.13) (0.04) (0.11) (0.13)
15 0.98 0.64 0.68 0.02 0.36 0.32
(0.02) (0.10) (0.12) (0.02) (0.10) (0.12)
18 0.98 0.72 0.71 0.02 0.28 0.29
(0.02) (0.09) (0.11) (0.02) (0.09) (0.11)
21 0.97 0.77 0.74 0.03 0.23 0.26
(0.01) (0.09) (0.13) (0.01) (0.09) (0.13)
24 0.82 0.78 0.18 0.22
(0.09) (0.18) (0.09) (0.18)
This table presents estimates of β
(n)
y (h) and β
(n)
ex (h) from equation 15, the shares of variance of
excess-return innovations due to interest-rate news and excess-return news, respectively. Newey-
West corrected standard errors are given below coefficient estimates to account for overlapping
observations.
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Table 29: Variance Decomposition of Excess-Return Innovations (no ZLB)
Share of Interest-Rate News Share of Excess-Return News
Horizon Maturity (months) Maturity (months)
(months) 6 12 24 60 120 6 12 24 60 120
1 0.90 0.73 0.41 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.27 0.59 0.83 0.86
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
2 0.95 0.80 0.48 0.21 0.17 0.05 0.20 0.52 0.79 0.83
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
3 0.96 0.85 0.54 0.25 0.22 0.04 0.15 0.46 0.75 0.78
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
4 0.97 0.90 0.61 0.28 0.26 0.03 0.10 0.39 0.72 0.74
(0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
5 0.93 0.67 0.31 0.28 0.07 0.33 0.69 0.72
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
6 0.96 0.73 0.34 0.31 0.04 0.27 0.66 0.69
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
9 0.98 0.85 0.44 0.38 0.02 0.15 0.56 0.62
(0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
12 0.91 0.50 0.44 0.09 0.50 0.56
(0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09)
15 0.95 0.56 0.48 0.05 0.44 0.52
(0.03) (0.07) (0.10) (0.03) (0.07) (0.10)
18 0.97 0.64 0.52 0.03 0.36 0.48
(0.01) (0.07) (0.11) (0.01) (0.07) (0.11)
21 0.98 0.71 0.56 0.02 0.29 0.44
(0.01) (0.06) (0.13) (0.01) (0.06) (0.13)
24 0.78 0.60 0.22 0.40
(0.06) (0.14) (0.06) (0.14)
This table presents estimates of β
(n)
y (h) and β
(n)
ex (h) from equation 15, the shares of variance of
excess-return innovations due to interest-rate news and excess-return news, respectively. Newey-
West corrected standard errors are given below coefficient estimates to account for overlapping
observations.
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Table 30: Alternative Variance Decomposition of Excess-Return Innovations
Share of Variance Horizon Maturity (months)
of ER Innovations (months) 6 12 24 60 120
Var(ER News) 1 0.09 0.25 0.56 0.78 0.87
(0.02) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Var(IR News) 0.88 0.73 0.38 0.11 0.10
(0.22) (0.18) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02)
2Cov(IR News, ER News) 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.04
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
Var(ER News) 3 0.02 0.10 0.39 0.69 0.82
(0.00) (0.02) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Var(IR News) 0.94 0.82 0.50 0.17 0.16
(0.25) (0.21) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04)
2Cov(IR News, ER News) 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.02
(0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Var(ER News) 6 0.03 0.25 0.63 0.81
(0.01) (0.05) (0.09) (0.12)
Var(IR News) 0.94 0.70 0.27 0.25
(0.24) (0.17) (0.06) (0.06)
2Cov(IR News, ER News) 0.04 0.05 0.10 -0.06
(0.03) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10)
Var(ER News) 9 0.00 0.14 0.55 0.81
(0.00) (0.03) (0.09) (0.11)
Var(IR News) 0.96 0.84 0.39 0.35
(0.25) (0.20) (0.08) (0.08)
2Cov(IR News, ER News) 0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.16
(0.02) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13)
Var(ER News) 12 0.08 0.48 0.81
(0.02) (0.10) (0.13)
Var(IR News) 0.91 0.47 0.42
(0.21) (0.09) (0.10)
2Cov(IR News, ER News) 0.02 0.06 -0.23
(0.06) (0.12) (0.15)
Var(ER News) 24 0.17 0.87
(0.03) (0.19)
Var(IR News) 0.76 0.60
(0.12) (0.13)
2Cov(IR News, ER News) 0.08 -0.46
(0.09) (0.24)




Table B.1: Variance Decomposition of Excess-Return Innovations (4th-Order Poly-
nomial for Bootstrapping Procedure of the Current Zero-Coupon Yield Curve)
Share of Interest-Rate News Share of Excess-Return News
Horizon Maturity (months) Maturity (months)
(months) 6 12 24 60 120 6 12 24 60 120
1 0.88 0.66 0.41 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.34 0.59 0.85 0.91
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
3 0.96 0.81 0.55 0.23 0.12 0.04 0.19 0.45 0.77 0.88
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
6 0.93 0.70 0.31 0.12 0.07 0.30 0.69 0.88
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
9 0.97 0.82 0.41 0.12 0.03 0.18 0.59 0.88
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
12 0.88 0.50 0.14 0.12 0.50 0.86
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
15 0.93 0.56 0.16 0.07 0.44 0.84
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
18 0.96 0.64 0.19 0.04 0.36 0.81
(0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04)
21 0.98 0.72 0.23 0.02 0.28 0.77
(0.01) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.04)
24 0.79 0.26 0.21 0.74
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
This table presents estimates of β
(n)
y (h) and β
(n)
ex (h) from equation 15, the shares of variance of
excess-return innovations due to interest-rate news and excess-return news, respectively. Newey-
West corrected standard errors are given below coefficient estimates to account for overlapping
observations.
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Table B.2: Variance Decomposition of Excess-Return Innovations (Case 2: Time-
Varying Means and Time-Invariant Factor Loadings in Fitted Zero-Coupon Forecasts)
Share of Interest-Rate News Share of Excess-Return News
Horizon Maturity (months) Maturity (months)
(months) 6 12 24 60 120 6 12 24 60 120
1 0.89 0.73 0.41 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.27 0.59 0.84 0.89
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
3 0.96 0.86 0.55 0.24 0.17 0.04 0.14 0.45 0.76 0.83
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
6 0.95 0.72 0.32 0.22 0.05 0.28 0.68 0.78
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
9 0.98 0.85 0.42 0.27 0.03 0.15 0.58 0.73
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
12 0.91 0.49 0.30 0.09 0.51 0.70
(0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08)
15 0.95 0.57 0.33 0.05 0.43 0.67
(0.02) (0.05) (0.09) (0.02) (0.05) (0.09)
18 0.97 0.64 0.35 0.03 0.36 0.65
(0.01) (0.05) (0.10) (0.01) (0.05) (0.10)
21 0.98 0.72 0.36 0.02 0.28 0.64
(0.01) (0.05) (0.10) (0.01) (0.05) (0.10)
24 0.78 0.37 0.22 0.63
(0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.11)
This table presents estimates of β
(n)
y (h) and β
(n)
ex (h) from equation 15, the shares of variance of
excess-return innovations due to interest-rate news and excess-return news, respectively. Newey-
West corrected standard errors are given below coefficient estimates to account for overlapping
observations.
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3.9.2 Survey Forecasts of Yields
Forecasts of future Treasury yields are available at a monthly frequency for short
horizons and semi-annually for longer horizons (Table 1). In addition, the period over
which future interest rates are forecast varies between horizons and releases. While
available at a monthly frequency, forecasted end-dates are fixed at the quarterly
or yearly level. In order to construct consistent estimates of the average interest
rate between the forecast date and the forecasted horizon, I rely on the following
interpolation scheme. First, I make one key assumption about the very shortest
horizon forecasts (1-3 months), namely that the average forecast is evenly distributed
between months. For example, a 1-quarter ahead forecast (between January and
March) of 3% made on February 1 would assume that the average interest rate for
February and March would be 3%, giving a 2-month ahead forecast of the Treasury
bill rate. To be precise, I denote yt,t+1 as the average interest rate realized between
month t and t + 1.56 The very shortest horizon forecasts provided by the Blue Chip












(Et[yt,t+1 + yt+1,t+2 + yt+2,t+3]) for Jan, Apr, Jul, Oct
For forecasts occurring in March, June, September, and December, the 1-quarter
ahead forecast provided by Blue Chip is to the average of the previous two months’
56For example, if t corresponds with January, then this would be the average interest rate over
the month of January.
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realized values and the 1-month ahead expectation of interest rates. For forecasts
occurring in February, May, August, and November, the 1-quarter ahead forecast
provided by Blue Chip is the average of the previous month’s realized value and the
2-month ahead expectation of interest rates. For January, April, July, and October
the forecasted number provided by the survey is exactly the expectation over the
current quarter. I denote yEHt,t+k as the expectation of the average level of interest
rates made at time t for the period t to t+ k, which corresponds theoretically to the
“Expectations Hypothesis” component of nominal yields. Given this notation, I can
formally state the assumption as yEHt,t+k = y
BC
t,t+k. This assumption will hold exactly
when k = 3 and not when k = 1, 2.
Quarterly forecasts between two- and six-quarters ahead are formed based on
the average level of interest rates prevailing in that quarter. Formally, denote the
k-month ahead forecast made at t+k−3 as yBCt+k−3,t+k, which is the average expected











To construct forecasts from t to t + k, I simply average over forecasts for different
horizons. For example, in order to construct a 5-month ahead forecast on February 1,
I take the average of the 2-month ahead forecast and the “2-quarter ahead” forecast
provided by BCFF, which would give the average expected level of interest rates
between April and June. Thus, for horizons between four and eighteen months (two-
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 for Jan, Apr, Jul, Oct, k ∈ 6, 9, 12, 15, 18
In order to construct forecasts at horizons longer than six-quarters ahead, I utilize
yearly and long-term forecasts. Yearly forecasts between one- and six-years ahead are
formed based on the average level of interest rates prevailing in that year. Formally,
denote the k-month ahead forecast made at t + k − 12 as yBCt+k−12,t+k, which is the











Forecasts are only available at these horizons on a regular basis in March (1984-
1996), June (1997-2018), October (1983-1995), and December (1996-2018), due to
the fact that the date on which longer-term forecasts were made changed in 1996. In
addition, there is one instance in which these forecasts were made in January (2003)
and November (1985). Due to this varying coverage of forecasts, I present below
precise construction of average expected rates (yEHt,t+k) for horizons between two- and
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six-years ahead (k ∈ [19, 79]):












 , k ∈ 24, 36, 48, 60, 72















 , k ∈ 22, 34, 46, 58, 70















 , k ∈ 19, 31, 43, 56, 67

















 , k ∈ 31, 43, 56, 67, 79












 , k ∈ 27, 39, 51, 63, 75










 , k ∈ 27, 39, 51, 63












 , k ∈ 26, 38, 50, 62















 , k ∈ 25, 37, 49, 61, 73












 , k ∈ 25, 37, 49, 61
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The one assumption I make in constructing June forecasts in 2005 and 2008-2018
is that the expected average interest rate 13-16 months in the future equals the
expected average interest rate 16-19 months ahead, i.e. that yBC13,16 = y
BC
16,19. I make
this assumption since forecasts over the latter horizon are unavailable on those dates.
Long-term forecasts of interest rates are formed based on the expectation of the
average level of interest rates prevailing over a five-year period in the future. The
Blue Chip survey gives semi-annual estimates of expectations of average interest rates
either 6-10 or 7-11 years ahead.57 Formally, denote the k-month ahead forecast made
at t+ k− 60 as yBCt+k−60,t+k, which is the average expected level of interest rates in the











Forecasts are only available at long horizons on a regular basis in March (1986-1996),
June (1997-2018), October (1986-1995), and December (1996-2018), due to the fact
that the date on which long-term forecasts were made changed in 1996. In addition,
there is one instance in which these forecasts were made in January (2003). Due to this
varying coverage of forecasts, I present below precise construction of average expected
57While Blue Chip provides forecasts at horizons of 1-5 and 2-6 years ahead, I do not use this
information since it is already embedded in the yearly forecasts on those dates.
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rates (yEHt,t+k) for horizons between ten- and eleven-years ahead (k ∈ [121, 139]):
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, k ∈ 121
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